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ABSTRACT

If we begin with Fredric Jameson's summation that High Modernism concerns itself with
temporality, while postmodernism concerns itself with space, how do we trace the exchange of
the object of concern? Moreover, did philosophical preoccupations precipitate this supplantation
of questions of time by those of space? To attempt to answer this question, we examine two
distinct areas of critical theory, cultural theory and deconstruction, as presented within the
oeuvres of Jameson and Jacques Derrida, respectively. The question of temporality leads herein
to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and a critique of the variations on Heidegger's
conceptualizations of temporality created by Jameson and Derrida, and the role of those
variations within the broader pursuit of critical theory. Ultimately, this dissertation functions as
preparation for an examination of the moment at which, we preliminarily posit, the focus of
literary studies transfers from time to space: Late Modernism. While Jameson does not forward
this argument, we rely on his nomenclature and distinction.
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Introduction
I confess to you, Lord, that I still do not know what time is, and I further confess to you,
Lord, that as I say this, I know myself to be conditioned by time. – Augustine,
Confessions, Book XI

Despite the well-documented, and seemingly hypostatized, tenet that postmodernism
focuses on space where modernism obsessed over time, multiple strains of critical work that
attempt to theorize postmodernism nonetheless predicate themselves on certain suppositions
concerning temporality. As we shall see, specifically in the work of Fredric Jameson and
Jacques Derrida, these suppositions rarely receive explicit statement, and, rather, frequently incur
a multiplicity of definitions, often contradictory or unable to withstand scrutiny without resulting
in an unintentional paradox or aporia that contradicts the internal logic of a given critical mode.
We are, in fact, considering time, that which, as Augustine finds in his contemplations, to be
beyond his ken. A question that arises: if a critical theorist bases on her discourse on a
problematic conceptualization of temporality, does this not problematize the theory that depends
from that conceptualization of temporality? The three chapters of this section will examine the
multiplicitous qualities attributed to time, primarily in the work of Jameson, Derrida, and Martin
Heidegger. The second section will demonstrate the connection between temporality and trope
in Jameson's and Derrida's respective theoretical endeavors.
First, a caveat: this work states, as its goal, clarity. The purpose herein is not the
wholesale denigration or refutation of the work of either Jameson or Derrida, nor an expressive
argument for the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, which will play a significant role in this study.
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While the illation appears to be that critical theory seeks first to describe the postmodern relation
to temporality, this dissertation asks, what reification of conceptualizations of temporality occur
during the codification and examination of the conditions of postmodernity? To offer pure
description, without any trace of presumptive confabulation, would be to achieve pure
objectivity, a process and system generally held to be ludicrous in the postmodernist milieu.
The question, however, of the function and impact of critical theory will remain
implicitly moving under the surface. Is critical theory relevant in any way? Does it have any
detectable effect on the realms outside of literary studies? A preliminary answer, interrogatively
stated in a highly limited dichotomy that may prove to be false: if critical theory manifests no
consequences, then the underlying temporal suppositions of a specific train of theoretical thought
matters little beyond academic argument; if critical theory does produce palpable phenomena,
then the figurations of time upon which a theory has been predicated demands understanding so
that the theory may be understood. A third option, concerning the inconsequence of the
foundational formulation of temporality in conjunction with the centrality of critical theory to
any human project, combines the limitation of always finding ourselves in media res with the
beneficence of teleology as provided by a course of action inscribed with, and from, critical
theory. We, then, plot our escape from the cage with an imperfect understanding of the cage,
and so simplify the cage, or at worst, merely insist that the cage does not exist.
A fourth option, tied here to the example of Augustine, would be never to disremember
the paradox and aporia of temporality, that which we do not know, yet conditions us 1. That
disremembrance, as we will see in the work of Jameson and Derrida, leads to paradoxes of a self-

1

The writers examined in the second half of this work all share some relation to time as an aporia experienced
subjectively, and their respective uses of allusion as metaphor will be examined to demonstrate this stance.
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contradictory nature. In contrast, we perhaps cannot read Heidegger without understanding that
temporality, like Being, cannot be succinctly defined.
This work, as it now exists, comprises four chapters and an epilogue. The first examines
Fredric Jameson’s spatialization of temporality in relation to the philosophical concept of Event,
as here defined by Jameson, and supplemented by a sympathetic conceptualization of Event by
Slavoj Žižek, and this conceptualization of Event in relation to by Wyndham Lewis’ definition of
a bifurcated temporality dependent on the thought of Heraclitus and Plato, and the structuralist
categories of synchrony and diachrony. To be read both against and in tandem with Jameson’s
work, the second chapter details Jacques Derrida’s concept of dia-synchrony, and its relation to
Event, as supplemented not by Žižek’s definition, but through the phenomenology of Edmund
Husserl.
After the establishment of the temporality required for the theorizations of both Jameson
and Derrida, the third chapter turns toward a temporality neither, after Lewis, Platonic nor
Heraclitean, nor structuralist in the terms of synchrony and diachrony. To do so, we return to
Jameson, and, particularly, his reading and use of the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, as well as
the implications the inherent temporality of Jean-Paul Sartre’s seriality, in comparison to the
conceptualization of ecstatic temporality as forwarded by Heidegger. The fourth chapter returns
as well, but to Derrida and his conceptualization of dia-synchrony and its relationship to khora
that appears frequently during the final third of his career. Although having been introduced
prior to the fourth chapter, from Derrida’s concept of khora, we direct our attention to its
relationship to trope, specifically metonymy and synecdoche, and posit metaphor as the
alternative to metonymy, and the difference between the two tropes with regard to temporality.

4

Finally, in the epilogue, we offer an extended metaphor to describe the interaction the synchrony,
diachrony, and ecstatic temporality, with the intention of how they may within the same text.
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Chapter 1: The Elevation of Spatiality over Temporality in Fredric Jameson's Map
of Time
The following chapter comprises five sections. The first argues Jameson’s spatialization
of the question of temporality; the second places Jameson’s conceptualization of temporality
within the discourse on time from Wyndham Lewis’ Time and Western Man; the third turns
from Lewis’ conceptualizations of time as Platonic or Heraclitean toward the implication and
relation of these conceptualizations to Event; the fourth further turns, from Lewis, through Event,
and to the structuralist conceptualization of time as synchronic moments within a diachronic
flow; and the fifth tests the possibilities of constructing such a map of time through a
methodology frequently employed by Jameson himself to consider dialectical possibilities.

A. The Territory
In the first chapter of Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist,
Fredric Jameson examines briefly the rhetorical tropes employed by Lewis and their significance
(25-34). For Jameson, the figure of metaphor in Lewis exists as an offering, a presentment given
for the sole purpose of being sacrificed, for being obliterated: "in Lewis...metonymy is read
against metaphor, as its determinate negation: [metaphor] thus becomes a sign of the
devaluation of inspiration itself, and of the art sentence" (30). Jameson positions the
hierarchizing of metonymy over metaphor in Lewis as a complex process, not merely the "simple
substitution of metonymy for metaphor" (31). The point Lewis makes via this process,
according to Jameson's reading, involves the mechanization of literary production, as the
devaluation of inspiration, and the overturning of metaphor in a tradition stretching back to
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Aristotle. Despite his own characterization of Lewis as an "elitist" who stood against the "rising
tide of mass mediocrity," Jameson, in quintessentially Jamesonian dialectical fashion, finds
Lewis' mechanization of literature, through the emphasis on metonymy over metaphor,
ultimately to be part of the democratization of literature. Jameson's analysis of Lewis
synthesizes the patrician and the plebeian.
This dialectical movement, presumably with a vision of a Marxist utopia lurking
somewhere yet to be glimpsed in the future, should not be the focus here. Although a reading
that would allow one to attribute to Wyndham Lewis the appellation of "demotic" provides a
subject interesting in itself, Jameson's reading of Lewis' preference for metonymy constitutes the
groundwork for the rest of this volume of criticism. For example, in the chapter already being
discussed and in the "Prologue," Jameson draws from Lewis' tropical play the justification of his
accession of Lewis' work as a foundation of the future that will be postmodernism: "the
aggressive deconstruction of metaphor and the organic in Lewis can be seen as an anticipation of
the poststructuralist assault on the Romantic valorization of organic form and symbol" (30).
Though the phrase "the poststructuralist assault on the Romantic" may give us occasion to turn
toward the work of Paul de Man, that will not yet occur. The most significantly telling feature of
Jameson's Wyndham Lewis: The Modernist as Fascist, which may or not be treated as a
synecdoche and then metonymically applied to the much of Jameson's other work and many
strains of critical theory, is the implied temporality. Jameson presents a flattened temporality
here, time as a two-dimensional line in its absolute construction. One may protest that to discuss
Jameson requires the conception of temporality in dialectical terms, but, even dialectically, the
movement of temporality always precedes in a Newtonian fashion, even when the embodiment
of that temporality is a "step-by-step dismantling" (31). Within Jameson's conceptualization of
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the temporal, and with regard to the dialectical movement toward utopia common to his work
until utopia becomes limited to thought2 in Archaeologies of the Future, whether to raise or to
raze a particular building is utterly inconsequential.
The work of Lewis, however, presents a difficulty for Jameson's reading; time, and
specifically the Bergsonian "Time Cult" at which Lewis aims much of his vitriol in the polemic
Time and Western Man, partially frustrates any attempt to establish a dialectical movement.
Certainly, duration as described by Henri Bergson and the temporality of a dialectic process are
not the same; they do, however, require the assumption of the same generalized linear movement
of time, drawn, according to Lewis himself, from Heraclitus (Time and Western Man 232).
What then offers itself as most relevant in Lewis is Lewis' own distinction between two main
thrusts of temporality underpinning Western thought: that of the "Ionian naturalism" of the
unending flow as drawn from Heraclitus, and that of the Platonic "something indestructible and
constant behind the phenomenal flux" (233).
For Lewis, these two stances on temporality have not remained distinct. In words Lewis
offers a few pages later after an exploration of the effects of these two notions of temporality:
"The gap has closed up. Today we are all one. This question is whether we should rejoice or
not at this reconciliation; and probably our answer will depend upon which side of the ancient
conflict we think that the opposition has been resolved, and then whether our interests lie on that
side or the other" (237, italics original). In the terms Lewis sets forth in Time and Western Man,
Jameson has chosen a side in the conflict and has accepted the resolution; Jameson's reading
differs, however, in that the constant proves to be the dialectic, and Lewis' closed gap would

2

As Jameson concludes Archaeologies of the Future: "utopia as a form is not the representation of radical
alternatives; it is rather simply the imperative to imagine them" (416).

8

seem to support that point. And that point is essential to Jameson's work: though later, such as
in Archaeologies of the Future and then The Antinomies of Realism, Jameson seemingly
acquiesces to the unlikeliness of a truly totalizing dialectical process, at this point in his work,
the Marxist dialectic yet remains Jameson's constant, a constant through which the flux of time
telelogically moves.
Lewis' own disdain for the "Time Cult," however, problematizes not only Jameson's
reading of Lewis, but also Lewis' own work. Flatness pervades Lewis' work, both as a writer and
a visual artist. Consider many of Lewis' illustrations in Blast, (with the notable exception of
Decoration for the Countess of Drogheda's House and its depth that affords a perspective on
nothing but perspective itself [Blast 1, vii]), which is not to forget Alcibiades or Workshop or
Composition or The Crowd. Nor should we forget, as contrast, examples in Lewis' oeuvre of a
style much closer to realism, with its depth, as evidenced in his portraits of his wife, Edith
Sitwell, Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot. Lewis' vorticist paintings, and his Tyro paintings as well, utilize
a flattened perspective that offers little or no depth. Instead of plunging completely into the
aesthetics of this depthlessness as antithesis and critique of the vanishing perspective developed
in the Renaissance, which seems a more fitting pursuit for an art historian, the focus here will be
on the implications of Lewis' flatness with regard to temporality. Simply, the lack of depth in
Lewis' works functions as a rebuttal of the aesthetic, ideological, and philosophical centralization
of temporality, and, ostensibly, the attendant "Time Cult." One requires time, in either of the
two linear formulations mentioned by Lewis and reported above, to conceptualize the space
represented. To imagine distance is to imagine the passing of time in imagined movement. In
this flattened perspective, we view the pure action of the vortex, not necessarily out of time, but
as Ezra Pound will attempt to demonstrate in The Cantos, in all time.
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With this flatness and its relation to temporality in mind, the opportunity arises to draw
from Jameson's work on Lewis a preliminary distinction concerning the representation of
flattened space in Lewis. To judge a book by its cover, Jameson's Fables of Aggression:
Wyndham Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist features Lewis' self-portrait Mr. Wyndham Lewis as a
Tyro. What constitutes flatness in the artform of writing? For Jameson, that flattened
perspective derives from the conversational form of Tarr (47). Certainly, the endless chattiness
of the conversations between Kreisler and the eponymous Tarr point to a decided flatness of
scene and characters without depth, a celebration of the flowing surface, which is to place Lewis,
in a Jamesonian fashion, into the proto-poststructuralist milieu.
Jameson preemptively furthers this point in his discussion of Tarr by moving from the
early assumption of metonymy as the death of metaphor to the accretive metonymy of "sheerly
additive sentence production" (31). Metonymy then becomes linked, for Jameson, with the
allegorical function of Tarr and Kriesler as synecdoches for England and Germany, respectively
(Fables 90-96), for certainly Tarr insists on his Englishness in contrast to Kriesler's Germanness
during the fictionalized fomentation of the First World War: "The English are stupid hypocrites
then!" jibes Kriesler, to which Tarr retorts, "The Germans are uncouth but zealous liars!" (Tarr
194, italics original). In this question of national allegory, which is staged metonymically
through synecdochical representations, Jameson turns toward the work of Jacques Lacan and the
invalidation of such a type of artistic production by the reality of the First World War itself
(103). In later Jameson, to be discussed elsewhere, this particular end of national allegory does
not constitute the end of his repeated focus on allegory in general, and his return, and even
recuperation, of national allegory in The Geopolitical Aesthetic.
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In his reading of Lewis, Jameson replaces metaphor with metonymy, then incorporates
metonymy and synecdoche into allegory; as a result, and after Lewis' example, time succumbs to
space. Consider this process in Wyndham Lewis: The Modernist as Fascist with regard to
Jameson's later assertion that "our daily life, our psychic experience, our cultural languages are
today dominated by categories of space, rather than by categories of time, as in the preceding
period of High Modernism" (Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 16),
with its extraordinary and essential footnote that ties synecdoche to High Modernism and
metonymy to postmodernism, and thus, if we accept this characterization, obviates metaphor
from any discussion of the twentieth century art (420).
Allegory remains consistent, and for Jameson, demands some kind of essential pairing
with reading time and the synchronic; but the diachronic always remains as well. At worst, the
elevation of the synchronic over the diachronic, or vice-versa, or their antinomical non-synthesis,
seems to depend upon which Jameson one reads and that particular Jameson's preference and
purpose. Jameson plays both sides of the board. The metaphor of chess, however, lacks a
certain postmodernist spatialization when one considers the complex interplay of clock time;
game time; the sequence of moves within a game; the history of an attack or defense known by
serious players; the ability of an adequate player to form a hypothesis as toward future moves by
her opponent; and the unity of all these forms of temporality within the clearly demarcated limits
of a two-dimensional space divided into sixty-four equal squares, symmetrically divided between
light and dark. Jameson, rather, with regard to conceptualizations of temporality, plays a slew of
different characters in an online multiplayer game, like a many-limbed version of William
Blake's Urizen, each of his manifold hands playing avatars against, and in conjunction with, each
other simultaneously in the reading time of the game. Jameson's implied aggregation of
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conceptualizations of temporality runs toward the expansive and the atemporal, or, in a manner
we will discuss in relation to Jamesonian allegory in Section 2 herein, toward "the ultimate
horizon of human history as a whole...in the whole complex sequence of the modes of
production" (The Political Unconscious 76).
Consider the following list of examples. Each inflection of temporality yields a variation,
a modulation, a valence. The Jameson of Postmodernism decries the loss of the diachronic sense
of history and the annihilative victory of space over time that defines postmodernism; the
Jameson of Wyndham Lewis gladly accepts Lewis' attack on the "Time Cult," and directs it
toward his own project with its preoccupation with allegory. The Jameson of The Seeds of Time
offers that "perhaps we can affirm that postmodern time has become space anyhow" (21), a
suggestion which ultimately may be of no concern for time and space are but one pair of four
"postmodern antinomies" Jameson identifies (8). This explication may be synthesized, with a
few caveats, to be understood as always to be pointing toward the other (time toward space, at
least), even as we find ourselves mired in the postmodern "eternal present" (70-71). The
Jameson of "The Antinomies of Postmodernity," collected in The Cultural Turn, in comparison
to the loss of time "anyhow 3," bemoans the corporatized "effacement of the temporalities that
seemed to govern an older period of modernity, modernism, and modernization alike" (60). The
Jameson of Valences of the Dialectic reverts to Lewis' version of the Platonic unchanging
Eternal hidden behind all flux, but with the Eternal specifically figured as an eidos of utopia, a
utopia "no longer in time," and that "cannot be imagined as lying ahead of us in historical time as
an evolutionary or even a revolutionary possibility" (612). The Jameson of "The Ideologies of
the Text," later collected in The Ideologies of Theory, Vol. 1, advances the allegory of
3

Always in Jameson, a certain Schadenfreude concerning the loss of temporality lurks; joy, in the German, perhaps
should be replaced with "barely contained euphoria."
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synchronic "reading time" (212) in contradistinction to and in conjunction with the diachronic
concept of the "storehouse of ideas of things that trigger our recognition of them in the language
of art" (222). The Jameson of "The End of Temporality" turns toward allegory (a failed, nonJamesonian phenomenological allegory at that) to demonstrate the postmodern "suppression of
history and even...of time and temporality itself" (701). The Jameson of "Marx's Purloined
Letter" lauds the allegorical element of Derridean spectrality as "the moment in which space
gives way to time" (Valences of the Dialectic 147). And the Jameson of The Antinomies of
Realism posits, under the guise of affect theory, an elevation of reading time, only to be
imagined in a double helix with the "genealogy of storytelling and the tale" (10).
These myriad conceptualizations of temporality found in Jameson create a metaspatialization, a commentary on the question of temporality and spatialization itself. Other than
cognitive mapping, the most familiar tool of spatialization to readers of Jameson stands as the
Greimas rectangle, which appears first in The Prison-House of Language (most notably 163-68).
To attempt to map temporality with a Greimas rectangle, we would first require two terms,
which, in his own work, Jameson repeatedly gives: diachrony and synchrony. As he employs
Greimas "semantic structure," Jameson begins with S; then adds the "opposite of the term S:" –S,
also nominated as a "positive anti-S;" and a third term, Ŝ, which is "a simple negation" and a
"simple not-S" (164). The fourth term, –Ŝ, is "the 'negation of a negation' familiar from
dialectical philosophy" (166). As Jameson offers in "The Vanishing Mediator; or, Max Weber as
Storyteller," the "advantage [of the Greimas rectangle] lies in the possibility of generating other
supplementary and related elements out of that initial pair of contradictory terms" (The
Ideologies of Theory, Vol. 2 13). Therefore, let our S be diachrony; let our –S be synchrony; and
now let us consider the intractable problem.
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Certainly, we may quibble with allowing diachrony and synchrony to stand as opposites
of each other, although Jameson himself forwards this argument in "The Vanishing Mediator,"
which begins with diachrony, and then, again after reading a different selection from Aldrigas
Greimas, states that "the problem of narrative analysis may be seen as the reverse of...history; for
where history involves some basic conceptual breakthrough to the realities of change and of the
diachronic in general, narrative already presupposes some fundamental feeling of change which
we are then called on to account for in synchronic and analytic terms" (The Ideologies of Theory,
Vol. 2 17-18). As based on Jameson's own argument, let us cede him this point: the opposite of
diachrony is synchrony. What then would be the third term, the "positive anti-S?" Would that
not be a conceptualization of eternity that accommodates both diachrony and synchrony? What
of the fourth term, then, the "negation of negation?" To remain true to dialectical thought, we
have nothing remaining with which to fill the fourth term except for the non-existence of time,
which thus ends our dialectical procession through the Greimas rectangle in atemporality; time
vanishes along with the mediator. This argument, it should be noted, is not dissimilar in
construction, if not intent, to the four-fold argument, proffered by J.M.E. McTaggart in "The
Unreality of Time," which is an argument that lends itself, retroactively and nicely, to
representation in a Greimas rectangle. We could represent quadrilaterally, although in an
arguably Procrustean manner, McTaggart's "A-series," "B-series," and "C-series" of time, which
leads to the conclusion of the non-existence of time we could call the [ ]-series 4.

4

Briefly, in McTaggart's thought, the A-series describes the movement of time from past to present, and from
present to future, which indicates change. The B-series, however, depends upon the positional relation between
events, and not the movement of time itself, but yet indicates the direction of movement; an event Q (a variable
intentionally chosen here with regard to the presentation, in the extremely limited omniscient narration of To the
Lighthouse, of the alphabetical internal discourse of Mr. Ramsay, who offers an example of the B-series in fictive
action [33-35]) occurs before an event R; and an event S follows an event R. In the C-series, according to
McTaggart, the order of events – not the movement of time or the positional relations between events – functions as
the determining factor. Following the Ramsayian notation, the C-series events could be S, Q, Z, R, and could occur
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A possible refutation of the immediately preceding argument, in which an analysis of
Jameson's adherence to the structuralist temporality ends as nihility, would be to argue that the
third term in the Greimas rectangle for time should not be eternity, but, rather, the materialist
dialectic. The first problem would be that the first term, diachrony as S, does not find its third
term of the "positive anti-S" in the movement of time as described by dialectical materialism; in
fact, diachrony and dialectical time are far closer to being similar than antithetical. If, however,
we do accept the dialectic as the third corner of the rectangle, then what would be the fourth, the
"negation of negation?" Eternity5. Or, if the rebuttal continues that eternity functions simply as
a synonym for both and either dialectical materialism and/or G. W. F. Hegel's Weltgeist from
The Phenomenology of Spirit, then we once again find the "negation of negation" to be
atemporality, if time is understood as incorporating some element of change 6.
Or, again, if we accept Marx's famous claim of having "stood Hegel on his head," and
thus treat the Weltgeist as the negation of dialectical materialism (and, conversely, dialectical
as S, Q, Z, R or R, Z, Q, S. McTaggart, based on his own suppositions of the A-series as changing and the B- and
C-series as unchanging, argues against the B-series; then for the necessity of the A-series and C-series for time to
exist, but not the B-series; and then against the A-series as absurd, leading to the conclusion of the unreality of time.
The []-series suggested here, then, as the "negation of a negation" with regard to the application of Jameson's use of
a Greimas rectangle to McTaggart's notions of time, would require the negation of all series, or, rather, the
confirmation of absolute simultaneity; that is, temporality without sequence or order, temporality beyond the series
of synchronic moments that occur in a diachronic order. This resultant simultaneity, then, as anathema to myriad
branches of Marxism that incorporate the concept of dialectical materialism and have some teleological element,
leads to the conclusion of the inapplicability of the Greimas rectangle to time for Jameson's work. Or, to invert that
thought for an alternate conclusion, this exercise demonstrates that the simultaneous, and therefore unchanging,
temporality of the utopian telos may be reached only through the diachronic movement of time, which, in these
temporal terms presented here in relation to McTaggart, is a position Jameson has explicitly argued against in his
formulation of the concept of utopia as a "form" to be imagined in narrative, not distinctly as a telos reachable in
human praxis, in Archaeologies of the Future (all of which supposes "utopia" to be a static state to be achieved, an
absolute condition, such as "perfection"). Either conclusion suggests the difficulty in moving from a diachronic
march of history to a static utopian temporality, and also a great difficulty in Jameson's (and Marx's) work vis-à-vis
temporality.
5
In Book V of The City of God, Augustine works through a major argument, via a number of minor ones, that
counterposes "succession" to "eternity," the comparison of the sequential movement of moments to the perfect and
unchanging eternity of God, who is outside of time. In this thinking through herein of the application of the
Greimas rectangle to Jameson's preferred conceptualization of temporality, Augustine is the source of the idea of
eternity as the antithesis of diachrony.
6
See preceding footnote for a consideration of atemporality, not as an antithesis to eternity, but as absolute
simultaneity.
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materialism as the negation of the Weltgeist, which likely sounds more pleasing to a Marxian
thinker), then we have run out of corners on the rectangle. Either we stop with the Weltgeist, or
we simultaneously regress and expand to a pentagon that proceeds by supplementing negations,
thus destroying the equilaterally quadrisecting elegance and functionality of the Greimas
rectangle. The fifth corner would then be indifferent eternity as the negation of the idealism of
the Weltgeist, but we would then have recourse to a logical hexagon so that we may
accommodate atemporality as the negation of eternity7. Unfortunately, we still find ourselves
burdened with the dissatisfying condition of accounting for a temporality that presents itself as a
countermand to any and all conceptualizations of time8.
Unless, of course, time cannot be confined in a Greimas rectangle, which Jameson admits
in Valences of the Dialectic, with the caveat that Greimas adduced a "narrative
unconscious...presumably out of time" (491-92). Must we then admit that we do not know what
time is, that time is beyond logical representation? Or is time a special case, an a priori
condition? We would therefore find ourselves in the position of ostensibly relying on the
metaphysics of Immanuel Kant from The Critique of Pure Reason to corroborate dialectical
materialism as deployed in Jamesonian cultural criticism. To answer these questions, Jameson
turns to Paul Ricoeur's three mimeses from Time and Narrative to demonstrate, ultimately,
Ricoeur's failure in recognizing that "human time in late capitalism has undergone a kind of
structural mutation" (494).

7

In the preceding, we may glimpse another great difficulty of temporality: the semantic. Depending on context,
"eternity" denotes – at least – the following, both as occasionally discrete terms and in various combinations, in not
only philosophical, but also conversational usage: (A.) an unending series; (B.) absolute and unchanging stasis;
(C.) the complete absence of time; or (D.) the presence of all time as simultaneity.
8
As will be demonstrated later, this dissatisfaction relates to the technicization of temporality. When Heidegger, in
"The Question Concerning Technology," proposed that the new epoch of life would be, and was being, defined by
the relation to Being as determined by technology, he did not explicitly address the application of technology to
time.
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Two significant implications stand forth. First, Jameson's defense of the inherent
spatialization of the process of a Greimas rectangle depends upon an ultimately Freudian
psychoanalysis; any discussion finds itself instantaneously off-kilter the moment the work of
Sigmund Freud appears to counteract Heideggerean temporality for that introduction of
psychoanalysis elides one of the great differences between Heidegger's work and Husserl's
phenomenology, to mention only one case. Secondly, as demonstrated above herein, Jameson's
work quite often depends upon the very "kind of structural mutation" in postmodernity Jameson
frequently laments. As noted above, Jameson employs the Greimas rectangle not infrequently;
he himself points out, the flattening of time into a pure synchrony must be assumed. And
although he cites the temporal "structural mutation" of postmodernity, Jameson's recognition,
and even periodization, of our supposedly mutated current conceptualization of temporality does
not prevent him from plotting, on a modified Greimas rectangle, the historical novel in "post1848 literature," with regard to the work of Georg Lukàcs, in The Antinomies of Realism (275).
Jameson's temporal positions, true to the form of postmodernity, exist as multiplicities,
undefined quanta, even rhizomes. From occasion to occasion, the value of the variable of
temporality shifts: Jameson lauds synchrony with regard to the Greimas rectangle; elsewhere,
such as in the upcoming discussion of the lengthy chapter on temporality in Valences of the
Dialectic, Jameson's states his goal as the formalization of the conceptualization of diachrony
"neither existential nor objective, which is historical time as such" (484).
To create an analogy (an extended metaphor), this diachronic litany, which we should
now call a legend, of Jameson's temporal positions circles upon itself, always orbiting a central
point, and therefore roughly describing a sphere. At the core of this sphere, one finds synchronic
allegory, and we can now begin to visualize Jameson's myriad temporal positions. Over the
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surface of that sphere, on the surface of this world, in a process analogous to the "uneven
development" of globalization, we could plot Jameson's temporal positions and construct a globe
of time. Given our understanding of the Mercator Projection, Jameson's adherence to the twodimensional synchronic/diachronic structuralist split, and Jameson's repeated implicit and
explicit statements that the question of temporality has become inconsequential, we should have
no hesitation in regard to flattening our globe of time into a virtually two-dimensional map of
time. The former center of a four-dimensional world (in Newtonian terms), given that we are
adequate cartographers, now lies where the Prime Meridian and Equator timelessly meet, that
intersection itself a purely spatial allegory for the core of Jamesonian allegory.
Nonetheless, at the conclusion of Postmodernism, Jameson offers a few words on the
failure of cognitive mapping as a project:
the strength of this formulation is also its fundamental weakness: the transfer of
the visual map from city to globe is so compelling that it ends up re-spatializing
an operation we were supposed to think of in a different manner altogether. A
new sense of global social structure was supposed to take on figuration and to
replace the purely perceptual substitute of the geographical figure; cognitive
mapping, which was meant to have a kind of oxymoronic value and to transcend
the limits of mapping altogether, is, as a concept, drawn back by the force of
gravity of the black hole of the map itself (one of the most powerful of all human
conceptual instruments) and therein cancels out its own impossible originality
(416).

18

If we can imagine Jameson's process of mapping time as described above, we are now
left with a dilemma, or dilemmata. If cognitive mapping cannot function for space, can it
function for time? If cognitive mapping can function for time, even though it cannot function for
space, is time then separable from space? Is time substantively different from space, capable of
reduction to an independent phenomenon, a being there where no there is necessary? If, by
Jameson's own admission, the cognitive mapping of space is a Sisyphean task, wherein the
metaphorical gravity of the map always triumphs, should we not make the same claim for any
cognitive map of temporality? If the alluring cognitive map of space ultimately leads to the
Borgesian confusion of the map with the territory, should we not also say the same about any
map of temporality? And is not, as in "On Exactitude in Science," the creation of such a map the
destruction of the territory, the mapping of time as the destruction of time, a philosophical – even
ideological – act, on Jameson's part, rather than a critical description?

B. Uneven Development, by Quadrants, by the Whole Map
The argument above that begins with the litany of the conceptualizations of temporality
shares, in fact, a basic structural premise with an argument made by Jameson himself in "First
Impressions," his review of Slavoj Žižek's The Parallax View. Jameson posits, early in the
review, a functional distinction between critical theory and philosophy: "theory...has no vested
interests inasmuch as it never lays claim to an absolute system, a non-ideological formulation of
itself and its 'truths;' indeed, always itself complicit in the being of current language, it has only
the vocation and never-finished task of undermining philosophy as such, by unraveling
affirmative statements and propositions of all kinds" (7). We may view in this statement, with
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regard to the outline of a method of mapping Jameson's various temporal positions, as a
justification of those multiple positions by Jameson himself. Unfortunately, Jameson accuses
Žižek of exactly the same approach, but in the terms of parallax: "in parallax thinking...the
object can certainly be determined, but only indirectly, by way of triangulation based on the
incommensurability of the observations" (8), which, Jameson argues, opens critical theory to
other dangers. The "provisional terms" of critical theory:
get reified (and even commodified...), and eventually turn into systems in their
own right. The self-consuming movement of the theoretical process gets slowed
down and arrested, its provisional words turn into names and thence into
concepts, the anti-philosophy becomes a philosophy in its own right. My
occasional fear is, then, that by theorizing and conceptualizing the impossibilities
designated by the parallax view, Žižek may turn out to have produced a new
concept and a new theory after all, simply by naming what it is probably better
not to call the unnameable (8).
Despite his qualms over Žižek's theory in this case, throughout his career Jameson
engages in exactly such a parallaxical process in his multiple conceptions of an "unnameable,"
time9. As a prelude for a later section, and as a reminder from the future, in numerous places
Heidegger refers to time as Being, which, as his own thought changes, he writes sous rature,
which designates its unnameability, as either Being or time.

9

In his Platonic dialogue with Socrates, Cratylus, protégé of Heraclitus, leaves in silence to ponder the slippage of
the meaning in words; Aristotle, in Metaphysics, tells us Cratylus forsook speech rather to gesture simply with his
finger (1010a-15). Jameson's resistance to any anti-Cratyltic reification of the terminology of critical theory should
be kept in mind both with regard to the distinction between two types of temporality by Wyndham Lewis as cited
above and in the forthcoming discussion of the conceptualization of temporality in Derrida.
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None of the preceding necessarily negates Jameson's theorizing. To brush aside
brusquely the question of time vis-à-vis Jameson's work, however, risks an unintentional
contradiction that nullifies, in comparison, the possibly productive tension of a carefully
constructed paradox, within or without a Greimas rectangle. Despite his frequent aversions to
any consideration of time being anything other than being both a perpetually and momentarily
moot point, Jameson himself frequently turns toward the diachronic as rationalization and
justification of his theory. Jameson defends his position of the irreversibly postmodern and
globalized world repeatedly, from The Political Unconscious onward, with Ernst Bloch's concept
of "uneven development." After nearly four decades, one may question what requires the
repetition of Bloch's formulation; at a certain point, such a generalized and universal condition,
which we must hold in mind while theorizing, should be obvious and dully self-evident. Unless
Jameson's assumption is incorrect.
In almost each instance, Jameson posits anew that we can finally cease thinking in
Blochian terms of uneven development for global social conditions have become universal under
the aegis of postmodernity. Jameson makes this point, for example, in 1991,10 in
Postmodernism, thusly: "Ours is a more homogenously modernized condition; we no longer are
encumbered by the embarrassment of non-simultaneities and non-synchronicities. Everything
has reached the same hour on the great clock of development or rationalization [at least from the
perspective of the 'West']" (310, [brackets original]).

10

Given Jameson's incredible production of articles that then become collected as books, dating his work can be
difficult. For example, the quotation from The Seeds of Time comes from a Wellek Library Lecture, "The
Antimonies of Postmodernism," given in 1991, according to the same volume (xi), itself published in 1994. When
recollected and reprinted in The Cultural Turn, "The Antimonies of Postmodernity" and The Seeds of Time are
given the publication date of 1989 in the "Acknowledgements" (ix). As this has relevance for the argument herein,
the publication dates of individual volumes will be used, under the assumption that Jameson composed the work
contained within Postmodernism prior to that in The Seeds of Time, although that contains an implicit danger, but a
danger mitigated by the inherent spatialization of Jameson's own reading time.
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Soon thereafter, in 1994, in The Seeds of Time, Jameson finds uneven development
washed away by the river of time, in a Heraclitean nightmare of absolute change that
dialectically creates absolute homogeneity (17). In his own other words, "[N]othing but the
modern henceforth exists in Third World societies...with the qualification that under such
circumstances, where only the modern exists, 'modern' must now be rebaptized postmodern"
(20); the gap has again closed up for, working within the frame provided by Wyndham Lewis,
behind the Heraclitean flux there lies the unchanging eidos of postmodernity 11. This
relationship, in its way, functions dialectically, not coincidentally: the sublation of the thesis of
Heraclitean temporality and the antithesis of the eidos of postmodernity creates the synthesis of
spatialization (or globalization, in its socioeconomic, geopolitical guise), which Jameson, by
turns, views positively and negatively. Jameson himself, in one of his greatest moments of
cultural criticism, summarizes postmodernism, and its subsets and semblances, in the terms of
fashion12 in The Seeds of Time (17).

11

Whether we term this "postmodernity" as Jameson does, or frame it through the concept of Heideggerean "epoch"
presented in "The Question Concerning Technology" or the "episteme" of Michel Foucault from The Order of
Things, or through any other conceptual frame relating to the era or eon, the question is the totality of the change,
and any rate of change that is not instantaneous, which is the rate Jameson implies here.
12
Jameson at this point, however, does not admit the occurrence of the fashionable within intellectual pursuits. We
can trace, rather simply, in literary scholarship or critical theory, the succession of stars, with a following great
enough to push them and their work into some central position as a public intellectual with its attendant fame. In a
very brief and intrinsically flawed form here: Freudianism replaces New Criticism; Joseph Campbell's Jungian
archetypical criticism replaces Freudianism, the poststructuralists take center stage, and so on and so forth with
clusters of central figures, rather than a dominant central figure, forming as we move fully into postmodernity. We
can find a ready example of both the centrality of certain figures and the element of fashion in this milieu in the
second film of director Denys Arcand's engaging comedy/comedic drama/tragedy trilogy, concerning the lives of
Québécois intellectuals (The Decline of the American Empire [1986]; The Barbarian Invasions [2003]; Days of
Darkness [2007]). Here follows a transcript of a brief conversation among a small group of friends immediately
preceding the climax of the second film:
Rémy:
Pierre:
Dominique:
Claude:
Rémy:

We've been everything: separatists, supporters of indenpendantists, sovEreignists,
sovereignity-associants...
At first, we were existentialists.
We read Sartre and Camus.
Then Fanon. We became anti-colonialists.
We read Marcuse and became Marxists.
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And as recently as 2009 in Valences of the Dialectic, uneven development no longer
appears to be a consideration: "there are no prehistoric peoples, no premodern survivals: tribals
listen to their portables and nomads watch their DVDs; in mountain villages without electricity
as well as in the most dismal refugee camps the dispossessed follow world current events and
listen to the vacuous speeches of our president" (430). Although Jameson does not explicitly
mention the obliteration of uneven development, the presence and effects of which one can no
longer find inscribed in the text of the world; Bloch's concept informs this assessment, especially
in light of the work quoted above from The Seeds of Time. The implicit and profound
generalization here functions only problematically, creating the possibility of numerous onerous
ramifications, especially if we continue to compare Jameson's work to itself. In 2003, "The End
of Temporality," for example, Jameson historicizes early twentieth-century Europe and its
nascent modernism, via the work of Arno Meyer, as within the confines of "existential uneven
development," wherein "only a minute percentage of the social and physical space of the West

Pierre:
Alessandro:
Diane:
Rémy:
Pierre:
Dominique:
Claude:
Pierre:
Claude:

Marxist-Leninists.
Trotskyites.
Maoists.
After Solzhenitsyn, we changed, we became structuralists.
Situationists.
Feminists.
Deconstructionists.
Is there an –ism we haven't worshipped?
Cretinism.

Claude offers the final line of this litany without irony, which yet may or may not intend a deadpan irony
on the part of director Denys Arcand. Regardless, this scene dramatizes well the murky state between a form of life
that may be viewed, near the extremes, as the admirably restless and relentless non-ideological intellectual in the
ideological panoply of postmodernity, or as the dilettantish fashionista of critical theory, the criticism of whom is
not for having read widely, but for the sequence of postures that accompany each newly adopted mode of critique
and float on the surface current of novelty. Or, if we prefer, critical theory itself, and not the art it critiques, assumes
the position of functioning as the avant garde, with all the necessary acceleration that implies, such as can be
glimpsed in Timotheus Vermeulen and Robin van der Akker's essay "Notes on Metamodernism," which offers a
fine, brief overview of a number of attempts at the vanguard to name the new era after postmodernism (postpostmodernism, hypermodernism, digimodernism, automodernism, altermodernism, etc.) before they themselves
argue for their own nomenclature "metamodernism" (3-4).
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could be considered only fully modern in technology or production or substantially bourgeois in
its class culture" (699, emphasis mine). This process of modernization in Europe would not be
completed until after the Second World War, meaning that the artistic and philosophical
progenitors of High Modernism often lived in two worlds simultaneously and maintained a
"sensitivity to deep time" (ibid.).
Unfortunately, we can draw a few unpleasant conclusions. Either Europe and the
Europeans of the first half of the twentieth century, with their plodding developing and lingering
premodern sensibilities, were, unlike the "tribals" and their "portables," a special case, which
opens Jameson's work to justifiable criticism from anyone interested in any area of study in
which the terms postcolonialism, cultural hegemony, and Orientalism have a certain cachet; or,
postmodernity and modernity (and postmodernism and High Modernism), in comparison to each
other as cultural moments, comprise substantive and radical differences. The recognition itself
of the pronounced differences between modernity and postmodernity, then, becomes quite
significant. According to Jameson, we must understand the markedly diachronic slog of
European culture into modernism, while the rest of the world finds itself subsumed completely,
instantaneously, and irrevocably, into the synchronic absolutism of spatialized postmodernity,
which we can attribute, as so many others13 do, to the speed (occasionally, of communication)
and the transformative force of transnational capital. Rather than leveling accusations, the latter
consequence, that which entails the recognition of a radical difference between modernity and
postmodernity vis-à-vis uneven development, seems much more in the ideological spirit of
Jameson's oeuvre. To accept the second position, which Jameson's varied promulgations of the
concept of uneven development elucidate, demands, however, a disavowal and logical

13

These others will be briefly treated in the forthcoming section on Heidegger.
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nullification of any concept of A Singular Modernity, or, at the very least, significant
qualifications of this pronounced difference, which is to say very little at the moment of what
appears, perhaps, to be an unstated objective of The Antinomies of Realism and its looking
backward to Émile Zola, Leo Tolstoy, and George Eliot: the intimation of the creation of a Long
Twentieth Century, attempted without periodizing, exactly.
In an early work, Marxism and Form, Jameson explains the futility of seeking Walter
Benjamin's aura, as described in "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,"
because the ability to glimpse that aura "is available to the thinker only in a simpler cultural past"
(77). In many ways, by 1972, Jameson already sensed the alteration, the postmodernized
circumstances of human life, and, for Jameson, these conditions preclude any recognition of the
Benjaminian aura. In a notion that will return in the second section, Jameson's proposed
solution, at this point, is that allegory, which we could also call the synchronic, is the opposite of
the diachronic aura, which combines present and past, into "a kind of plenitude of existence"
(ibid.). And, as will also return in the next chapter, Jameson's implementation of the visceral,
reactive aspect of affect theory in The Antinomies of Realism foregrounds synchrony as opposed
to his earlier expression, as noted above, of the primacy of diachrony.
From this brief exploration of the multiplicity of conceptualization of temporality in
Jameson whether in the terms of synchrony/diachrony or as expressed in uneven development, a
few preliminary conclusions suggest themselves and their respective dialectical negations. If the
allegory of narrative, or allegory itself, does, in fact, hold the position of the center in Jameson's
work, then we can quote again Wyndham Lewis on the conflation of Heraclitean and Platonic
time: "The gap has closed up" in as much as allegory, along with the spatialization of
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globalization, provides some kind of eidetic function14, at least for Jameson's brand of Marxian
literary and cultural criticism. The ceaseless, diachronic, Heraclitean flux of narrative continues,
while narrative, as an allegory for this very movement of time, achieves stasis, and reading time
functions of the moment. Outwardly, this last sentence seems to be an expression of the Platonic
conceptualization of temporality as formulated by Lewis, and it is, as long as we ignore
Jameson's acquiescence to the totality of flowing narrative as the ultimate form. Again, as
mentioned earlier, to pinpoint Jameson's conceptualization of temporality, especially within the
terms of narrative (the diachronic) and allegory (atemporal eidos) and reading time (the
synchronic), depends upon which Jameson we read.
The issue of believing "all is narrative" implies origin, unless we read a circular text such
as James Joyce's Finnegans Wake that seeks to render the search for origin futile. The structure
of temporality affords the underlying complication for any of these tasks; if we choose a
diachronic temporality akin to Newtonian, "linear" time, what recourse do we have to
circularity15? If we search for origins, have we not already and irrevocably determined the
structure of temporality to, at least, a generalized specificity, and positioned ourselves exactly at
the metaxical intersection of synchrony and unidirectional diachrony? General, in that the
present always subsumes the past; specific, in that not only have we defined the direction of
time, but also, implicitly, discerned some sense of magnitude. Time becomes a vector because
of the inescapability of its absolute magnitude. We then, however, also may recognize, as Henri
Bergson did, the tendency to treat time as a constant, capable of being plugged into any equation
without qualification or quantification, as though it were the force of standard gravity on the
14

As the center of the map of time.
This is to let pass Nietzschean eternal recurrence, or some kind of conceptualization of the structure of
temporality as helical to synthesize both linearity and (at least the similitude of) recurrence, as opposed to helical to
synthesis synchrony and diachrony.
15
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surface of the Earth at sea level or, mostly importantly in the relation to time, the constant of the
speed of light in a vacuum. And here the greatest difficulty and opportunity to claim liberation
ensues.
The myriad spatial explorations begin with this implicit dictum of time as a constant: we
no longer have to consider it. Jameson makes a similar point in "The End of Temporality," but
begins by conceding the "epochal change" represented by spatialization (696), asserts that "to
position language at the center of things is also to foreground temporality" (706). Despite the
temporality indicated by language, spatialization continues its dominance in postmodernity
through what Jameson terms "existentialism," which he links to Heidegger, and which Jameson
sees as its function in postcolonialism: "existentialism" produces the recognition of
"innumerable others that renders vain and inconsequential my own experience of some essence I
might be" (710). After a brief passage on Bergson a la Deleuze, Jameson finds the postmodern
temporal condition as one of time reduced to a pure present and "a reduction to the body as the
present of time" (712). Speed, of course, still lurks here; the rapidity of the availability of news
of events from across the world, for example, demonstrates this function in an exceedingly
familiar fashion. It should very definitely be noted that the temporality Jameson views as having
been lost in the transformation from modernity to postmodernity is the diachronic, both in the
terms of "deep time" of a specific culture and general human history, and in the terms of the
individual life.
Jameson's tracing of the loss of self, beginning with the "existentialism" he misattributes
to Heidegger16, completely ignores core concepts of Being and Time and Dasein: mitsein and in-

16

Heidegger explicitly, even scornfully, refused the nomenclature of "existentialism" in "The Letter on Humanism,"
specifically in relation to the work of Jean-Paul Sartre (Pathmarks 245-259, specifically 250).
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der-Welt-sein, being-with and being-in-the-world, respectively, which both appear repeatedly in
Being and Time, along with the related concept of Sorge, care; Heidegger devotes the entirety of
Chapter Four in Division One to the explication of these concepts. And it is from this chapter
that we find a damaging, linearly pre-emptive rebuttal for Jameson's attribution of the role
Heidegger's "existentialism" played in the formation of spatialized postmodernity, with its
sufficient cause of the recognition of others: "in being with and toward others, there is a relation
of being from Dasein to Dasein...The relation of beings to each other then becomes a projection
of one's ownmost being toward oneself 'into another.' The other is a duplicate of the self" (121).
Present here is what Jameson calls "innumerable others that renders vain and inconsequential my
own experience of some essence I might be" ("End" 710). If we apply Jameson's equivocations
to Heidegger's exposition of the relation between self, others, and Dasein to Jameson's
conclusions concerning the result of Heideggerean "existentialism," then Jameson's conclusions
are logically valid only if all terms – self, others, and Dasein – are each "vain and
inconsequential17." The possible accusation of nihilism aside, which is one far too often
gleefully and glibly leveled at the work of any number of thinkers, Jameson's reading of
Heidegger, in this instance, contains severe flaws in its attempt at a manageable shorthand
expressed by the word "existentialism."
Jameson's answer, for even the casual reader, is collectivism, but if the individual must
inevitably find herself to be 'vain and inconsequential,' and she exists in some kind of
metonymical relationship to all other members of collective of which she is but one meaningless
part, then why are not all other members of that collective also 'vain and inconsequential' and
meaningless? The addition or multiplication of zero always results in a sum or product of
17

This distinction will return in the third chapter on Heidegger and temporality in relation to Heidegger's The
Concept of Time, and Jameson's The Antimonies of Realism.
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nothing; the Aristotelean whole cannot be greater than the sum of its parts if each and every part
has absolutely no mathematical value; the valuable collective cannot emerge from an
agglomeration of absolutely value-less, inconsequential individuals. Perhaps.

C. "Nihil est sine ratio."
We arrive at the point where we will examine the generation of situations within the
human sphere, if we have reached the point where we must consider the absolute lack of value of
a human individual, and by extension, the absolute lack of value of the action of a single
individual. How do situations occur? How do events happen without an agent? How do we
understand effect without causality? For the moment, we will turn from Jameson, and examine
the work of Slavoj Žižek, whose Event, has recently been issued by Penguin in a series of brief
philosophical works under the subtitle Philosophy in Transit. Thus far, John Caputo writes on
Truth; Barry Dainton on Self; and Slavoj Žižek on Event. They are short works, seemingly
written with compression and clarity in mind, so that a passive commuter could read the books
"in transit." In that spirit of concision, Žižek defines event as such: "an event is thus the effect
that seems to exceed its causes and the space of an event is that which opens up by the gap that
separates an event from its causes" (3, emphasis original). At this moment, Žižek chooses to
create a formulation, like Aristotelean emergence, in which the whole is greater than the sum of
its parts, an event "that seems to exceed its causes," which is implicitly to imbue those causes
with some value, however negligible, rather that proposing an event as an instance of creatio ex
nihilo.
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Žižek will, in fact, do exactly that in the immediately proceeding sentences: "Already
with this approximate definition, we find ourselves at the very heart of philosophy, since
causality is one of the basic problems philosophy deals with: are all things connected with
causal links? Does everything that exists have to be grounded in sufficient reasons? Or are there
things that somehow happen out of nowhere?" Suddenly, we find ourselves being led by Žižek
into the possibility of event defined as creatio ex nihilo, and his next rhetorical maneuver
plunges us directly into that space: "How, then, can philosophy help us to determine what an
event – an occurrence not grounded in sufficient reasons – is and how it is possible?" (ibid.,
emphasis mine). In the span of a paragraph, Žižek takes us from an Aristotelean emergence to
the possible invalidity of causality to the non-existence of causality as elided in his presentation
of the concept of event. As with Derrida's scission, to be discussed later, instead of avoiding the
question of causality, Žižek broaches the question, and then refutes it ineffectively through a
spare rhetorical tactic.
This stands as a significant difference, in comparison to Heidegger, whose concept of
Ereignis, or appropriation, from Contributions to Philosophy Žižek will briefly run through later
in Event, and will focus primarily on the aspect of enowning, or enframing (30-31). In doing so,
Žižek presents the Heideggerean Ereignis without any mention of a (arguably, the) core concept
that cannot be separated from the rest of Heidegger's corpus: ontological difference. Being and
Time, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event),
Introduction to Metaphysics; "On the Essence of Ground" collected in Pathmarks, On Time and
Being, Identity and Difference: this affords only a partial list of the texts into which Heidegger
incorporated the distinction between the ontic and ontological, between beings and Being. And
in that distinction, we find Heidegger's temporality, as he phrases it most directly in the prelude
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to Being and Time, The Concept of Time: "Dasein, conceived in its most extreme possibility of
Being, is time itself, not in time" (14-15, emphasis original). As Žižek presents Ereignis, the
Heideggerean event of appropriation is detached from ontological difference, and therefore
detached from beings (especially as Žižek renders it), and therefore detached from any concept
of ecstatic temporality.
We may view not only this detachment from ecstatic temporality, which Jameson called
"phenomenological time," but also find Žižek's continuation of the ideas first presented herein
through the work of Wyndham Lewis. Žižek further explains the concept of event through the
use of the category of "Asiatic mode of production" as a catchall category for those modes of
production that did not fit into the Marxian schema, and which category Žižek defines as being
"an empty container for all such unfitting elements" (32-33). As Žižek explains:
So what has this additional concept [the empty container], which disturbs the
clarity of the rational classification of a genus into its species, to do with the topic
of Event?...Everything. In principle, we can distinguish between a rational
structure, an atemporal classification of a totality into its species and sub-species,
and its imperfect temporal actualization in contingent material reality. There may
be surpluses in both directions – there may be formal possibilities which are not
actualized...or there may be a wealth of empirical formulations which do not fit
any of the categories allowed by the classification. However, the paradoxical
negative container is something quite different from both of these cases: it
represents within the structure of classification, as one of its elements, that which
escapes this structure, i.e. it is the point of inscription of historical contingency
into a formal structure, the point at which the formal structure, as it were, falls
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into its content, into contingent reality. And, insofar as the formal structure is in
itself atemporal while the level of contingent reality is evental – i.e., the domain
of contingent events, of constant change, generation and corruption – the negative
container is also the point at which event intervenes (or is inscribed) into the
formal structure. (34)
To summarize Žižek's argument through a paraphrase of Wyndham Lewis: "event is how
the gap has closed up." In this passage, Žižek counterposes the Heraclitean temporality of "the
domain of contingent events, of constant change, generation and corruption" to the Platonic
formal logic (presented here by Žižek with both the tenor of Platonic form and material and
Aristotelean categories) of "a rational structure, an atemporal classification." Or, as to recall
Lewis' phrasing presented earlier: Heraclitus' notion of ceaseless flux articulated in "Ionian
naturalism" stands against Plato's "something indestructible and constant behind the phenomenal
flux." And, as Žižek presents it here, event functions as the synthesis of the those two
conceptualizations of temporality for event transcends either conceptualization: event resists
becoming part of the atemporal schema, yet event inscribes itself into the formal structure even
though its origin lies in the elements of the flux, "the level of contingent reality is evental." This
is not a completed synthesis, but a suspended synthesis, metaxis, and an indissoluble trinity, in
which the hypostases remain distinct, yet inseparable. This summation here is, of course and
intentionally, the language of theology, a parallel of both the Holy Trinity and the "Word became
flesh." And that summation drawn from a questionable allusion Žižek soon confirms, as he will
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draw from Soren Kierkegaard that "Christianity is the first and only religion of the Event" (37),
before closing the chapter with a flight into the creatio ex nihilo of quantum mechanics18.

18

A few notes on religion and science: we are brought, once again, to a point of conflict. Speaking in only the
most general and exaggerated terms, on the one hand, faith, not infrequently, pushes toward various
fundamentalisms. On the other hand, excellent scientists, who are not particularly skilled philosophers and who
seem to have difficulty considering concepts beyond the ideological mandates of their respective purviews, spend an
inordinate amount of time arguing against ideologies, the validity of which they refuse to consider as possible (cf.
Stephen Hawking's declaration "philosophy is dead" in the chapter "The Mystery of Being" that opens The Grand
Design [5]). When it comes to an explanation of origin, scientists turn toward explanations that sound suspiciously
like metaphysics: in science writing, they often obscure the seeming impossibility of Being with the paradoxical
mask of quantum mechanics or M-theory. Žižek, for example, summarizes a description of creatio ex nihilo as
drawn from Brian Greene's The Elegant Universe: "even in an empty region of space, a particle emerges out of
Nothing, 'borrowing' its energy from the future and paying for it (with its annihilation) before this system notices this
borrowing. The whole network can function like this, in a rhythm of borrowing and annihilation" (Event 53,
emphasis mine).
From this, we are justified in drawing the conclusions that before a single particle exists, already exist
space and future (and therefore, time), system, and network. In other words, in one sense, Žižek here, like Jameson
above, functions as a Kantian in his insistence on space and time as a priori conditions, while moving beyond that to
posit the respective eidoi of system and network that precede the particle; that is, a metaphysics. And this is to
leave, as only briefly mentioned, the reification of theoretical physics, and the validity attributed to such arguments
because they are "scientific." And it is now only to mention in passing that the temporality Žižek describes is
explicitly a network of synchronic moments within the diachronic sequence of a system; yet the particle itself is
implicitly dependent upon a temporality that is projected from the future to the past: annihilation awaits the particle,
just as death awaits Dasein.
Much of what Žižek offers in this short passage can easily be fitted to match Heidegger's use of the terms
polemos and dike, especially in Introduction to Metaphysics, which will be discussed later with regard to Derrida.
Žižek's attempt to rationalize into irrelevancy the origin of the universe demonstrates the great difficulty of such a
task, and why Thomas Aquinas' first two Proofs may long stand: "Where did time and space come from?" (cf.,
again, Hawking's brief, implicit encounter with Aquinas in The Grand Design in which Hawking attempts to
sidestep any "model [of the universe] in which time continued back beyond the big bang" [51]). And we can view
other attempts to avoid the difficult question of origin in the infinite regression that Husserl will find with the
Rückfrage and that Derrida will attack with the concept of scission.
For Heidegger, the question of origin is answered variously, but never with universal depth. He practices
Gelassenheit, even before he argues for such a stance, leaving unanswered any sort of question of origin
recognizable to the Abrahamic tradition, and most world religions. Instead, the question Heidegger famously asks is
the Grundfrage of fundamental ontology, dependent upon the difference between the ontic and ontological: "What
is Being as such?" Science, purportedly, asks the same question, but begins with an ontic epistemology, which
overshadows the traditionally ontological or the Heideggerean ontological. Whereas religion argues, with varying
degrees of sophistication – as with every other area of human thought – for an unseen cause within an ontology that
subsumes the epistemological (to draw a simple and intentionally and profoundly unsophisticated example: "God
made it that way.").
In other words, Heidegger queried, "What is Being as such?" And in equally simplified (and perhaps
oversimplified) terms, science, in its essence and against its own occasional pretentions to the absolute pinnacle of
human endeavor, asks "How is Being as such?" Scientific description, whether in applied science or theoretical
physics or in the example immediately above from Žižek, almost invariably delineates processes in which time must
proceed unidirectionally from past to future – even in Žižek's example above, time does not alter; it must stay
constant so that the particle can "act" and borrow from the future – at a regular, invariable rate (and thus the scandal
of time dilation in Einstein's theory of relativity, which still posits a unidirectional time moving from the past to the
future, but at different rates for different observers). Religions, generally, with their longstanding search for
meaning, ask "Why is Being as such?"
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As he works through the concept of Event, Žižek next posits that for Christians "the
ultimate Event is the fall itself, the loss of some primordial unity and harmony which never
existed, which is just a retroactive illusion" (49, emphasis original); for Buddhists, the
selflessness of Nirvana is failure for now in his progression, Žižek proffers that "the true Event is
the Event of subjectivity itself" (75); and for Western philosophy, Žižek inverts matter and form,
stating that "what Plato was not able (or, rather ready) to accept was the thoroughly virtual,
immaterial (or, rather, insubstantial) evental status of Ideas: Ideas are something that
momentarily appear on the surface of things 19" (87, emphasis original). The question of how
Christianity can be the only religion of the Event, when Žižek defines the Event for Christianity
as "the fall itself" aside, we find a movement toward the generation of forms, as Žižek will later
phrase it, in his Lacanian explorations of what he terms the Real Event, the Symbolic Event, and
the Imaginary Event: "it is not that temporal deployment merely actualizes some pre-existing
conceptual structure – this atemporal structure is itself the result of contingent temporal
decisions" (144); "the truly New emerges through narrative, the apparently purely reproductive

The difference lies, obviously, in the interrogatives, which themselves function as a frame for the question,
and thus each question creates a Gestell like technology itself, as Heidegger argued in "The Question Concerning
Technology" (The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays 3-35). We could, actually, call this the
technology (or techne or technics) of the interrogative. But this difference in the pall of the interrogatives, even the
possibility of allowing this difference to be recognized, is almost always ignored in an enormous number of
discourses, which points toward a questionable kind of absolutism at the extremes of any given discourse: a
plethora of fundamentalisms, whether religious, scientific, philosophical, or critical.
19
Heidegger proposes exactly this argument, only not with regard to the failure of Plato that Žižek holds, but toward
his conclusion of the status of Friedrich Nietzsche as the last metaphysician: after Nietzsche inverts Platonism "the
sensuous, the world of appearances, stands above; the supersensuous, the true world, lies below" (Nietzsche, Vol. I
201). The issue with this inversion, and what qualifies Nietzsche as a metaphysician in Heidegger's estimation, is
that, even with Nietzsche's inversion, "as long as the 'above and below' define the formal structure of Platonism,
Platonism in its essence perdures" (ibid.). Platonism, then, and thus metaphysics, if we follow Heidegger's
assessment (which is also a criticism Heidegger formulates on the use of existence and essence in Sartrean
existentialism in "The Letter on Humanism" [Pathmarks 250]) defines the work, thus far, of both Jameson and
Žižek; metaphysics has been implicitly reinscribed into the critical conversation. We will return to this idea in the
upcoming chapter on Heidegger and temporality. It is worth noting as well that in his much more argumentative
critique of Heidegger (in comparison to Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche), Theodor W. Adorno proffers much the
same appraisal of Heidegger's work itself: "Heidegger transposes the empirical superiority of the way things are
into the realm of essence" (Negative Dialectics 100; 98-104 presents Adorno's adjudication of Heidegger as a failed
dialectician.)
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retelling of what happened" (150); and that "the system fully emerges once it starts to cause
itself" (154; it should be noted that all three of these further definitions occur in "Connection 5.2
– The Symbolic: The New Harmony.")
Or, after that recapitulation of Žižek's voyage from Christianity, through Buddhism, then
Western metaphysics, to Lacanian psychoanalysis: to quote Jameson's phrasing that will be
quoted again shortly, at length and in context: "Event which is the ephemeral rising up and
coming to appearance of Time and History as such" (Valences 543). Neither the theory nor the
usage of event can function without the reification of Lacanian psychoanalysis as a foundation;
but with that reliance on Lacan, we find ourselves in a space where the subject is yet is not, a
ghost haunting itself, and always secondary to event, collective, space.
To an even greater extent, in this similarity between the work of Jameson and Žižek, we
begin to view exactly how "human time in late capitalism has undergone a kind of structural
mutation," as Jameson phrased it in the citation from Valences of the Dialectic quoted above:
that "structural mutation" is the de facto enforcement upon temporality of a limit that oscillates
between the two conceptualizations of temporality drawn from Heraclitus and Plato,
respectively. Here, an initial claim to be expanded later: the gap between Heraclitean and
Platonic temporalities had already "closed up," as Wyndham Lewis expressed it, during High
Modernism; postmodernism, as sketched briefly thus far via its critical theory, operates within
that same limited conceptualization of temporality20.

20

As can be seen in A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present, Jameson confronts the difficulty
he discovers in Late Modernist works, namely those by Vladimir Nabokov and Samuel Beckett, with readings
generated from allegory. This difficulty, here proposed briefly, stems, however, from a differing conceptualization
of temporality in Late Modernism that does not belong to this gap, its components, or its jointure.
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D. Die Rückerklärungen
As we have seen, Jameson's discussion of uneven development, especially with regard to
fixing even a relative moment of the origin of postmodernity, exposes numerous difficulties and
contradictions. Jameson's methodology for dealing with the social condition of uneven
development, and, implicitly, its originary moment, faces the same contradictions that Derrida
points out in the ninth chapter of The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy (161-69,
especially 164-66 and its examination of the temporality of "dialectical method of the 'zigzag'"
created by the process of the Rückfrage, the "return question" or "regressive inquiry," the asking
one's way back to an origin and an eidos by questioning from present to past to present to past,
and so forth). Whereas Derrida's examination concerned Husserl's explanation of geometry as
having gone from "an absolutely originary individual antepredicative...to the existence of a
geometric being in its ideal objectivity" (166), above we concerned ourselves, as did Jameson,
with uneven development, or the end thereof. Jameson's employment of the concept of uneven
development over the course of his career creates exactly this kind of zigzag. Instead of
proposing a number of Rückfrage that sought the moment of the end of uneven development and,
therefore, the concurrent eidetic origin of complete and globalized postmodernity, Jameson
proceeds by Rückerklärungen, a zigzag of definitive statements, a zigzag of declarations
concerning the moment of the origin of full postmodernity.
If we accept the summation of Jameson's process vis-à-vis uneven development as
Rückerklärungen, we find ourselves immersed in a deep problem. On the one hand, as traced
above, Jameson certainly does modulate, even in contradictory terms, his conceptualization of
uneven development between works; Jameson does not, however, alter the purpose of each
Rückerklärung, and that is to state the condition of uneven development, whether at origination,
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completion, or some incomplete state. Here follows Husserl's estimation of the role of the
historical search for an eidos, which appears in "The Origin of Geometry," as an appendix to
Derrida's work on Husserl's essay:
Every explication and every transition from making explicit to making selfevident (even perhaps in some cases where one stops much too soon) is nothing
other than historical disclosure; in itself, essentially, it is something historical, and
as such, it bears, with essential necessity, the horizon of its history within itself.
This is of course also to say that the whole of the cultural present, understood as a
totality, "implies" the whole of the cultural past in an undetermined but
structurally determined generality. To put it more precisely, it implies a
continuity of pasts which imply one another, each in itself being a past cultural
present. And this whole continuity is a unity of traditionalization up to the
present, which is our present as [a process of] traditionalizing itself in staticflowing vitality. This is, as has been said, an undetermined generality, but it has
in principle a structure which can be much more widely explicated by proceeding
from these implications, a structure which also grounds, "implies," the
possibilities for every search for and determination of concrete, factual states of
affairs. (173, emphasis original, [brackets original])
The reason the problem in which we have immersed ourselves has such depth stems from
Jameson's pretermission, given his Rückerklärungen concerning uneven development and its
antithetical similarity to Husserl's Rückfrage, for any sort of phenomenological concept. Beyond
the common conceptualization of temporality in Jameson of the synchronic and the diachronic,
we also confront "reading time." In Valences of the Dialectic – and elsewhere, such as Fables of
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Aggression where Heiddegger's Being and Time, in Jameson's estimation, may as well function
as a synecdoche for the entirety of Lewis' Time Cult (123) – Jameson places the differing
conceptualizations of temporality of "Augustine, Husserl, and Heidegger" under the same rubric
(again, an imprecise catchall, such as Jameson's use of "existentialism" as noted above), wherein
"the world of the past and the future [is] held powerfully together by the expansive power of the
now" (498). While Jameson will differentiate the respective conceptualizations of temporality of
Augustine, Husserl, and Heidegger slightly, Jameson will do so in the terms of continuity, or
rather, diachrony, which is not unlike Husserl's conflation of the eidetic with history as
demonstrated in the preceding quotation. Simultaneously, Jameson will counterpose the
conceptualizations of temporality of Augustine, Husserl, and Heidegger as "the subjective time
of human beings to the objective time of the universe" (idem 501) as drawn, by Heidegger, from
Aristotle, who, according to Jameson, proposes "the time of the before-and-after, of the
chronology we observed in the heavens and in the natural or objectal world" (498).
The problem births interrelated problems. First, Jameson, of course, reconfigures what
he generally, throughout his corpus, calls "phenomenological time" as synchrony, but not
universally so; Jameson's "Aristotelean" temporality triumphs. Rather, to put it simply, given
that it is "objective," diachrony wins. Second, as will be examined in the next section on
Heidegger, to place Augustine, Husserl, and Heidegger into the same category of
conceptualizations of temporality is to elide, with excessive violence, extraordinary differences
among the three with regard to the structure of temporality.
Third, in the other direction, this grouping could be expanded to include Bergson and his
"unwinding scroll in a consciousness" on which "perceptions succeed each other" (Matter and
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Memory 13), with the past and present fixed as points relative to the present 21. Fourth, whether a
Rückfrage or a Rückerklärung, the search or the declaration of an eidetic, whether in terms of
geometry or uneven development, faces similar, and well-documented, difficulties.
Fifth, there is either simple error or an unsupportable reading of Heidegger. According to
Jameson, there are "four candidates for any complete theory of temporality: the time of the
world, the eternity of God, the time of the individual22, which as we have already seen,
Heidegger refracted, according to Jameson, into the vulgar time sense (that of precisely Aristotle
himself), and some more authentic temporality, which in the closing pages of Sein und Zeit
seemed to touch on history" (Valences 502). Clearly in this passage (and others in this section of
Valences of the Dialectic), Jameson states that Heidegger, in Being and Time, attributes what
Heidegger nominates "the vulgar conception of time" to Aristotle; Heidegger, to the contrary, is
himself quite clear that he perceives in Plato's Timaeus "this perspective of time as a succession
of nows that come into being and pass away" (Being and Time 402). Heidegger, to the contrary,
cites Aristotle, from Physics, and Augustine's Confessions, to argue that although "the
interpretation of Dasein as temporality does not lie beyond the horizon of the vulgar conception
21

As an aside, Bergson's valuation of the past befits what had been Jameson's Marxian project, while Bergson's
identification of the power of the individual to remember the past conflicts with the same Jamesonian collective
project: the "past does not interest the animal enough to detach it from the fascinating present, and its recognition
must be lived rather than thought. To call up the past in the form of an image, we must be able to withdraw
ourselves from the action of the moment, we must have the power to value the useless, we must have the will to
dream. But even in him the past to which he returns is fugitive, ever on the point of escaping him, as though his
backward turning memory were thwarted by the other, more natural, memory, of which the forward movement bears
him on to action and to life" (Matter and Memory 94). The "fascinating present" or "the expansive power of the
now" holds "powerfully together" "the world of the past and the future." As an aside on an aside, here we can
witness Walter Benjamin's angel of history itself witnessing the aggregating catastrophe of the past in the present
moment while being blown toward the future ("Theses on the Philosophy of History," Illuminations 257-58). The
comparisons just proposed herein function only metaphorically; although the structure of the conceptualizaiton of
temporality in these ideas from both Bergson and Benjamin are extremely similar, if not essentially the same, the
nuances of each conceptualization differ greatly. Any kind of insistence on a precise metonymical substitution –
which is itself a dialectical process – rather than metaphorical resistance to absolute synthesis, leads exactly to the
same kind of problematic feature apparent in Jameson's grouping of "Augustine, Husserl, and Heidegger." As with
the rest of this section on Jameson vis-à-vis Heidegger, the difficulty, and even impossibility, of applying dialectical
reasoning to any conceptualization of temporality stands as the core consideration.
22
To be clear, Jameson here uses "individual" as a synonym (i.e. a metonymical substitution) for "Dasein."

39

of time" (406), to ignore the element of distention would be to accept the series of nows, a next
now replacing a previous now, as the structure of temporality, which, in essence, precludes any
consideration that "ecstatic and horizonal temporality temporizes itself primarily out of the
future" (405, emphasis original). In light of these quotation from Being and Time, one finds it
greatly difficult to accept, without significant qualification, Jameson's summation of a
Heideggerean temporality in which "the world of the past and the future [is] held powerfully
together by the expansive power of the now;" in light of these quotations from Being and Time,
one finds it greatly difficult to accept Jameson's assessment of Being and Time as seeking "some
more authentic temporality" in history. Again, this marked difference in the structure of
temporality as related to Dasein, will be examined later in the forthcoming section on Heidegger
and temporality.
Sixth, and most importantly, Jameson, despite his open aversion to "phenomenological
time," depends on exactly such a temporal structure for one of his central concepts. Reading
time appears repeatedly, first in Postmodernism in relation to a reader's synchronic experience of
a Faulknerian sentence as compared to the "deep time and deep memory" of the narrative (134).
Again, in "Form and Production in The Magic Mountain," collected in The Modernist Papers,
Jameson deploys reading time as one of the central tenets of his reading of Thomas Mann's
novel: "all these representations of time, often as probing as anything in St. Augustine, are
themselves the after-effects of reading time itself; or rather the concrete experience of this last
has...been imperceptibly substituted for that 'real' or existential time of which it is so often a
question in these pages" (70). In the case of Mann, synchrony wins, but it is synchronic reading
time qualified – here, at least – as being distinct from "existential time."
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Which is a reasonable distinction, except that in Valences of the Dialectic, Jameson
formulates reading as exactly "the expansive power of the now." While not specifically offering
another definition of reading time, Jameson essentially accomplishes exactly that by defining the
act of reading with regard to temporality and as an interpretation of Ricoeur: "reading is then the
momentary and ephemeral act of unification in which we hold multiple dimensions of time
together for a glimpse that cannot prolong itself into the philosophical concept" (532). Reading,
then, and also reading time, are synonymous, perfectly metonymically interchangeable, with "the
expansive power of the now." Seemingly heeding his own criticism of Žižek concerning the
danger of the reification of critical apparatus, Jameson plots another point on the map of time,
which is an elegantly accommodative solution to the artificial and cramped confines of the
Greimas rectangle -- for the cardinal, and even ordinal, directions on a map still enable
dialectical opposition.
Synchrony wins again, but only temporarily. The "multiple dimensions of time" function
thusly, quoted at length to preserve the context of the culmination of one of Jameson's most
difficult chapters:
Yet the appearance of Time or History as such depends not on the multiplicity and
variety of these trajectories [of synchronic moments], but rather on their
interference with each other, with their intersection now understood as dissonance
and incommensurability rather than as a conjuncture which augments them all, in
the fashion of synthesis, by the central space of some harmonious meeting and
combination.
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We must therefore retain this violence and negativity in any concept of
intersection, in order for this dissonant conjunction to count as an Event, and in
particular as that Event which is the ephemeral rising up and coming to
appearance of Time and History as such. Nor is this a purely textual or
philosophical matter: for it is the same discordant conjuncture that constitutes the
emergence of time and history in the real world, the world of real time and real
history. The moment of intersection 23, indeed, is also that in which Time suddenly
appears to individuals as an existential or phenomenological experience.
(Valences 543-44, emphasis mine)
Simply, diachrony wins.
Throughout this chapter, as throughout all of his work, Jameson stages the dialectical pas
de deux between diachrony and synchrony, with diachrony ultimately being judged as the prima
ballerina for his Marxian dialectical materialism that grounds his work. This chapter of Valences
of the Dialectic is essential to understanding how Jameson conceptualizes time, at least until a
later work, such as was pointed out above with regard to the spatialization inherent to the use of
a modified Greimas rectangle in The Antinomies of Realism. The core of the chapter, however,
involves Jameson finally attempting to overcome the lingering and persistent specter of the
individual, here conflated by Jameson, with Dasein. Instead of his frequent dismissiveness for
the concept of the individual, Jameson admits the existence of the individual, if only to subsume,
by synthesis, the individual under the auspices of diachrony; unlike in the Heideggerean event of
appropriation, the individual realizes temporality as an independent force. More than that,

23

Allegory, specifically the allegory of reading time as the synchronic recognition of the diachronic procession, is
this intersection. As stated above, it is the center of the map of time, where – not when – the "dissonant
conjunction" of latitude and longitude occur.
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however, as Jameson presents his thinking through of Heidegger's work, diachrony depends
entirely on the synchronic "moment of intersection" that does not occur in a "central space 24."
His nomination of the intersections in such a "central space" as harmonious scans as a bit
disingenuous and towards the strawman: first, for the characterization of being harmonious with
its deep resonance with musica universalis and the comity often found and sought in classical
philosophy after the pre-Socratics, which is exactly the moment of the wrong turn of Western
metaphysics Heidegger writes about throughout his life, and very few philosophers in the last
century (or two) have made a point of declaring the harmonious functioning of the world or the
collective or the individual; secondly, for the advocacy of temporality over spatialization, which,
as we have seen repeatedly, certainly does not function as a constant in Jameson's work.
In other words, according to Jameson, the synthesis of a moment of "phenomenological
time" in Dasein ("there-being," quite literally) with the synchronic moment, nullifies (in some
unexplained way) that "central space," which we would not be remiss in reading at the singular
level as Dasein.25 How this absolute negation functions, Jameson never precisely explains – and
if he did, it would be through psychology or in relation to the aforementioned others that negate
the individual – but it leaves us with the depersonalized "Event," which generates "the
emergence of time and history in the real world, the world of real time and real history"

24

Much of this has to do, seemingly, with Jean-Paul Sartre's concept of seriality from his Critique of Dialectical
Reason. Jameson's reading of Sartre's seriality in Archaeologies of the Future recasts both Sartre's concept and
Jameson's own thinking as Derridean, specifically with the obvious echo of the centerless structure Derrida posits in
"Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" (279). (All will be discussed below because of
the inherently metonymical structure of seriality.)
25
In his reading of Heidegger, Jameson replaces, without any apparent reservations, Heidegger's terminology with
his own equivalent, often with its own specific socio-cultural baggage; Heidegger's tracing of the movement, in
Parmenides, from alethia to falsum, from Greek to Latin, and the error, according to Heidegger, that translation
introduced to thinking may spring to mind. To replace the Jamesonian "individual" with the Heideggerean "Dasein"
is a simple reversal of Jameson's substitution.
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apparently independent of individuals, who only experience an Event as "existential or
phenomenological experience26."
First, whether with regard to the "deep time and deep history" of Faulknerian narratives
in Postmodernism, or with regard to the "sensitivity to deep time" in the European moderns in
"The End of Temporality" (699), Jameson's description of the Event and the generation of Time
and History precludes any such depth for it precludes causality or any form of tradition beyond
the synchronic intersection of forces. Secondly, from this intersection, time and history arises.
But for whom? For what? History in itself, for itself? Time in itself, for itself? For the
individual, who now appears, and finds herself both and either at the mercy of history, and/or as
the recipient for its dialectical gift? The hierarchy created by Jameson, at least at this moment,
places diachrony, in as much as it is time and history, at the apex, followed by the subserviently
generative synchronic moment, followed in order by the collective, which colligates each and
every individual, who at least exists momentarily in this Jamesonian formulation. In other
words, after a bravura performance in this chapter, Jameson ends exactly where he began.

E. Endless Temporal War without Death
Does Jameson maneuver in a Heideggerean fashion? Can we substitute Jameson's Event
("the moment of intersection") with Heidegger's Augenblick27; can we substitute Jamesonian
Time with Heideggerean Facticity, Jamesonian History with Heideggerean Tradition? Jameson's
treatment of time, not as a being, but as time itself, does not conflict with Heidegger's treatment
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With regard to the work in focus here, whether Jameson's turn to the Event or Derrida's citationality-cumrepetition, the resistance to – yet the centrality of – the concept of causality in postmodernist critical theory may be
recognized, as with Žižek's origin of particles discussed in an earlier footnote.
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at this level: "Temporality 'is' not a being at all. It is not, but rather temporalizes
itself...temporality temporalizes and it temporalizes possible ways of itself. These make possible
the multiplicity of the modes of being of Dasein, in particular the fundamental possibility of
authentic and inauthentic existence" (Being and Time 314, emphasis original). Jameson's
conceptualization of time, however, is purely ontic, based on, to use Heidegger's phrasing, the
"pure successions of nows, without beginning and without end, in which the ecstatic character of
primordial temporality is leveled down" (ibid.), which describes the general movement of
dialectical materialism. Certainly, Jameson does not posit synchrony as a singularity, but rather
a series of synchronic moments; otherwise, since Jameson positions the individual as she who
recognizes Time and History in the synchronic moment, either all individuals would have to
achieve a recognition of a singular synchronic moment simultaneously throughout all time, or
only those individuals sentient at the singular synchronic moment either would have, will have,
or have had the opportunity for recognition, unless exists a series of synchronic moments,
repeatable in their actualization.
The act of substituting Event for Moment or History for Tradition has one significant
effect: the elision of the self, ego, subject, or Dasein, and with the elision of Dasein, the elision
of death:
Only a being that is essentially futural in its being so that it can let itself be
thrown back upon its factical there, free for its death and shattering itself on it,
that is, only a being that, as futural, is equiprimordially having-been, can hand
down to itself its inherited possibility, take over its own throwness and be in the
Moment for "its time." Only authentic temporality that is at the same time finite

45

makes something like fate, that is, authentic historicity, possible. (Being and Time
366, emphasis original, emphasis original)
Jameson's formulation of the Event, and therefore, Time and History, depend upon
exactly the same conditions Jameson identifies as the conditions of postmodernity in
Postmodernism: "the 'death' of the subject itself – the end of the autonomous bourgeois monad
or ego or individual" (15). For Jameson, in Postmodernism, the death is figurative only, the
famous or infamous "death of the subject;" Jameson rarely engages death as the end of life, the
ceasing of physical functions, the failure of the body, or by whatever other metric one would
wish to use to calculate the facticity of the difference between organic existence and nonexistence, which is much the same criticism Jameson himself levels at the Bonaventure Hotel by
quoting Michael Herr's fictional representation of flying a helicopter: "death itself, hardly an
intruder" (45).
Jameson, in Postmodernism as well (39-45), finds the perfect symbol for the
"bewildering immersion" (43) in postmodernity in the Bonaventure Hotel, which "has finally
succeeded in transcending the capacities of the individual human body to locate itself, to
organize its immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its position in a
mappable external world" (44). The question proposed here, then: if we accept Jameson's
summation of the pure, disorienting spatialization achieved by the Bonaventure Hotel, can we
not apply the same judgment, but with regard to temporality, to Jameson's own formulation of
the Event? Would it not be more productive, at least if we wish to move toward understanding
rather than toward questioning, to view the Bonaventure Hotel as a Jamesonian Event, an Event
that generates Time and History as their respective negations, an Event that demonstrates for
Dasein as its own inconsequence, an Event that requires Jameson himself to turn to his own
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"phenomenological experience" (in the block quotation from Valences above) in an attempt to
understand? In other words, the very criticisms Jameson offers against the Bonaventure Hotel
are (re-)achieved by Jameson's own formulation of temporality in Valences of the Dialectic,
which itself ends with a concept of Event as depersonalized, as dehumanized, and as
dehistoricized as any person who finds himself effectively lost within any labyrinthine
postmodernist architecture. The Jamesonian Event in Valences of the Dialectic and the
Bonaventure Hotel function similarly: each is each a map itself of itself, nonrelational, quasidiscrete, generative, whether of Time and History for the former, or of critique for the latter.
Nonetheless, to close the frame around Jameson's reading of Heidegger, now we return
again to uneven development as Jameson so often does. By 2013, Jameson revives its corpse so
that this revenant can offer an explanation for the insurgency in "the current US occupation of
Iraq and Afghanistan:" "...guerilla warfare – the result of uneven development and the incursion
of an 'advanced' mode of production into an 'underdeveloped' one – can also offer the very
prototype of war itself and not its savage exception28" (Antinomies 234). As inventoried above,
we find ourselves with another question concerning time, posed again in Jameson's usage of the
concept of uneven development, which may entail either an implicit self-castigation for his own
earlier work in formalizing a completed globalization beyond the reach of any application of the
concept of uneven development, or simply another temporal contradiction, or another point
plotted on the map of time. Is the multi-temporal condition of the concept of uneven
development in Jameson's work simply a function of reading time? Is Jameson's insistence on
the pure synchronic temporality of reading the cause of the confusion? But that leads to a
question: to whom do we ascribe the confusion? And is reading time confined to a single text,
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In passing, of note as well is the synecdochical movement from guerilla warfare to all warfare.
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or are we, somehow, for some reason, not permitted to read across several texts and present the
internal contradictions in succession and in the "expansive power of the now?" Here arises the
intentional and central aporia in Jameson's work, that which revolves around the questions of
memory and self, self and others, temporality and Dasein, being and time. The declaration of
full postmodernity in Jameson's theory, even if it cannot be justified when we attempt to read
Jameson's theory against itself, stands as another shorthand notation, another variation on the
presupposition of the irrelevancy of time, even when Jameson, such as in Postmodernism,
seemingly laments such a loss. By promulgating multiple conceptualizations of time, each one at
its given moment of deployment held to be exact, Jameson spatializes temporality; the process
creates a system. Even more so, as much as in the postmodernity he sometimes derides,
Jameson's map of time allegorizes time as space. And if we follow Heidegger that Dasein is
temporality, then Jameson allegorizes Dasein as space as well, as we will see.
Antinomies, or perhaps dilemmata, and even the aporia of time that may secretly function
as the center of postmodernism and may compel critical theory toward the recourse of space,
present themselves. Does Jameson's effective cognitive mapping of time essentially obscure
time itself within his theory, despite (and, more so, because of) his arguments, especially in "The
End of Temporality" and Valences of the Dialectic, against exactly such an obfuscation? These
are no small questions, in that this situation alludes in analogous and metaphorical parallel to the
interpellations and speculations on the individual and the constructed subject, and the world and
the text.
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Chapter 2: Deconstruction, Différance, Death: Jacques Derrida’s Dependence on
Dia-Synchrony to Form the Center of His Theory
This chapter comprises five sections: the first examines Derrida’s emphasis on scission
as an arbitrary, but generative Event, and the metaphysical implications that arise from his
employment of scission, and the temporal consequences. The second section contextualizes
Derrida’s work doubly: first in comparison to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl -- itself
replete with its own necessary temporality -- and, secondly, through Derrida’s first two major
works that deal with Husserl. After the introduction of Derrida’s preferred conceptualization of
temporality and its metaphysical implications, the third section details, more specifically, what
we term Derrida’s “metaphysics of absence,” while the fourth section argues Derrida’s
dependence, through this metaphysics of absence, on metaphysics proper. Finally, we turn from
the question of metaphysics and its relation in Derrida to the question of the death of the
individual, which, for Heidegger, served as perhaps the central foundational tenet of Being and
Time.

A. Beyond Nothing: Différance and Its Temporality
The intention of the foregoing chapter was not to argue directly for any given
conceptualization of temporality, but to demonstrate briefly the multivalent functions and
formulations of temporality found in Jameson's work, which may or may not ultimately be
relevant. "I am at least postmodern enough," offers Jameson in Valences of the Dialectic, "to
defend the proposition that everything is narrative" (484). If this is the case, if this offers the
ultimate configuration of temporality in Jameson as the synchronic experience of a diachronic
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narrative, which itself functions as atemporal allegory, then despite the many other heads
growing from his hydra, we have some semblance of a core conceptualization of temporality in
Jameson, one that, even when engaged in flashbacks or flashforwards, retains the same essential
diachronic movement from a beginning to an end. Synchronic moments rest within the
diachronic procession that forever flows, while allegory remains eidetically outside. These
synchronic moments, however, beyond that of reading time, also appear to have the quality of
either duration or distention (or duration and distention, perhaps, since we view this indistinction
under murky waters), as may be understood from Jameson's assessment of Gilles Deleuze's
"distinction between the two great forms of time, the Aion and the Chronos" ("Marxism and
Dualism in Deleuze" 414). Whereas Chronos provides the figure of the diachronic with its
tripartite system of past, present, and future, Aion presents eternity as absolute synchrony, as all
time present simultaneously (ibid.). These concepts, in the forms as expressed by Augustine and
furthered by Paul Ricoeur in Time and Narrative, Vol. 1, not Deleuze, will return in the next
section on Heidegger.
As much as time in Jameson exists as extended monologue, which is then flattened and
spatialized into reading time, the map of time, and our state of globalization, what would the
theory of Jacques Derrida be without the conceptualization of temporality as ceaseless diachronic
flux? To quote Jameson quoting Derrida from "Ousia and Grammé" in Margins of Philosophy
(42): "'In a certain sense, it is always too late to talk about time 29'" (A Singular Modernity 19;
Valences of the Dialectic 475; "The End of Temporality" 697). For most of his career, Jameson
held some sort of Marxian Utopia as the telos of human events, whereas Derrida insisted on
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This specific translation appears in Valences of the Dialectic and "The End of Temporality;" A Singular
Modernity features an affirmative qualification: "it has authoritatively been said, 'it is always too late to speak about
time'" (emphasis mine).
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deferral, not only as an aspect of différance, but also seemingly as part of not only the human
condition (to create a violent contrast based on the inapplicability of such a term to Derrida's
work), but also in relation to beings and Being as such.
As for the human condition, Derrida very rarely, if ever, adumbrates the implications of
postmodernity until his own ethical turn, and then those implications tend to appear only as
absence or a problematic statement. For example, a litany of longstanding social issues, which
Derrida presents as "plagues of the 'new world order,'" appears in Specters of Marx (100-05).
The list begins with "unemployment," which has no special provenance in postmodernity and no
origin endemic to the "new world order;" unemployment has certainly been a problematic social
issue since the advent of wage labor. As for beings and Being, Derrida continually attempts to
obviate the question. In "Différance," Derrida claims that différance as the trace, or perhaps the
trace as différance, exerts some type of (non-) ontological priority over Being itself, with Derrida
then rendering "Being" as the name of a epoch of thought, which cannot be maintained as an
epoch for the trace precedes it (22). In other words, différance occurs, has occurred, will occur,
but yet is not, is not yet, and never was: "the play of the trace, or the différance, which has no
meaning and is not" (ibid.) In other greatly simplified, yet commonplace, Derridean words,
absence generates presence, and then, of course, absence leaves its trace, the tracks of nothing.
In Valences of the Dialectic, Jameson will expand his original review of Derrida's Specters of
Marx precisely with an eye toward Derrida's "anti-dialectical" position, which, for example,
Jameson presents succinctly in "Marxism and Dualism in Deleuze." There, Jameson states that
Derrida concerns himself with "tirelessly dissolving all the reified thoughts he encounters in the
tradition back into the first impossibilities and antinomies from which they sprang" (393).
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Jameson's laconic assessment of the Derridean project elides two significant points.
First, Derrida radically altered several of the key vantage points in his work as his career
progressed. For example, in Derrida's dissertation, we glimpse a very different Derrida. In the
dissertation, published as The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy, Derrida prosecutes an
inverted dialectical regression, in which a refutation precedes a contradiction, which itself
precedes another refutation, then another contradiction, and so forth, in an argumentative
structure that recalls Plato's dialogue Parmenides. While specifically absorbed with Edmund
Husserl's own philosophical method of the Rückfrage, Derrida's deconstructive process appears
in nascent form. Derrida, however, appears in agreement with Husserl to a certain extent and
with myriad qualifications. As Derrida summarizes the thought of Husserl:
If one does not begin by a description of the a priori essence30, there can never be
a claim to any rigor. Existence itself, in its most originary coming forth, will not
be able to appear to a philosophical gaze. So any reproach addressed to this
Husserlian essentialism in the name of an empirical or existential originarity, or in
the name of some preceding moment of genesis will, in order to have a sense,
have to suppose an already constituted eidetics. It is this postulate of all
philosophy that the first steps of phenomenology had brought out in all its depth.
The absolute beginning of philosophy must be essentialist (137-38).
According to Derrida, two significant flaws occur in Husserl's asking after origins,
despite Derrida's seeming praise for the "postulate of all philosophy that the first steps of
phenomenology had brought out in all its depth." First, and substantively demonstrated by
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A serious Derrida scholar, despite Derrida's prohibitions, could well point to this very moment as the birth of
différance, the a priori non-essence.
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Derrida in The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy to have been a self-criticism by
Husserl of his own work, this phenomenological reduction "gives account only of what is not
genesis itself, but merely its phenomenological sense" (139). Here, a simplification: Derrida
demonstrates the flaw of Husserl's thinking that the origin can be reached, which is a fair point,
and why, as an analogy in traditional metaphysical and theological terms, Aquinas' first two
Aristotelean proofs of the existence of God may never be refuted, despite the refutation of the
last three over the centuries.
The origin for Derrida, however, commands the central point in his thought, at least all of
his thought before his ethical turn. The trace precedes Being; the trace is origin; the trace is
nothing; the trace is apeiron. Not only has Derrida, like Husserl, asked after origins, he has
ostensibly found an origin, but configured in a counterintuitive – and pre-Socratically
Anaximandrine -- beginning of nothing. And with that trace, which has many names, especially
différance, we begin the chain of substitutions. In other words, according to Derrida, Husserl
cannot find the origin, yet Derrida places one at the center of his thought, which, most
importantly, demands a specific conceptualization of temporality: "I am teaching you pleasure, I
am telling you the limit and the paradoxes of the apeiron, and everything begins, like the post
card, with reproduction" (The Post Card 66). As that post card traverses space, any space, all
space, time proceeds regularly, its origin always past, its future always deferred, its present never
exactly present and always slipping away like the Heraclitean river, regardless of the apeiron
from which it sprung, upon which, later, Heidegger will have something to say on that which
Anaximander said.
Secondly, Derrida's estimation of Husserl's inability to view the dialectical nature of the
essential origin belies the tendency toward binarism even in Derrida's earliest thought: "Husserl
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sees only a methodological limit; at the moment when we believe that any idealism must be
converted into its opposite, Husserl believes he is merely getting through a stage" (Problem of
Genesis 140, italics mine). This earliest Derrida advocates for dialectical thought, a plea for the
necessity of attempting to discern the antithesis to the thesis of Husserl's eidetic reduction, even
if working, essentially, backwards from synthesis to antithesis to thesis. While the thesis, in this
case, appears again to be apeiron, from which, after scission, leaves its trace, we can view
Derrida's process: from the synthesis at hand he avulses the antithesis, for which, as he argues
Husserl fails to do, he then converts that antithesis into its opposite, the thesis, which in the case
of the trace, différance, the post card, or any question of origin, is apeiron, formless chaos, a
trace that leads from nowhere and to nowhere. Scission, the originary moment, as Derrida
defines it,
is of course a beginning that is forever fictional, and the scission, far from being
an inaugural act, is dictated by the absence...of any de-cisive beginning, any pure
event that would not divide and repeat itself and already refer back to some other
'beginning,' some other 'event,' the singularity of the event being more mythical
than ever in the order of discourse. Scission is necessary because of the fact...that
the beginning is piled and multiplied about itself, elusive and divisive; it begins
with its own division, its own numerousness (Dissemination 330, emphasis mine).
To accept this position of multiple beginnings, scission, essentially, as an arbitrary choice
in order to end the process of the Rückfrage, we must ignore a significant moment of a later
Derrida work, namely his definition of différance in Margins: "In a conceptuality adhering to
classical strictures, 'différance' would be said to designate a constitutive, productive, and
originary causality, the process of scission and division which would produce or constitute
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different things or differences" (8-9). What prevents us, however, from viewing différance in a
conceptuality that adheres to classical strictures? Only Derrida's prohibition on doing so
because "the trace is nothing," (Of Grammatology 75), as we will see in next section. As far as
causality is concerned, Derrida himself cannot manage not to frame différance in classical
strictures, as he makes apparent in "Freud and the Scene of Writing." Here, he defines further
différance in a form that will remain fairly consistent through Margins 31:
No doubt life protects itself by repetition, trace, différance...but we must be wary
of this formulation: there is no life present at first which would then come to
protect, postpone, or reserve itself in différance. The latter constitutes the essence
of life. Or rather: as différance, is not an essence, is not anything, it is not life, if
Being is determined as ousia, presence, essence/existence, substance or subject.
Life must be thought of as trace before Being may be determined. This is the
only condition on which we can say that life is death, that repetition and the
beyond of the pleasure principle are native and congenital to that which they
transgress (Writing and Difference 203, emphasis original).
In other words, we can accept much of deconstruction only as far as we can obey
Derrida's imperative, like Lot's wife, not to look back, only from an authority with far less
capability to punish than Yahweh. Alternately, what prevents us from refusing to seek origin,
what prevents us from finding the question unimportant and uninteresting? Is it possible to read
Derrida -- any Derrida before his turn -- without constantly confronting the question of origin? It
is not. We view a constant, nearly obsessive, referral to, and repeated denial of, any origin other
than the arbitrarily adjudicated moment of scission. In this way, rather than a deconstruction of
31

This discussion will return in upcoming sections.
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metaphysics, Derrida's oeuvre functions as a call for the return to metaphysics, even if only in
the negative.

B. A Metaphysician Standing on His Head Is Yet a Metaphysician 32
To leap ahead (and to leave the second problem with Jameson's laconic description of
Derrida's methodology in suspension for a while longer), in an interview published in Positions,
after a few comments concerning Hegel's concept of Aufhebung and dialectic reasoning, Derrida,
in one of his most straightforward moments, offers "a kind of general strategy of
deconstruction...to avoid both simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics and
simply residing within the closed field of these oppositions, thereby confirming it" (41, italics
Derrida). Although discussing Aufhebung, which can be expanded into the dialectical terms of
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis or sublation, Derrida, or his translator, avoids such terms for
several pages. Derrida, rather, describes one side of his deconstructive "double writing" this
way: "in a classical philosophical opposition, we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence
of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other...or has
the upper hand. To deconstruct the opposition, first of all is to overturn the hierarchy at a given
moment" (41, italics mine). Allowing the momentary nature of deconstruction to speak for
itself, Aristotle's Categories, to name only one text, provides ample evidence that the whole of
Western metaphysics does not function purely within "binary oppositions," unless Derrida
reduces such categories to an eidos of pure presence, after which taxonomic logic and the objects
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it describes finds itself in binary opposition to pure absence and whatever "comprises" it,
regardless of whether or not we can conceive of absence as a unity, or the iteration of a form that
is the form itself.
In a discussion of Jacques Benveniste's work, in "The Supplement of Copula: Philosophy
Before Linguistics," Derrida examines Benveniste's proposition of the oppositional binary of
"categories of thought" and "categories of language," of which Derrida presents the following
criticism:
What is not examined at any time is the common category of the category, the
categoriality in general on the basis of which the categories of language and the
categories of thought may be dissociated. The concept or category of the category
systematically comes into play in the history of philosophy and of science (in
Aristotle's Organon and Categories) at the point where the opposition of language
to thought is impossible, or has only a very derivative sense. Aristotle...did
attempt to take the analysis back to the site of the emergence, that is to the
common root, of the language/thought couple. This site is the site of "Being."
(Margins 182, emphasis Derrida).
To mention it only briefly, Derrida, almost surreptitiously, places categorical thought
under an eidos, "the concept...of the category, " which belongs as part of Derrida's methodology
in which demands the eidetic, so that it may be deconstructed, as Derrida will do on the next
page: "the category of the category is but a systematic setting in place of the pretension to an
exterior of language, making it both language and thought because language is examined at the
site where the signification 'Being' is produced" (183). More importantly, given what we
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understand of Derrida's well-established disdain for "Being," by incorporating the discourse of
language/thought into that of Being, not only do all Derrida's criticisms, whether ostensibly
concerning "thought," "language," or "Being" now apply to all three simultaneously, regardless
of the subject in question, but now Being is simply another signification predicated on the
originary absence that leaves its trace. In other words, this is exactly how Derrida simplifies (i.e.
"deconstructs") categorical thought in an operation with a certain algebraic efficiency seemingly
devoid of nuance of thought outside of the purview of the laws of his methodology. If the
intended strategy is the confrontation of any thing (in the philosophical sense of the word) that
indicates presence with the nullification of absence, which leaves only the originary absence of
the trace, which, again, we could also read multiply as apeiron or différance, we find ourselves
with exactly the very sort of asymmetrical opposition Derrida finds untenable and "violent," only
now it is an asymmetrical opposition in which absence "has the upper hand" in this binary, and
every binary, and answers for each and all, and any and every, example and instance of
presence33 after it has been deconstructed. Rather, as Derrida argues:
then différance, in a certain and very strange way, (is) older than the ontological
difference or than the truth of Being. When it has this age, it can be called the
play of the trace. The play of a trace that no longer belongs to the horizon of
Being, but whose play transports and encloses the meaning of Being: the play of
the trace, or the différance, which has no meaning and is not. Which does not
belong. There is no maintaining, and no depth to, this bottomless chessboard on
which Being is put into play (Margins 22).

33

See Footnote 51 below for a justification of this reading from Derrida's later work.
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To paraphrase Anselm of Canterbury's ontological argument 34 in order to demonstrate
how closely and how frequently Derrida approaches, via simple inversions, the very metaphysics
he wishes to deconstruct: "différance is greater than that which can be conceived35."
This suggestion, if accepted, problematizes John Caputo's summation of Derrida's work
as "religion without religion" in The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida for now we may
addend an ontological argument to Caputo's own notation of importance of the via negativa in
Derrida's work (ibid., specifically 52), and, perhaps, edit Caputo's phrase from "religion without
religion" to, simply, "religion," which is only to allude briefly to the trace as a metaphysical
construct. To quote Heidegger on his Destruktion of metaphysics as a premature salvo for the
next section: "Not that antiquity should be overcome...But it is the inept guardians of tradition
who should be fought against...This is what I mean by the destruction of tradition. It is not a
matter of doing away with two millennia and setting up oneself in their place" (The Metaphysical
Foundations of Logic36 155, emphasis mine). Heidegger's phrasing connotes the criticism of
sublation, the negation and supplantation of tradition with novelty: the movement of dialectic
and the movement of the ever-flowing moments of Heraclitean temporality. To view Derrida's
deconstruction as an inverted dialectic -- but one indifferent about the ultimate reality of the
source -- only demands the configuration of the process of deconstruction as "the necessity of
interminable analysis" (Positions 42). In other words, to substitute, to supplement, within the
structuralist terminology of temporality used earlier with Jameson, Derrida describes one hand of
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Therefore, to work metaphorically, with the tenor and vehicle never to be synthesized, never to function as
metonymies for each other, never to permit substitution without the destruction of the analogy itself.
35
And as will be discussed below, Derrida places absence and apeiron as the wholly Other beyond any
conceptualization of God.
36
Derrida's does not engage this Heidegger text in any great fashion, unless it will be forthcoming in further
posthumous publications. The most sustained interaction with The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic appears in
the second volume of Psyche: Inventions of the Other, published in English translation the year of Derrida's death.
His engagement primarily concerns sexuality and Dasein (11-23).
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his double writing as the synchronic, that which occurs "at a given moment," with each moment
replaced by the next in a diachronic series.
Rather, we should permit Derrida to explain himself, in his own words, in a supposition
about temporality that remains remarkably consistent throughout a career built upon the
fomentation and promulgation of the multiple and the contingent37: "dia-synchrony...a serial
one-time, the several times that will have taken place only once" (Psyche 167-68, emphasis
original).
Derrida's movement to this moment is textual, of course, a self-reflexive statement
concerning his own reading and re-presenting of Levinas. In a lengthy metaphorical flight,
Derrida describes this dia-synchronic process as "seriasure," which accounts for both series and
interruption:
This book here, the one composed of his books beyond all totality, how is it
delivered over otherwise to the other? From one moment to another...the one that
picks up the other in its stitches must leave another trace of the interruption in its
stitches, and by schematizing the trace make another knot (left to the discretion of
the other in the reading). But another knot remains insufficient; what is needed is
another chain of multiple knots having the peculiarity that they do not tie together
continuous threads...but retie cut threads while keeping the barely apparent trace
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The essay in question, "At This Very Moment in This Work Here I Am," was originally published in English in
1991, but in French in 1980, in the collection of essays Re-Reading Levinas; Derrida incorporates this essay into
Psyche, Volume I: Inventions of the Other, which was published in English in 2007. Although very few would
reasonably argue that Derrida ever acted as a martinet with regard to strict documentation, especially with regard to
his own work, we would not be remiss in claiming that the fact that Derrida lets stand, and even presents to a wider
audience, his definition of dia-synchrony, instead of revising or removing it, constitutes an endorsement of the
concept.
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(perhaps, probably) of absolute interruptions, of the absolute as interruption. The
trace of this interruption in the knot is never simply visible, sensible, or assured...
How is this supplement of the knot to be figured? It has to chain the knots
together in such a way that the text holds up, but also so that the "interruptions"
remain numerous (one alone is never enough): not merely as a present, apparent,
or substantial remaining...which would be another way for it to disappear, but
with enough of a trace left by their passing...to leave a better chance for the trace
of the other. Now for this, a single knot, keeping the trace of a single interruption,
is not enough, and neither is a chain exhibiting the trace of a single hiatus. A
single interruption in a discourse does not do its work and lets itself be
immediately reappropriated. The hiatus must insist, whence the necessity of the
series, of the series of knots. The absolute paradox (of the ab-solute) is that this
series, incommensurable with any other, an incomparable series out-ofseries...does not tie together the threads but the interruptions38 between threads,
traces of the interval that the knot must only remark, give to remark. (164-65,
emphasis original)
We find the hallmarks of Derridean thought encapsulated in this iteration: from an
incursion into a text, Derrida launches an excursion39; from his reading of Levinas, he draws a
conceptualization of temporality in dia-synchrony, "a serial one-time." Derrida's description of
the knotting of the string, quoted at length from Psyche immediately above, metaphorizes
38

Again, Heidegger's estimation, with regard to Sartre in "The Letter on Humanism," of the intractable problem
generated by the inversion of a metaphysical proposition, in that such a reversal yet remains in metaphysics, may
spring to mind.
39
Incursion and excursion: always running, always flowing, exactly as dia-synchrony does, in and out, beyond
interiority or exteriority, beyond containment, a river without banks.
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scission, hiatus, trace, interruption, interval, rupture, and différance; Derrida, as well, instructs
this string to be doubled, for a reason here unclear other than, presumably, due to his tendency to
double as a method for formulating absence and/or for demonstrating a hierarchy. In the final
estimation, we find in Derrida's description of a book as knotted threads, not only a possible
contradiction and/or an expansion of citationality (as found in Of Grammatology and to be
discussed below), but also a clear definition of temporality that incorporates the knot of the
Living Present into a chain of knots of Living Presents. Or, as Derrida will shortly explain in
Psyche, while avoiding both the terms "citationality" and "Living Present:" "Once tied, the tip of
each thread remains without contact with the other, but the contamination will have taken place
between the (internal and external) borders, between the two nearby tips of the same and the
other, the one maintaining [maintenant]40 the other within the diachrony of the 'moment'" (167).
To expand further and to return to the basic methodology of deconstruction outlined in
Positions, Derrida also warns us against thinking of this hand of double writing as a moment to
push through or simply allow to pass: "It is not a question of chronological phase, a given
moment, or a page that one day simply will be turned to go on to other things" (41-42). Husserl
seemingly lingers here in Derrida; the knots on the string remain on the string, are the string and
are not the string, are contaminated and contaminating, with each knot holding two ends -- two
moments of scission from a multiplicity of cuts -- yet are linear. First, one of Husserl's
descriptions of the Rückfrage and what elsewhere he calls the "Living Present," quoted at length
to preserve context:

40

This word will shortly return again in discussion of Derrida's work, but in a slightly different form. This footnote
is merely to call attention to its use by Derrida in Psyche and its lingering fixity in Derrida's thought.
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The immanent contents are what they are only so far as during their "actual"
duration they refer ahead to something futural and back to something past. In this
reference thither and back, however, there is still something different to be
distinguished. In each primal phase which primordially constitutes the immanent
content we have retentions of the preceding and protentions of the coming phases
of precisely this content, and these protentions are fulfilled as long as this content
endures. These "determinate" retentions and protentions have an obscure horizon.
Flowing, they pass over into indeterminate ones with reference to the past and
future running-off of the stream. Through these retentions and protentions, the
actual content of the stream is joined together 41. From retentions and protentions,
then, we must distinguish those recollections and expectations which are not
directed toward the constitutive phases of the immanent content but which
presentify the past or future immanent contents. The contents endure: they have
their time; they are the individual Objectivities which are the unities of alteration
or constancy42 (The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness 110-11).
Derrida's moments, if we follow this reading from Husserl, cannot simply be "waited
out43" for they contain past and future, held together in, to repeat Jameson's phrase discussed

41

In Derridean terms, the knot is tied.
To recall Derrida's explication of the functioning of knots mentioned above: "the contamination will have taken
place between the (internal and external) borders, between the two nearby tips of the same and the other, the one
maintaining [maintenant] the other within the diachrony of the 'moment.'"
43
At least not as of Positions, but that will change with "Hostipitality." Waiting will assume an almost openly
theological tone, whether one waits for the Messiah, the return Christ or al-Mahdi or Krishna or Elijah. Like so
many of his clearest statements, the significance Derrida attaches to waiting appears in a footnote. In explaining the
difference between the "invitation" and its implied "conditional hospitality," and the "visitation" and its
"unconditional hospitality," Derrida provides the following description:
42

if I expect the coming of the other, the arriving of the other who could come at any moment
without asking my opinion and who could come with the best or worst intentions: a visitation
could be an invasion by the worst. Unconditional hospitality must remain open without horizon of

63

earlier, "the expansive power of the now." Secondly, for comparison, Derrida's reading of the
Living Present as found in Edmund Husserl's "Origin of Geometry:" An Introduction, utilizes
the phrase "over and over again" with respect to the Rückfrage and the Living Present. A few
pages before the lines quoted above from The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy,
Derrida notes that for Husserl: "geometry is this extraordinary operation: the creation of an
eidetic" (135). Which brings us to the second point from Jameson's laconic assessment of the
Derridean project kept in suspension since the beginning of this chapter: we find in Derrida at
this point, as in Jameson, the helical structure of temporality of synchronic moments in relation
to the diachronic flow of time, with those synchronic moments being generative of history,
whether we nominate them as moments of Derridean scission or Jamesonian Event 44. The
Husserlian eidos must be disqualified because, unlike the Jamesonian version of Event and
Derridean scission, the Husserlian eidos does not function exactly because of its attempt at
specificity and precision; scission and Event is multiple. In other words, unlike scission (trace or
différance) or Event, the Husserlian eidos does not divorce itself to as great an extent from the
concept of causality, which, as we will see, is the problem of a causality specifically functioning
toward a telos.

expectation, without anticipation, to any surprise visitation. I close this parenthesis, but obviously
it should count for a lot (17).
To quote T.S. Eliot from "East Coker" in order to draw a quick comparison, and to attempt to ameliorate the
theological tenor of Derrida's footnote: "I said to my soul be still, and wait without hope/For hope would be hope
for the wrong thing."
44
The temptation here is to add another name to the knot of scission, cut, différance, trace, and that is event. Each
knot becomes an event, but event is then held to be multiple and susceptible to metonymical substitution: each knot
(event) is not unlike each other knot (event). As will appear in a forthcoming section of this chapter, and had
appeared in the previous chapter on Jameson, the concept of Augenblick, essential to Heidegger's formulation of the
authentic existence, disintegrates, along with Dasein itself, if we accept Derrida's conceptualization of temporality.
Instead, as Derrida himself points out in word as deed, we are left only with "interminable analysis," an unending
series of knotty textual events.
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This warrants a comparison to the earlier quotation from Derrida's dissertation, but the
alteration in Derrida's thinking should become clearer after the following section from Edmund
Husserl's "Origin of Geometry:" An Introduction, and with regard to his summation of one hand
of the deconstructive process summarized in Positions. Again quoted at length to preserve
context, with attention paid to Derrida's mentioning of the "infinite task," as a solution to early
20th century European malaise, in Husserl's Vienna Lecture:
If the structure of "again and again" is fundamental here, the privileged position
of the protentional dimension of intentionality and of that of the future in the
constitution of space in general must be acknowledged...The "again and again"
which hands over exactitude inscribes the advent of mathematics within the
ethico-teleological prescription of the infinite task. And the latter is grounded,
then, in the movement of primordial phenomenological temporalization, in which
the Living Present of consciousness holds itself as the primordial Absolute only in
an indefinite protention, animated and unified by the Idea (in the Kantian sense)
of the total flux of lived experience. As we have seen, the Living Present is the
phenomenological absolute out of which I cannot go because it is that in which,
toward which, and starting from which every going out is effected. The Living
Present has the irreducible originality of the Now, the ground of a here, only if it
retains (in order to be distinguishable from it) the past Now as such, i.e., as the
past present of an absolute origin, instead of purely and simply succeeding it
in an objective time. But this retention will not be possible without a protention
which is its very form: first, because it retains a Now which was itself an original
project, itself retaining another project, and so on; next, because the retention is
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always the essential modification of a Now always in suspense, always tending
toward a next Now. The absolute of the Living Present, then, is only the
indefinite Maintenance (the Nowness) of this double enveloping. But this
Maintenance itself appears as such, it is the Living Present, and it has the
phenomenological sense of a consciousness only if the unity of this movement is
given as indefinite and if its sense of indefiniteness is announced in the
Present...Death will not be comprehended as sense but as a fact extrinsic to the
movement of temporalization. The unity of infinity, the condition for that
temporalization, must then be thought, since it is announced without appearing
and without being contained in a Present. This thought unity, which makes the
phenomenalization of time as such possible, is therefore always the Idea in the
Kantian sense which never phenomenalizes itself (135-37, emphasis Derrida,
emphasis mine).
Although much could be said in a comparison between Derrida's infinite, insurmountable
deferral and the "Idea in the Kantian sense which never phenomenalizes itself," Husserl's
advocacy for infinite tasks as a solution to the European crisis in "Philosophy and the Crisis of
European Man," and the centrality of the futural death in Being and Time as the ultimate horizon
of Dasein, we will not pursue that at this moment, other than to say we find three radically
differing horizons in these examples, and two of these horizons, as noted above with regard to
Jameson, elide the question of individuated death in favor of a variation of collectivity. The
relative conceptualizations of time, however, provide numerous paths to follow. Heidegger's
conceptualizations of temporality will return in the next chapter, especially with regard to the
projection of the present from the future; for Husserl, the Living Present, the Eternal Now from
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which extend protentions and retentions, and, according to Derrida's reading of Husserl,
functions as Maintenance, the "unity of infinity45" must then be thought as dialectic counterpart
to the synchronic now moment, with the qualification that the "unity of infinity" generates the
successive quality of temporality46.
In Husserl's "Origin of Geometry", infinity yet operates in Derrida's thought as limit and
horizon; by "Violence and Metaphysics," the "positivity" of infinity becomes a liability, a
disqualification in Derrida's reading of Emmanuel Levinas discourse on the Other and the face,
and, as Derrida reads it, a metaphor for problem of interiority/exteriority:
But, let us repeat, all this within philosophical discourse, where the thought of
Death itself (without metaphor) and the thought of positive Infinity have never
been able to understand each other. If the face is body, it is mortal. Infinite
alterity as death cannot be reconciled as infinite alterity as positivity and presence
(God). Metaphysical transcendence cannot be at once transcendence toward the
other as Death and transcendence toward the other as God as positivity. Unless
God means Death, which after all has never been excluded by the entirety of the
classical philosophy within which we understand God both as Life and as the
Truth of Infinity, of positive Presence. But what does this exclusion mean if not
the exclusion of every particular determination? That God is nothing
(determined), is not life, because he is everything? and therefore is at once All and
Nothing, Life and Death. Within difference, and at bottom as Difference itself.
45

That Derrida chooses the spatial term "infinity," rather than the temporal equivalent, "eternity," in a discussion
involving death and temporality is worth noting.
46
As noted in footnote 7 above, the concept of "eternity," as frequently deployed, oscillates between, at least, four
senses and combinations thereof. Here, Derrida, although he chooses the spatial word "infinity," presents eternity,
in the sense of "unity of infinity" as the totality of time, and, in the implied sense of that, unlike the never
phenomenalized Kantian idea, as an unending series.
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This Difference is what is called History. God is inscribed in it (Writing and
Difference 115-16, emphasis original, emphasis mine).
Derrida, at this moment, offers a sharp distinction between God and Death, and then
draws from that distinction his own variation on negative theology, which he finds Levinas illequipped to combat due to Levinas' failure to cultivate a "disdain of discourse" (ibid.) This
"disdain of discourse" is necessary to enable oneself to understand the point, which Derrida
relates to negative theology, that all human discourse cannot match the divine Logos. The
solution for Derrida, here, as elsewhere, is interminable critique, an "economy of violence,"
wherein the telos of discourse is silence, and silence is peace (116). "War dies out only at the
end of discourse," determines Derrida, but violence must be enacted to prevent greater violence
in an "economy of violence." We find again endless temporalized war without death: "This
becoming [inscribed in discourse] is war. This polemic is language itself 47" (117).
In his parsing of Husserl, Derrida states that, "It is not by chance that there is no
phenomenology of the Idea" (Introduction 138). Rather, "the Idea is the pole of a pure
intention...It alone reveals, then, the being of the intention: intentionality itself" (139, emphasis
Derrida). Derrida performs a series of metonymical substitutions here, to which we may add
one more: The "total flux of lived experience" is the movement toward the never
phenomenalized "Kantian Idea," which itself is "the pole of pure intention," which is a
description of diachrony. As the earliest Derrida stated, with deconstruction, ironically, haunting
his text from the future, but not yet present, "the absolute beginning of philosophy must be

As in the previous chapter with regard to Žižek, we find ourselves with polemos and dike under the looming
Introduction to Metaphysics.
47
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essentialist," a concept Derrida will eventually spend a lifetime arguing for and against, by
providing the concept scission as both a confirmation and refutation.
And, as seen in his second work on Husserl, disquietude exists in the form of a
disagreement with a former position; such a summarization of the implications of Husserl cannot
pass without comment. The manner in which Derrida phrases his comments are in translations
from Husserl in the form of supratemporality (Zeitlosigkeit) and omnitemporality
(Überzeitlichkeit), the former being uchronie, timelessness in the atemporal sense, and the latter,
panchronie48 (Introduction 71). As Derrida asks, are not supratemporality and omnitemporality
"the characteristics of Time itself? Are they not the characteristics of the Living Present, which
is the absolute concrete Form of phenomenological temporality and the primordial Absolute of
all transcendental life?" (148, emphasis original). Or, as Derrida phrases it much earlier in the
book, "We would have on one side a synchronic or timeless 49 [uchronique] ground and, on the
other side, a purely empirical diachrony with its indicative function but without any proper unity
of its own. Neither pure diachrony nor pure synchrony make a history. The rejected hypothesis
is once more that of a complicity between 'Platonism' and empiricism" (61-62 [brackets
original]). As we had seen above, against the Kantian Idea, that pure pole of intention that never
phenomenalizes itself, Derrida juxtaposes in synchronic Living Present; in the latter work on
Husserl, Derrida presents the problem of time as one between Platonism and empiricism, which

48

Here again, we find differing senses of eternity, atemporality on one hand, and on the other, some indeterminable
combination of the totality of time and simultaneity, as noted above in Footnote 7 of Chapter 1; although, shortly,
another quotation from Derrida will be introduced that seemingly defines panchrony strictly as the totality of a
diachronic movement.
49
A great difficulty here is that Derrida defines synchrony as atemporal rather than momentary, which will be the
configuration of synchrony in dia-synchrony, as has been noted above. Although Derrida, in this early text, rejects
the hypothesis "of a complicity between 'Platonism' and empiricism," that will be exactly his position. The two cut
strings of synchrony and diachrony will be twisted into a knot with the already knotted string of the Living Present –
in a literal, practical form, a crown knot; as a symbol, the long tradition stretching at least from the recognizable
from the Indian subcontinent and stretching to Celtic knots.
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we would not be overzealous to rephrase in Wyndham Lewis' terms of Platonism and Ionian
naturalism. The pure, unmoving pole vanishes 50 and in its place, Derrida substitutes uchrony and
panchrony as subservient positions in a hierarchy culminated by the Living Present. The
difference is subtle, but profound for Derrida's thought. In the former book on Husserl, Derrida
maintained some sort of distinction, where the pole of intentionality remained outside of the
present; now, it has been subsumed. The emphasis, then, lies on the present, "at a given
moment;" Husserlian eidetic thought has been elided, and with it, the issues of telos and origin.
Derrida will further seek to solve the former with deferral, and the latter with scission, the
capricious cut, for which we have already listed a number of the aliases given to it by Derrida,
and yet deserves another: Event, with all of the resonances from the discussion in the last
chapter concerning Žižek, Jameson, and Event intended, but with a qualification: the Event of
the Present. The Event of the Present, though, is not a particular engaging event, as Derrida had
argued through citational substitution in Of Grammatology. One present surpasses the last, and
so on and so forth, leading nowhere, from an arbitrary cut. Each present, then, functions as a
replacement for the last in a perfect metonymical equivalency; but only if we implicitly posit
Derrida's own "extraordinary operation" vis-à-vis his own estimation of Husserl's goal for
examining geometry: "the creation of an eidetic 51," which, in this case, is the eidetic of the
present within the diachronic flow of temporality, the center for Derrida's structure, the center for
deconstruction.

50

Or, to mention again Lewis' definition of Platonic temporality, with recognition that Derrida's context is ostensibly
Kantian: "something indestructible and constant behind the phenomenal flux" (Time and Western Man 233).
51
For clarity, the phrases in quotation marks are Derrida's words regarding Husserl as quoted above.
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C. Before Nothing
To prod différance a bit, rather than to accept blindly its status as non-entity, we may
consider the possibility that here -- and elsewhere, whenever he discusses différance -- Derrida
arguably plays with an exceedingly odd combination of Russell's Paradox, which states that a
normal set cannot contain itself as an element without generating a contradiction of its own
terms, and Gnosticism. To quote again Derrida from "Violence and Metaphysics," "infinite
alterity as death cannot be reconciled as infinite alterity as positivity and presence (God). Unless
God means death." First, the set of God, so to speak, as Derrida presents it, contains everything
and nothing, the totality of a binary opposition of the subset of presence and the subset of
absence, if (and it is a rather significant if) we concede to Derrida that "classical philosophy" first
determines God as "the Truth of Infinity, of positive Presence," despite classical philosophy, in
its entirety, having never excluded the possibility that God is death. This broad qualification of
the entirety of classical philosophy functions as a red herring and a false dichotomy; whether the
totality of classical philosophy did or did not exclude the equivalency of God and death is, in one
sense, an irrelevancy, a falsified binary presented by Derrida in order to be deconstructed, the
sacrifice of an effigy.
Secondly, even for the sake of argument, we certainly cannot concede to Derrida this
point of the strict separation between God and death if we give any consideration whatsoever to
the influence of Gnostic thought on classical philosophers 52, concerning whom we must arguably

52

The great difficulty here is what Derrida means by "classical philosophers." Certainly in the West, the history of
philosophy is entangled with the history of the Church (the work of Augustine, Aquinas, and Anselm all make
appearances herein), and therefore, theology, and even theosophy as well, given Heidegger's appropriation and
modification of Meister Eckhart's term Gelassenheit. In other words, if we accept Derrida's supposition that
Heidegger was focused on presence, and if presence is the hallmark of classical philosophy (and said obsession with
presence necessitates such deconstruction), then we would not be remiss in defining "classical philosophy" as all
that preceded deconstruction, which includes the various intersections with theology.
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mention Augustine (and Harold Bloom for that matter in a more recent context), and therefore,
also those who wrote against Gnosticism, which includes Augustine as well. In a Gnosticism
generalized here, the totality of material presence -- and therefore, death as well -- stands within
the province of the demiurge and not of God Himself; death is excluded from God, if not by the
totality of classical philosophy, at least within the terms of Gnosticism, which was viewed as
heresy, as least partially because of a generalized Gnosticism's general contempt for the material
world, or rather, Creation. Additionally, if God is an absence beyond the demiurge and its
creation, we find a refutation by example of the familiar Derridean universalization of presence
as the center of all Western thought. Derrida, however, must posit his terms in a binary, which is
then to be deconstructed, brought into question, and made shockingly suspicious. Even though
Derrida puts forth that the totality of classical philosophy never excluded death, the declaration
of Gnosticism as heresy suggests otherwise, that death had never been separated from God, and
to do so may even be considered sacrilegious -- an affront to the Divine Will expressed in
Genesis with the expulsion from Eden and paradisiacal eternal life -- which mitigates Derrida's
presentation of the supposedly shocking idea that the Western tradition never conceived of God
as related to death.
All of this is confused profoundly because of Derrida's insistence on the metonymical
substitution of God by death in an equivalency, coupled with an inversion of the sets; in this brief
passage, the set of God suddenly changes from the totality that contains the subsets of death,
presence, and absence, to a subset of the totality of death shared with the set of the totality of
history (and, likely, by implication, its supplement of writing). This is Derrida's first point of
error53 here – or Derrida's demand for the abeyance of our knowledge of his stance on the totality

53

Or obfuscation.
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of metaphysics while he presents his own metaphysics -- when such a totality, as the denial or
acceptance of God as death, as Gnosticism demonstrates, never existed, nor did any such
absolute unity as "classical philosophy" as an engine for the promulgation of the center of
presence. In other words, despite his attempt to qualify his own statement with ersatz doubt,
Derrida's binarism cannot accommodate the complexity of the historical, philosophical, or
theological situation, and Derrida's argument here depends greatly upon a reasonably accurate
assessment of the past, even if only quickly sketched, as well as some sort of distinction between
absence and différance, a distinction Derrida elsewhere, and repeatedly, elides.
Thirdly, "what does this exclusion mean if not the exclusion of every particular
determination?", then becomes problematic for, as pointed out earlier, Derrida builds this
argument on the basic structural foundation of Anselm's ontological argument and its
metaphysics, but in the inverse54.
Fourthly, as his tendency toward being the anti-Anselm of différance, Derrida offers an
elegant solution: the set of différance -- "the play of the trace, or the différance, which has no
meaning and is not" as quoted from Margins earlier -- contains the set of God and its subsets of
the respective totalities of presence and absence. This set that contains the subset of God and its
subsets is inscribed into history, so that, as Derrida had written in Of Grammatology: "there is
nothing outside the text," or "there is no outside-text" (168). The totality of presence and
54

In "Economimesis," in a discussion of Kant and the sublime, Derrida explores Kant's term "negative pleasure," but
with a significant qualification, "I start from the place of the negative" (Derrida Reader 289). As much as Anselm's
ontological argument incorporates an unspoken sublimity -- "greater than that which can be conceived" is and is not
that which is "beyond human comprehension" -- this reading, in conjunction with the pleasure generated by apeiron
and the post card mentioned at the opening of this chapter, hopefully, tentatively illuminates différance as something
we could call the negative sublime, if such a qualifying adjective, and therefore, such terminology, can make any
sense. Read against the Lisbon Earthquake, for example, a profoundly negative event, this terminology does not
make sense; but, when read through Derrida, wherein any event indicates presence, which then indicates absence, a
negative sublime also could be termed the sublimity of absence. Again, such a concept is tentative and in nascent
form here, but worth a passing mention.
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absence, as individuated or subsumed under the set of God, appears in text. Although there is
some controversy concerning the former translation, both above translations from Of
Grammatology, which are both provided by Gayatri Spivak in the corrected edition, confirms the
position of "difference at bottom" later forwarded in "Violence and Metaphysics." Derrida's
solution to the set of God (as all elements that are presence) containing the set of death, (as one
of all elements that are not presence, and therefore absence, but offered as a present absence, not
an empty set), is addition: the set of différance, with its supplement of writing, is greater (or
rather, lesser) than that which can be conceived, and since différance is nothing, it is itself not
actually a set, and therefore does not approach Russell's Paradox by not having anything for
itself to contain; nothing added to nothing is nothing; there is no set to be empty. Or, to apply
Derrida's condemnation of "classical thought" in "Structure, Sign and Play in the Human
Sciences" to his own work: "The concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a
freeplay based on a fundamental ground, a freeplay which is constituted upon a fundamental
immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the reach of freeplay" (Writing and
Difference 279). The center55, for Derrida as quoted above in his refutation of a concept from
Emmanuel Levinas, is "within difference, and at bottom as Difference itself." Clearly, Derrida
treats différance as a set and as the center (the "at bottom," the fundament -- at least in his system
of process, the ultimate catchall), which may be viewed in his use of the concept as quoted
immediately above from "Violence and Metaphysics;" différance is a set that contains elements
as subsets, and those subsets contain their own elements. Therefore, Derrida's procedure

55

We know have two centers, which would be problematic under "classical strictures," but not under Derridean
logic. First, scission, these aribitrary cuts made here to define the center, is "always multiple." Secondly, as his
thought progresses from his first two works on Husserl, we may view différance as a citational substitution for diasynchrony; différance as the supplement of dia-synchrony; or, dia-synchrony as the supplement of différance; or a
combination of options, maintained in intentional obscurity. While it would take much more time and
argumentation, a combination of the first and third options suggests itself: dia-synchrony abdicates the center in
favor of différance; différance requires dia-synchrony as its supplement.
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demands treating death (and the subset of absence, as well) as presence instead of an empty set,
unless, of course, the set of différance is exactly an empty set, despite its elements, which may or
may not be the case.
We cannot ever know from Derrida's work: for example, if death and absence are
interchangeable, Derrida will write against death as any kind of presence in Aporias with regard
to Heidegger and the impossibility of death as Derrida reads death from the doubled death
postulated by Maurice Blanchot, only then to treat a modulation of death as a presence in The
Gift of Death. This points toward the great difficulty in accepting binarism as Derrida forwards
it in the terms of absence and presence; of Derrida's slipperiness in treating absence as presence;
of Derrida's near metaphysics, which may be metaphysics proper; of Derrida's penchant for dicta,
and the creation of methodology and hierarchy, while adamantly insisting all other dicta,
methodologies, and hierarchies are mistakes, and that he himself is actually not forwarding dicta,
methodology, and hierarchy; of the problems Derrida's work creates when approached through
the analytical tradition, and an expansion of the context as to why his infamous debate with John
Searle could never have been anything but an unproductive draw.
Further, in "Structure, Sign and Play in the Human Sciences," Derrida argues that we
cannot imagine a structure without a center, even while he proposes one. While Derrida brings
us to an aporia in his own work, différance (that Derridean master-signifier in addition to that
Derridean set and that center of the Derridean structure and even that Derridean objet petit-a)
holds its empty central position, surrounded by its own metaphysical laws, such as is
demonstrated by Derrida's insistence of the position of différance "at bottom" as the nadir of an
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inverted hierarchy rather than as the apex; the empty hole at the bottom of a funnel56 rather than
the peak of a pyramid or the top of a pile subject to the angle of repose.
We can accept this insistence -- and with it, most of Derrida's ideas, especially before his
turn -- or not, for it is only that: an insistence, the generation of a formless form, the instantiation
of an eidos of absence. To keep with the metaphor of the hole of an empty funnel, all subsequent
textual production – and, really, human life – diachronically flows from, and is marked by, this
void for Derrida. In contrast, Heidegger, in "The Thing," offers a vastly different take on
absence. In his example, when a potter throws a jug, the potter is not making a vessel, but
shaping the void around which the jug "things," to use Heidegger's term (Poetry, Language,

56

This choice of this metaphor was made in relation to Heidegger's jug that soon appears. One suspects one could
substitute another Derridean term for the funnel. In the following passage, Derrida discusses a text as "an internal
pocket larger than the whole" that finds its beginning in the opening line of a text in "The Law of Genre" (Signature
Derrida 7). (Why and how the sum of the parts of the text being larger than the whole of the text is not viewed,
simply, as yet another metaphysical inversion, this time the reversal of the standard formulation of Aristotelean
emergence, is another matter.) As he continues, Derrida's polynomination replaces the hymen of the earlier works,
such as in "The Double Session" in Dissemination (173-286), with invagination to describe how a text functions:
"And it is without beginning or end, without content and without edge. There is only content without edge – without
boundary or frame – and there is only edge without content. The inclusion (or occlusion, inocclusive invagination)
is interminable; it is an analysis of the account that can only turn in circles in an unarrestable, inenarrable, and
insatiably recurring manner – but one terrible for those who, in the name of the law, require that order reign in the
account, for those who want to know, with all the required competence, 'exactly' how this happens" (Signature
Derrida 19-20, emphasis mine). As presented here, and if we were to ignore the problematic implications of
Derrida's invagination (implications as problematic in their respective manner as the reading of Jameson, vis-à-vis
uneven development, that would justify claims of Jameson's support of the notion of European exceptionalism), we
could draw a number of parallels between a funnel and a vagina, especially as Derrida deploys both hymen and
invagination, but that would risk moving us toward ludicrousness more than Derrida's nounal verb does, as well as
risk pushing us toward a discourse on Holy Vessels, a concept with which Derrida, one also may or may not suspect,
is obliquely playing in the word invagination. What matters here, most centrally, is that différance and an
invaginating text can be said to function in much the same fashion, so much so that we may begin to catch a glimpse
of another consistency in Derrida's work despite Derrida's polynomination of différance. Différance here, it seems,
haunts from the past rather than from the future; différance implies absence, just as invagination, as Derrida will
argue in "The Retrait of Metaphor," implies absence. In this case, scission (the arbitrary cut to resolve the condition
of being "without beginning or end"), citationality (the "insatiably recurring" aspect), and the centerless structure
("without boundary or frame;" "edge without content" [i.e. an empty set]; "content without edge" [i.e. the non-set])
also haunt. While much effort could be expended in making comparisons and tracing the new names for old
concepts in Derrida, the second point is that invagination, in Derrida's own estimation as absence, and in relation to
metaphor, metaphysics, and Heidegger, will return in the fourth chapter during the discussion of Derrida's "The
Retrait of Metaphor," a broader discussion of the specter of metaphor that never ceases to haunt Derrida. His tactic
is polydefinition, rather than the polynomination of différance; Derrida arrives at three extremely differing
conclusion concerning metaphor in "Edmond Jabés and the Question of the Book" in Writing and Difference,
"White Mythology" in Margins, and "The Retrait of Metaphor" in Psyche.
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Thought 167) We will return to this essay later, with regard to regioning, but, in passing,
Heidegger's posits the possibility of shaping the void, while Derrida's positions the void as the
center/noncenter, a certain absence almost beyond any conceptualization: that void, but not the
vessel, must remain our focus, according to Derrida; to shape the void requires agency, and
therefore, an agent, which is decidedly the wrong emphasis for Derrida's work 57. As has been
mentioned, and will be argued again shortly, from that différance, Derridean dia-synchronic
temporality emanates, or, from the chaotic apeiron, via différance, springs temporal order, both a
necessity to generate a citational chain of substitution and a necessity to describe a citational
chain of substitution. In citationality, we find the only specifiable and unchanging order,
perhaps, in the whole of Derrida's thought and the secret center of deconstruction masquerading
as a supplement: sequential temporality.
Or, to return to "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,"
Derrida offers such a temporal center himself:
Play is the disruption of presence. The presence of an element is always a
signifying and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences and the
movement of a chain. Play is always the play of absence and presence, but if it is
to be thought radically, play must be conceived of before the alternative of
presence and absence58. Being must be conceived as presence or absence on the
basis on the basis of the possibility of play and not the other way around...

57

This is only one of many pronounced differences between the respective thought of Heidegger and Derrida, and a
passing refutation of those, including Derrida himself as well as some of his most virulent critics, who argue that
Derrida's work is explicitly or implicitly a continuation, correction, and expansion of Heidegger's thought.
58
In the chronology of Derrida's work, this predates both the quotations above from "Freud and the Scene of
Writing" and Margins that repeat this argument concerning the originary function of différance, here presented as
"play."
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...the thinking of play...would be the Nietzschean affirmation, that is the
joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the
affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin
which is offered to an active interpretation. The affirmation then determines the
noncenter otherwise than as loss of the center. And it plays without security. For
there is sure play: that which is limited to the substitution of given and existing,
present pieces. In absolute chance, affirmation also surrenders itself to genetic
indetermination, to the seminal adventure of the trace (Writing and Difference
292, emphasis Derrida)
The issue Derrida avoids here is "the movement of a chain," which is the movement of
play, a movement dependent upon the absence every present signifier implies. If play (or trace
or différance) precedes presence, precedes absence, precedes Being as presence and absence,
then does not time, as a sequential series of moments, precede play? Otherwise, if play is
movement, play could not exist, unless play is a timeless eidos. Again, we find ourselves in
metaphysics, whether beholden to Kantian temporality or Platonism, as we did with Jameson.
Likewise, how can play exist without any pieces? That would then be a pure totality of absence
without the possibility of the play of absence and presence. Phrased this way, the entire
discourse stands as an esoteric metaphysical discussion in the inverse: the metaphysics of
absence rather than the metaphysics of presence.
Aside from Derrida's metaphysics, Derrida's reconfiguration of the temporality of the
Nietzschean Bejahung provides telling evidence for Derrida's insistence on the conceptualization
of temporality as a series of moments, which is the de facto center upon which he lays the
foundation of différance and then builds the edifice of deconstruction. If we understand "the
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seminal adventure of the trace" as occurring in a series, which is how Derrida always presents
the functioning of the concept, then we have the structure of time under which the Nietzschean
affirmation surrenders. Unfortunately, Derrida offers no explanation, only another insistence.
The affirmation, as presented by Nietzsche in The Gay Science, cannot be separated from the
concept of eternal return, of cyclical temporality. Or, as Nietzsche famously phrased it: "This
life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once again and innumerable times
again; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and
sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you, all in the same
succession or sequence..." (194). The affirmation comes, for Nietzsche, first by understanding
the totality of the repetition, utterly not "absolute chance" as Derrida proposes, and secondly,
that, despite the appearance of sequence, the movement is cyclical, absolutely not the "serial onetime, the several times that will have taken place only once," of dia-synchrony. Nietzsche's
affirmation, then, does not affirm Derrida's work; only Derrida's Nietzsche affirms Derrida's
work. And if Nietzsche's "affirmation then determines the noncenter otherwise than as loss of
the center," then we have no determination of the noncenter, but, nonetheless, find ourselves
under the Derridean center of sequential temporality without eternal recurrence.
Again, or, as Derrida defines his methodology, and with it, his adamantly held
conceptualization of temporality in another discussion of one of Nietzsche's fragments in Spurs:
"my relation -- and yours too -- to the event of this text, which otherwise never quite makes it,
our relation is that of a structurally posthumous necessity" (137, emphasis mine). To extend here
the analogical use of Gnosticism in comparison to Derrida, the knot of ouroboros, rather than
continuing some kind of Maintenance of the "unity of infinity" that is forever the Living Now,
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finally succeeds in consuming itself – or pulls its threads out of tension – and leaves its ghost to
slither forward and haunt for eternity59.

D. The Center Holds
In Derrida's reading of Husserl considered in the first section of this chapter, we may
hear the echo in advance of the sounding of Derrida's reading of Levinas from "Violence and
Metaphysics:"
If there is any history, then historicity can be only the passage of Speech [Parole],
the pure tradition of a primordial Logos toward a polar Telos. But since there can
be nothing outside of the pure historicity of that passage, since there is no Being
which has sense outside of this historicity or escapes its infinite horizon, since the
Logos and Telos are nothing outside of the interplay (Wechselspiel) of their
59

Or, in Derridean terms, as he writes in "The Double Bottom of the Plupresent" in Dissemination:
The present presents itself as the simplicity of a bottom or ground. A past tense that
would mark only another present would assure itself of the grounding of a simple foundation,
hidden behind the surface of present appearances. What the double bottom of the imperfect
summons up [n.b.: like the specter of ouroboros, the specter of the Living Now], here at least, is a
time without grounding, foundation, or limit [n.b.: time spatialized via spatial terminology], a
tense that would no longer be tempus; it is a presentless time [n.b.: uchrony or panchrony?], the
total account depriving the square of its ground, leaving it suspended in the air. As soon as there
is a double bottom, there is no bottom or ground at all [n.b.: the hole at the bottom of the funnel]
in process of formation, and this law will not cease to confirm itself from now on [n.b.: another
dictum].
The imperfect will have provided the motion [n.b.: the flow from the hole at the bottom
of the funnel with its metaphorical supplement of gravity]. The illusion of the present, the illusion
which, playing upon the dead surface [n.b.: not the false iteration of a "dead surface" as opposed
to the eternal eidetic of the present], makes us believe in the secure foundation of an originary
donation or providence, is also denounced [n.b.: the annulment of the Living Present], as you can
see, and set in motion [n.b.: presumably a diachronic motion, unless motion can be conceived in
terms other than the sequential, even if that sequence is then recurs eternally] by the touch of a
whip…But that denunciation takes place in a sequence that is itself written in the present [n.b.: a
present that does not exist, and therefore, a sequence that does and does not exist, and therefore,
the existence and nonexistence of time, or the triumph of space, at least at this moment in Derrida,
although the claim that the "Absolute is Passage" and any "structurally posthumous necessity"
certainly contradicts this point.]
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reciprocal inspiration, this signifies then that the Absolute is Passage (Writing and
Difference 149, emphasis Derrida).
We see here time expanded, a third time offered by Derrida's analysis, a serial movement
of time captured in speech, generated by the interplay of the timeless "polar Telos" and the
omnitemporality of the Living Now as Absolute Origin as Maintenance. The argument Derrida
makes is for serial temporality, for diachrony; the movement functions dialectically, but without
synthesis, always held in tension, any resolution forever withheld, eternally – and citationally –
so, in an endless repetition. Time, in terms familiar to Jameson, exists in a suspension; as in
Jameson, a synchronic Event births diachronic History. In this particular text signed by Derrida,
we can witness the birth of arche-writing, although it will yet be a few years before its diachronic
christening in Of Grammatology: "arche-writing as spacing cannot occur as such within the
phenomenological experience of presence" (68). In other words, arche-writing is the eidos of
writing, a supposed center that will be deconstructed itself, endlessly.
And what also may be witnessed is the unmistakable similarity between Derrida's reading
of time in Husserl, presented first above, and Derrida's generation of temporality in relation to
Levinas, presented as both counterpoint and confabulation. What we must not miss, however, is
the elision of Husserl in the later Derrida's substitution of the exceedingly vague "polar Telos"
for the more specific language of the "ethico-teleological prescription of the infinite task"
Derrida deploys in his discussion of Husserl in Introduction. At the bottom, the difference here
is Derrida's removal of Husserl and the minimization of any kind of eidetic function, which
essentially alters the conceptualization of temporality from being based on an infinite task to a
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ceaseless movement toward a "polar Telos 60." Death and Dasein are myths and mistakes; the
Event, the messianic Event of any variety, may or may not ever come, may (or rather, must)
remain forever indeterminate, a-venir; scission as originary Event has occurred as we have
chosen. The river of time, however, burbles onward, even if it will never reach the ocean, even
if there may well be no ocean to reach, or is, as a river without banks, the ocean itself, moving
over the surface of an impossible earth, flattened and extending toward infinity, for which we
would require an invaginated61 map without borders, which would be the text of the earth itself.
That is, for all of his radical search for contradiction, the incessant search for aporias,
Derrida's conceptualization of time changes little, or, perhaps, undergoes no change at all. In his
discussion of Emmanuel Levinas in "Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida encapsulates Levinas'
thought as such: "Only the other, the totally other, can be manifested as what it is before the
shared truth, within a certain nonmanifestation and a certain absence. It can be said only of the
other that its phenomenon is a certain nonphenomenon, its presence (is) a certain absence. Not
pure and simple absence, for there logic could make its claim, but a certain absence62" (91,
emphasis Derrida). This "certain absence," this Derridean specification, also appears in Of
Grammatology in his reading of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Emile: "A certain absence, then...the
experience of which we speak is such as to reduce that absence as much as to maintain it" (152).
Recall, for a moment, Derrida's description of the "double enveloping" of the Living Present
60

Which, nonetheless, can only be the form of telos -- the eidos of telos -- for it cannot be reached, as Derrida
points about repeatedly, most notably in his bafflement over any kind of end in "Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently
Adopted in Philosophy," but let us ignore another exploration, other than to note its presence.
61
If we think this word as Derrida likely may have, in the sense of endless etymological play, or at least a doubling,
we first have the Latinate root from which we draw the word vagina. Simultaneously, the root of –vag may also be
read as being derived from vagus, the source of the French and English words for vagrant, vagary, and vague. To
invaginate then would be to make indefinite, as in the erasing of borders, or, more poetically, to destabilize, to
displace, to dehouse, to make itinerant. Or even more poetically, to invaginate, with its root of wandering, may be
read as the denial of the possibility of dwelling, and by implication, Heideggerean thinking.
62
To view this as a periphrastic definition of the trace certainly suggests itself, as does periphrasis-via-nearsynonym in the exploration above of deconstruction and Russell's Paradox.

82

from Edmund Husserl's "Origin of Geometry:" An Introduction, which he nominates
"Maintenance:" "the Idea in the Kantian sense which never phenomenalizes itself." This
"certain absence" shares with "Maintenance" the qualification of an absence never present within
the essential unidirectional flow of time; to extend, time itself, it seems, is itself a certain absence
about which, as Derrida reminds us, and which Jameson thrice recommends to us, it is already to
late to talk, an absence that is never precisely present, always absent in a certain, nearly
indescribable way.
Derrida presents (presents, uttered repeatedly as a complete word, always a verb, with the
accent on the first then second syllable, alternately) this "certain absence" in "Writing and
Telecommunication" in Margins as well. Here, Derrida defines absence in terms of the future
addressee, which is a basic supposition of Derrida's entire corpus, but perhaps nowhere more
clearly formulated: "All writing, therefore, in order to be what it is, must be able to function in
the radical absence of every empirically determined addressee in general" (315-16). Derrida
introduces this "radical absence" on the previous page as a "certain absence" intrinsic to "every
sign," but "of an original kind in writing" (314) for a "written sign is proffered in absence of the
addressee" (315). Derrida also warns that we should not view the absent addressee as merely "a
presence that is distant, delayed, or, in one form or another, idealized in it representation"63
(315). To do so contradicts the iterability of writing, its ability to be read "beyond the death of
the addressee" (315). While the previous paragraph insinuated the conflation of temporality and
absence in relation to the unidirectional flow of time, these ideas from Margins make that
coalescence clear: time moves forever forward for Derrida, and his work depends entirely upon
the incontrovertibility of such movement.

63

As Derrida exactly does with the idealized metaphor of the post card in The Post Card.
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To return to this "certain absence" discussed in "Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida
draws conclusions concerning the work of two philosophers of time, Heidegger and Bergson,
with the qualification that "although Levinas...does not say so:" "Because they [Heidegger and
Bergson] do not think the other, they do not have time. Without time, they do not have history.
The absolute alterity of each instant, without which there would be no time, cannot be produced
– constituted – within the identity of the subject or the existent. It comes into time through the
Other. Bergson and Heidegger would have overlooked this...and Husserl even more so" (91).
We return briefly to Edmund Husserl's "The Origin of Geometry: An Introduction to examine
another metonymical substitution in the chain mentioned above that includes the Kantian Idea, so
that Derrida may explain the Other himself: "God speaks and passes through constituted history,
he is beyond in relation to constituted history and all the constituted moments of transcendental
life. But his is only the Pole for itself of constituting historicity and constituting historical
transcendental subjectivity" (148, emphasis original). Again, any accusation of metaphysics or
religion against Derrida are not precisely baseless; even if Derrida makes such assumptions only
in order to deconstruct them, we find a situation similar to Heidegger's critique of Sartrean
existentialism64: "the reversal of a metaphysical proposition...is yet a metaphysical proposition"
(Pathmarks 290). Derrida maintains a differing narrative: he holds up a flaw allegedly shared by
Bergson, Heidegger, and Husserl, and that flaw, if we take Derrida at his own word and apply his
own concept of a chain of substitution to his own work, is the failure by Bergson, Heidegger, and
Husserl to recognize God in the trace, scission, différance, "the total flux of lived experience,"
the Absolute as passage. To make a point to contrast with Heidegger later, we may propose, for
Derrida, that, through noting his own substitutions, God is time as différance as passage, God is

64

Discussed above in Chapter 1, Footnote 19.
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visible in history (via inscription), God is the yet-to-be-reached-and-never-to-be-attained polar
telos in the future, God is the certain absence, and the différance at bottom subsumes all.
The crucial point, however, has nothing to do with theology or divinity, the existence or
non-existence of a deity, or the process of the alteration of Derrida's thought through which he
realizes his initial proposal of God as the polar telos -- the solution to the problem of
intentionality -- would prevent his future work in deconstruction65, and provide a functional
center for human life, is exactly the kind of center Derrida dismisses in "Structure, Sign and Play
in the Discourse of Human Sciences."
The problem is, however, whether in terms of "absence and presence" or "dialectical and
anti-dialectical," we find ourselves with an opposition, one in which, following Derrida's own
process discussed in Positions, a "general strategy of deconstruction" does not, cannot, (and
perhaps even should not) exist (41). In his simplified description of his "double science,"
Derrida posits the first step that must be the "overturning" of the hierarchy of a classical
opposition, but then engaging in "interminable analysis" for "the hierarchy of dual oppositions
always reestablishes itself" (42). The other hand of this double writing is the overturning of the
hierarchy of writing/speech. How do we read, "the hierarchy of dual oppositions always
reestablishes itself?" Is the low made high, and the high made low, only to revert to the previous
orientation of the hierarchy, with the high re-achieving its status and the low returning to the
subaltern position, and thus the necessity of "interminable analysis?" Or should we read this as
the low becoming the high and then inflicting upon the former high a repetition of the same

65

If God is the polar telos, we would all know, then, toward Whom the postcard moves, and suddenly have a version
of Derrida who is very much a Berkelean idealist, until his predictable and inevitable perfect inversion of such a
position. In the section of "Violence and Metaphysics" quoted above, Derrida subsumes the polar telos under the
aegis of passage, effectively removing the consideration of the dependence of reality on any Eternal Witness.
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violence, and thus the necessity of "interminable analysis," an application of the violence of
"Violence and Metaphysics?" Or should we read this as the process of Derrida's own version of
his non-religious millenarianism, which is under the sign of a guaranteed failure via infinite
deferral66? We find nothing definitive, only the open-ended flow of play without a telos, but
with an absolute direction. We find the unchanging center of time as dia-synchrony. To repeat a
phrase from the chapter on Jameson, here the greatest difficulty and opportunity to claim
liberation ensues.
And we can find evidence that Derrida understood the necessity of serial temporality for
exactly such a claim to liberation for critical theory, and that evidence comes as absence.
Derrida does not begin with an absence, but creates one by starting with the negative67; only in a
highly attenuated sense can we begin to think of negative presence as absence, rather than simply
negative presence68. What we must keep in mind is the foregoing discussion of Derrida's
conceptualization of temporality that may be most succinctly summarized in the text taken from
Margins that Jameson quoted in three separate works: "In a certain sense, it is always too late to
talk about time." Given that Heraclitean temporality of the endless flow, with seeming eidetic of
the present noted above herein, not only do we again witness the closing of the gap named by
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See, for example and comparison, Luke 3:4-5: "(4)As it is written in the book of the words of Esaias the prophet,
saying, The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight. (5)Every
valley shall be filled, and every mountain and hill brought low, and the crooked shall be made straight, and the
rough shall be made smooth." As an aside, if we were to play as Derrida plays by association, and certainly Derrida
refers to Luke in The Gift of Death and elsewhere, we also find here, perhaps, an apt summation of Derrida's
deconstructive project in Luke 3:9, which even enables us to append Heraclitean undertones after the fact: "And
now also the axe is laid unto the root of the trees: every tree therefore which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn
down, and cast into the fire." The difference, of course, is différance, the nothing at bottom, as opposed to eternal
salvation.
67
To recall the declaration from "Economimesis" cited in Footnote 26: "I start from the place of the negative."
68
Or, as Heidegger does, specifically in Parmenides, but also elsewhere, to resist a discourse of presence and
absence: recast the question in terms of alethia, and then concealment and unconcealment, wherein a "negative
presence" as used here would not be an absence, but a condition of concealment. This idea will return in the
discussion of Derrida's and Paul de Man's shared insistence on the reading of Heidegger as a philosopher of
parousia.
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Wyndham Lewis, but we find another solution to the great mystery of time, which, briefly, taxed
Derrida himself:
We have seen that the traditional concept of time, an entire organization of the
world and of language was bound up with it [the linearity of the symbol]. Writing
in the narrow sense -- and phonetic writing above all -- is rooted in a past of
nonlinear writing69. It had to be defeated, and here one can speak, if one wishes,
of technical success; it assured a greater security and greater possibilities of
capitalization in a dangerous and anguishing world. But that was not done one
single time. A war was declared, and a suppression of all that resisted
linearization was installed...[initially] a writing that spells its symbols pluridimensionally; there the meaning is not subjected to the order of a logical time,
or to the irreversible temporality of sound. This pluri-dimensionality does not
paralyze history within simultaneity, it corresponds to another level of historical
experience, and one may just as well consider, conversely, linear thought as a
reduction of history...the pluri-dimensional symbolic structure is not given within
the category of the simultaneous. Simultaneity coordinates two absolute presents,
two points or instants of presence, and it remains a linearist concept. The concept
of linearization is much more effective, faithful, and intrinsic than those that are
habitually used for classifying scripts and describing their history (Of
Grammatology 85, emphasis original, emphasis mine).

69

Nonlinear writing, as aphorism, as the metaphor of the letter that presents "Being and Nothing," appears in
"Edmond Jabés and the Question of the Book," and will return in the fourth chapter herein (Writing and Difference
71-74).
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Derrida's discussion of pluri-dimensionality exists only for the duration of the chapter
"Science and the Name of Man" in Of Grammatology, and then it vanishes from his corpus
forever. His definition of the function of simultaneity may have some bearing on this: as
Derrida deploys simultaneity, it would function to eliminate absence, making present two past
presents present again70, or at least the current absolute present and a past absolute present 71.
Beyond the problem simultaneity would create for a theory based on absence, such as the
originary absence of différance, Derrida also finds himself painted into a corner: should we
consider pluri-dimensionality to have been vanquished in the war that had been declared to
suppress all that countered linearization? Derrida does not say, precisely, but we are left with the
sense that the technics of linear writing has won a complete and total victory. For Derrida's later
work on citationality, presented in this same volume, to make any sense we must share that
assumption; citationality can only be a chain of substitutions if the pluri-dimensional temporality
of writing has collapsed into a two-dimensional line.
And of this line, despite all of his later work, Derrida, for seemingly this and only this
moment, seems suspicious:
The 'line' represents only a particular model, whatever might be its privilege. This
model has become a model and, as a model, it remains inaccessible. If one allows
that the linearity of language entails this vulgar and mundane concept of
temporality (homogenous, dominated by the form of the now and the ideal of
70

But why not multiple past presents? The number of possibilities representable by the momental approaches the
infinite. Although it deserves to be discussed at length elsewhere, in one sense, pluri-dimesionality functions as the
rationalization of endless play as citationality will also rationalize endless play within other terms; simultaneity, as
deployed here by Derrida, evokes the search for a useable past, which, among other problems, leads us back into the
trap, for Derrida, of presence, and by extension, Dasein. Pluri-dimesionality, perhaps, disappears exactly because of
the ease of which the emphasis can slide to the being who is being there to view (or to hear) the multiplicity of past
moments and the future.
71
As it will later be argued that metaphor attempts to do.
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continuous movement, straight or circular)...the meditation upon writing and the
deconstruction of the history of philosophy become inseparable (Of
Grammatology 86, emphasis original)
Should we not read "model" as a synonym for "eidos?" It seems reasonable that we should,
especially given the phrase "the form of the now 72." What we confront then, to repeat Derrida's
assessment of Husserl's questions concerning geometry, is an "extraordinary operation: the
creation of an eidetic," especially since the model, according to Derrida, has become inaccessible
as all Platonic forms are. In attacking the form of linearized language, Derrida could then be
said to be attacking metaphysics, but only if we ignore the other metaphysical aspects of his
work, including his own dependence upon linear temporality for his theory to operate. This
dependence on linear temporality cannot be underestimated: the absolute, totalizing,
universalizing, inescapable serial movement of temporality for Derrida, despite any of his denials
to the contrary, is exactly why, in his discussion of the Augenblick in "Signs and the Blink of an
Eye," one cannot talk to oneself in full presence (Voice and Phenomenon 71-74). Therefore,
Dasein cannot possibly, to quote Heidegger, "take over its own throwness and be in the
Moment" (Being and Time 366) because there is no moment; and with no moment, no possibility
of authenticity; and without authenticity, Dasein (and, perhaps, by extension all other forms,
such as self, ego, cogito, empirical ego, potters of any kind who shape the emptiness, and dead
authors and dead subjects) would be merely an inauthentic iteration of a form forever empty
because of its impossibility.
What do we do with this section from Of Grammatology so at odds with the rest of
Derrida's body of work? To follow the argument of "Plato's Pharmacy," pluri-dimensionality
72

Or, as phrased herein in the closing of the last section, the eidetic of the present.
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sows the seeds of the destruction of this text. That is, all of Derrida's subsequent theory, from
this moment onward, commits the same error of linearization that he decries and counters with
pluri-dimensionality; all subsequent theory, from this moment onward, demonstrated by the
absence of any mention of pluri-dimensionality, translates the pharmakon (the simultaneous lifegiving curative and death-causing poison) of temporality as sequential moments of time. Derrida
has tied himself in knots.

E. Cutting the Derridean Knot
In a comparison between the conceptualizations of temporality as found in Jameson and
as found in Derrida, we find on one hand, Jameson's longstanding, if now self-cancelled,
utopianism and its recent position as its own kind of polar telos never to be achieved, and
Derrida's insistence on origin-cum-non-origin (or non-origin-cum-origin), even if only to
postulate the impossibility of such an origin.
In light of Derrida's insistence on infinite deferral73, deconstruction presents itself as a
ready example of the function of theory to codify temporality, proscribe the past, and prescribe
the future because, to use Derrida's own terms: "The death of speech is therefore the horizon
and origin of language. But an origin and a horizon which do not hold themselves at its exterior
borders. As always, death, which is nether a present to come nor a present past, shapes the
interior of speech, as its trace, its reserve, its interior and exterior différance: as its
supplement74" (Of Grammatology 315).

73
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Derrida's routinely privileges the spatial adjective of "infinite" over the temporal adjective of "eternal."
"Death strolls between letters," "Edmond Jabés and the Question of the Book" (71).
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In a fashion that would probably please Derrida, numerous issues immediately arise. We
must ask, "which death?" This is Derrida's work; do we understand "death" as the Heideggerean
version from Being and Time, the anticipation of which at least partially defines Dasein (the
whole of Chapter One of Division Two; 232, specifically with regard to the generation of Care in
relation to being-toward-death, to which we will return later)? Or do we understand "death" as a
bipartite experience described by Maurice Blanchot in Thomas the Obscure, with Blanchot's
assertion of the impossibility of the second death in the brief "The Instant of My Death" that
attempts to refute Heidegger's being-toward-death? In Of Grammatology, at least, Derrida
points toward "death" as found in the second Discourse of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, which is
"death" much more in line with the singular "death" of Heidegger (184). That, however, will
change. In a text generated nearly three decades after Of Grammatology as an examination of
exactly this question, Derrida, via Maurice Blanchot, will deconstruct the temporality of Dasein
as being-toward-death in Aporias:
When Blanchot constantly repeats – and it is a long complaint and not a triumph
of life – the impossible dying, the impossibility, alas, of dying he says at once the
same thing and something completely different from Heidegger. It is just a
question of knowing in which sense (in the sense of direction and trajectory) one
reads the expression of the possibility of impossibility.
If death, the most proper possibility of Dasein, is the possibility of its
impossibility, death becomes the most improper possibility and the most expropriating, the most inauthenticating one (77, emphasis mine).
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In Aporias, as well as another roughly concurrent work on Heidegger, Of Spirit, both of
which approximately mark the point of Derrida's own ethical turn, Derrida turns to the figure of
the braid, which should have us recall the doubled knotted pieces of string from Psyche
mentioned above. As for the braid, where each interwoven thread disappears on the other side of
a double- or triple- or quadruple helix, we must follow it with our eyes exactly as we follow the
string. The phrase italicized above, especially with regard to the work already presented as to the
conceptualization of temporality in Derrida, provides us with another example of Derrida's
conceptualization of temporality; here, however, in Aporias, we also find a disavowal of Dasein
on temporal terms: Heidegger's emphasis on the projection of time from the future of the death
of Dasein misidentified the direction and trajectory of time's arrow.
To an even greater extent, we find in Aporias the shape of this figure, this braid or
knotted string, through death: "death can replace -- and this is a metonymy that carries the name
beyond the name and beyond the name of name -- all that is only possible as impossible, if there
is such a thing: love, the gift, the other, testimony, and so forth" (79). To which closing litany,
we could add différance, as quoted immediately above: "death, which is nether a present to
come nor a present past, shapes the interior of speech, as its trace, its reserve, its interior and
exterior différance: as its supplement" (Of Grammatology 315). So then, if language is
"precisely the origin of the nontruth of death75," and if language functions via différance, and if
différance of language requires supplementation by death, then language depends upon death,
which is a product of language. Or, language produces itself. Or, as Heidegger phrased it in
"Language:" "Language speaks" (Poetry, Language, Thought 188).

75

(Aporias 76), to be discussed shortly.
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Heidegger, however, continues: "Language speaks. If we let ourselves fall into the
abyss denoted by this sentence, we do not go tumbling into emptiness. We fall upward, to a
height. Its loftiness opens up a depth. The two span a realm in which we would like to become
at home, so as to find a residence, a dwelling place, for the life of man" (189-90). While the
above demonstrates the danger, to his own theory, of Derrida's circular logic of endless
substitutions, it also passingly demonstrates Derrida's indebtedness to Heidegger with regard to
language. The overwhelming difference, however, is that where Heidegger famously claimed
"Language is the house of Being" in "The Letter on Humanism," Derrida posits Being (and thus
by extension beings, and especially the dwelling of beings) as a construct of language, as he does
with death. While we could infer that language is the center of the structure for Derrida, we
would be missing the greater point that the endless chain of signifiers, meaningless in
themselves, function exactly as an endless chain, a line, a knotted string, a river, sequential
temporality. And we find ourselves bereft of houseboat, or even canoe; we cannot dwell, but
only be rushed endless toward the sea that always already is this river.
Derrida offers much the same point in "Edmond Jabés and the Question of the Book,"
only by tying Being to writing directly76, again quoted at length to preserve context:
The nonquestion of which we are speaking is the unpenetrated certainty that
Being is a Grammar; and that the world is in all its parts a cryptogram to be
constituted or reconstituted through poetic inscription or deciphering; that the
book is original; that everything belongs to the book before being and in order to
76

We must ignore, throughout the upcoming discussion on the epoch of Being, Derrida's failure or unwillingness to
recognize that his argument reifies Being, and thus ignores Heidegger's premise of ontological difference. Such a
confusion eventually led Heidegger to write Being sous rature (see "The Question of Being"), but Derrida here
embraces the error, whether intentionally or not, and despite what will be a frequent use of writing under erasure in
Derrida's own later work.
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come into the world; that anything can be born only by approaching the book, can
only die by falling in sight of the book; and that always the impassable shore 77 of
the book is first (Writing and Difference 76-77, emphasis original).
For Derrida here, Being is book; book is Being; beings are in the book; the world is in the book.
At the beginning of Of Grammatology, Derrida states that "logocentrism is not totally absent
from Heidegger's thought" and that this defines the "epoch of onto-theology" and the "epoch of
logos" that have not freed themselves from "philosophy of presence" or "philosophy itself" (12,
emphasis original). To let pass the critique of Heidegger as metaphysician for now, Derrida, for
a moment, admits that although this epoch of onto-theology and logos is an "epoch whose
closure one can outline," we may not be able to leave it (Of Grammatology 12). Now that we
have shown the repetition of this thought in two of Derrida's works, let us return to "Edmond
Jabés and the Question of the Book" and further repetition on Derrida's part. As Derrida
continues:
But what if the Book was only, in all senses of the word, an epoch of Being (an
epoch coming to an end which would permit us to see Being in the glow of its
agony or the relaxation of its grasp, and an end which would multiply, like a final
illness, like the garrulous and tenacious hypermnesia of certain moribunds, books
about the dead book)? If the form of the book was no longer to be the model of
meaning? If Being was radically outside the book, outside its letter? (Writing and
Difference 77, emphasis original).

77

The invaginated shore?
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Being, that moribund itself, in Derrida's estimation, has no dwelling place, no cork-lined
room in which to languish in its hypermnesia. The "epoch of onto-theology," the "epoch of
logos," the "epoch of Being," the "epoch of the Book" are all one and the same. In later Derrida,
the dead may indefinitely and indeterminately dwell in some fashion as outlined in the
hauntology of Specters of Marx 78, but for now, the book of Being closes, or can be said to be
closing. Death is imminent, but not present. We cannot dwell because Being, in its death throes,
cannot dwell, or soon cannot dwell, in an invaginated language, that former house of Being.
Let us turn to Blanchot to supply a telling selection from Thomas the Obscure to
illuminate this braid woven here of death, time, de-individuation, doubling, deferral, absence,
and metonymy: "I feel myself dead -- no, I feel myself living, infinitely more dead than dead. I
discover my being in the vertiginous where it is not, an absence, an absence where it sets itself
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Although the seeming transformation of citationality into hauntology should be discussed at length, by the time
Derrida reaches Specters of Marx, he finds "At bottom, the specter is the future, it is always to come, it presents
itself only as the which could come or come back" (48, emphasis mine). Other than the repeated essentialism of "at
bottom" occurring again, Derrida also reconfigures the future as the past, thus eliding the discourse of death and
Dasein, despite the not insignificant presence of Heidegger in a text ostensibly concerning the work of Karl Marx.
Hauntology, in metonymical form, extends beyond the return of Marxism; the past haunts from the future in all
cases. This appears, at first glance, to be a radically different conceptualization of temporality opposed to that
outlined in this chapter. Derrida, however, does not differ from his previous work, but only adds to it, and further
obscures the temporality of Dasein while doing so. Hauntology does not represent a renaming and return to pluridimensionality; time remains flattened into linearity; Dasein (or ego Freudian or empirical, self, subject, the human
being) remains at the margins of the process. It is the ghost of ideology that haunts from the future.
As he continues: "If there is something like spectrality, there are reasons to doubt this reassuring order of
presents and, especially, the border between the present, the actual or present reality of the present, and everything
that can be opposed to it: absence, non-presence, non-effectivity, inactuality, virtuality, or even the simulacrum in
general, and so forth. There is first of all the doubtful contemporaneity of the present to itself" (ibid., emphasis
mine, emphasis mine to denote the return to the concept from Dissemination found in Footnote 31 herein).
Hauntology, or spectrality, offers a new wrinkle, a new way to deal with the unrelenting question of the future, and
will supply the central rationalization of the return of Marxism outlined in this volume; it does so, however, only
after being qualified within the terms of a Derridean presentism with questionable, invaginated borders. The
italicized text also complements the reading of Margins and Footnote 4 above; the bold text repeats both the
Heraclitean maxim, of which Jameson so vigorously approves, and which Derrida relies upon to note of the
impossibility of talking to oneself in full presence as quoted from Voice and Phenomenon at the end of the last
section. None of which demands the re-imagination of infinite deferral; while a past may haunt from the future, the
essential order remains past past, non-present present, deferred future. To risk unnecessary and tedious repetition:
the structure of deconstruction, despite, for example, the permutations of the concept of différance and its incessant
rechristening, retains an absolute center within itself in the unchanging structure of temporality with a Living
Present that may suffer revocation, but, nonetheless, exists in order to be revoked.
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like a god. I am not and I endure. An inexorable future stretches forth infinitely for this
suppressed being. Hope turns in fear against time, which drags it forward" (104). The quotation
presents much of what is common to both Derrida and Blanchot, but we need another description
of time from Blanchot for a more complete image of what they share: in Thomas' selfdescription of his thoughts: "every instant of my life this instant in which I was going to leave
life" (92). This is time, metonymized, each moment a knot on a string, and each knot, death, but
not death, never actually death, which cannot, for Blanchot and Derrida, be experienced. Again,
death is imminent, but not present, is never present. Time, in its utter inconsequence and banal
regularity, gives way to space, the only half of the pair that remains of any possible importance.
In the first chapter, it was noted how the concept of event in Jameson and Žižek elides
death via a simultaneously de-individuation and codification of time. The relevant section from
Being and Time that offers opposition is presented here again for convenience:
Only a being that is essentially futural in its being so that it can let itself be
thrown back upon its factical there, free for its death and shattering itself on it,
that is, only a being that, as futural, is equiprimordially having-been, can hand
down to itself its inherited possibility, take over its own throwness and be in the
Moment for "its time." Only authentic temporality that is at the same time finite
makes something like fate, that is, authentic historicity, possible. (Being and Time
(366), emphasis original, emphasis original)
Derrida, as read through Blanchot, comes to much the same conclusion as Jameson and
Žižek; instead of insisting on Event, however, to demonstrate the meaninglessness and
irrelevancy of an individual life, Derrida transmogrifies death into life itself, the difference
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erased, the distinction denied, death as the double of life. We find ourselves with death
omnipresent, each moment being the moment of death, but with that moment forever deferred,
always living in anticipation for something that, according to Blanchot (and Derrida, at times)
cannot occur79. The instruction momento mori is an empty signifier. Death, the double of life,
shares the qualities attributed to life: "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."
In contrast, in Being and Time, Heidegger offers this formulation of Dasein as beingtoward-death: "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being. In
this possibility, Dasein is concerned about its being-in-the-world absolutely. Its death is the
possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there...Thus death reveals itself as one's ownmost,
nonrelational, and insuperable possibility. As such, it is an eminent imminence" (241, emphasis
original). In Aporias, Derrida advances his deconstruction to this interesting point: "Who will
guarantee that the name, the ability to name death (like that of naming the other and it is the
same) does not participate as much in the dissimulation of the 'as such' of death as in its
revelation, and that language is not precisely the origin of the nontruth of death, and of the
other80 81?" (76). In this point by Derrida, there echo certain resonances.
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As Blanchot writes elsewhere of this life of waiting: "What was going to happen? She did not know, but
devoting her entire life to waiting, her impatience melted into the hope of participating in a general cataclysm in
which, at the same time as the beings themselves, the distances which separate beings would be destroyed" (Thomas
the Obscure 51). If we wish, we may read this as an early desire for pure spatialization generated from the
simplification of time into a sequence of fungible moments. This idea of distancelessness will return in the
discussion of Heidegger and regioning.
80
Here again is Derrida, by asking for a guarantee and thus framing the question in the terms absolutes, positing a
spurious totality in order to deconstruct it, and transfigure the question into one of text.
81
As quoted from Aporias at length above, Derrida concludes at a perfect inversion of Heidegger's valuation of
death in Being and Time: "death becomes the most improper possibility and the most ex-propriating, the most
inauthenticating one." In chess terms, here Derrida maneuvers to fork Heidegger. If we allow Derrida this gambit,
then we lose one of two pieces. If we agree that death is a function of language, we lose death; if we agree that
death is not proper to Dasein, then we lose Heideggerean authenticity. If we agree to either premise and lose either
death or authenticity, we lose Dasein, as its authenticity is predicated upon its own death. That is, of course, if we
allow Derrida the move to the supremacy of language in all considerations (and the inherent conceptualization of
temporality), wherein language functions not only as each and every piece, but as the board itself, "this bottomless
chessboard on which Being is put into play," as quoted above from Margins, which is the invaginated chessboard.
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There are at least three interrelated, inseparable consequences that are distinguishable by
their nuances. First, Derrida, with his career-long emphasis on the destabilization of language,
admonishes Heidegger ("who will guarantee?") for using terms which are not strictly defined or
even definable, a (mis-) naming is "the origin of the nontruth of death." There can be no appeal
to authority, which, in a very real sense, is exactly what death is: a final authority. But without
the authority of death, or any authority, we cannot use the term Dasein, which is a highly
problematic argument when discussing Heidegger, a thinker who points to etymological
explanations and coins neologisms only slightly less frequently than Derrida himself.
Secondly, in this moment, Derrida's argument echoes Ludwig Wittgenstein, doubly and
glancingly. In one ear, one can hear Derrida's rejection of the language games of the Ludwig
Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations. In the other ear, one can hear the echo the famous
seventh proposition that ends Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, an echo which aligns Derrida's
thought, at least in this limited moment, with the requirements of verification (again, "who will
guarantee?") demanded by logical positivism. And in considering that Derrida continues with
his own examination of the aporia of death, one should quote the seventh proposition of the
Tractatus with substitutions and one important addition. Derrida, not only in this case, but in
many others, essentially transforms : "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain
silent" (108) into "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof Heidegger should remain silent, but I must
not."
Thirdly, if this criterion of a verifiable definability were metonymically applied to
Derrida's work, Derrida's own prohibition against Heidegger would then obliterate Derrida's
entire corpus starting with the concept of the trace, for which Derrida never gave a definition any
more concrete than that "the trace is nothing" (Of Grammatology 75), or that the trace does not
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mark language with absence, as Derrida insists, but that language is the trace itself. That is, we
can as easily apply Derrida's critique of the use of death in Heidegger to Derrida's (non)-concept
of différance in an act of metonymical substitution; whereas Heidegger's work can be said to
depend upon death, Derrida's depends on différance. Or, rather, who will guarantee that the
name, the ability to name différance (like that of naming the other and it is the same) does not
participate as much in the dissimulation of the 'as such' of différance as in its revelation, and
that language is not precisely the origin of the nontruth of différance, and of the other?
In other words, despite Jameson's and Derrida's respective assumptions -- assumptions
from which their work depends -- concerning the structure of temporality, the great mystery of
time has not been solved. And if Dasein is time, as quoted in the first chapter herein from
Heidegger's The Concept of Time, neither has the mystery of Dasein. If we maintain
Augustine's admission of ignorance concerning the exact structure of temporality in Confessions
(although in The City of God he offers a few definite ideas concerning time) as a guide, then we
may wish to agree with Augustine. These first two chapters, despite the complexity at moments,
are merely, most simply, a reopening of the question of temporality, which Jameson and Derrida
each implicitly claim to have solved. Event, in various configurations historical or textual,
closes the gap, deemed by Wyndham Lewis, between a Platonic temporality and an Ionian
naturalism; rather than blurring this distinction, as Derrida so thoroughly does, the pairing should
not be phrased as an either/or and then an incomplete synthesis. We require at least a third
conceptualization of temporality, one that answers "neither/nor" to Wyndham Lewis' binary.
Time waits for no man, but the temporality of Dasein calls from the future of the next chapter.
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Chapter 3: The Third Time, or, the Remembrance, and Subsequent Consideration,
of the Possibility of the Function of Heideggerean Ecstatic Temporality
This chapter comprises five sections. In the first, we return to Wyndham Lewis’
conceptualizations of temporality for contrast to the introduction of Heidegger’s
conceptualization of ecstatic temporality. From that point, in the second section, we return to the
broader implications for the individual of the disindividuation promulgated by Derrida through
his denial of the possibility of death, with regard to a temporal binarism, whether configured by
Lewis or Saussure, and with regard to Jameson’s own dependence on Sartrean seriality at certain
points in his work. The third section examines the frequent reconfiguration of the question of
temporality as, rather, a question of speed in relation to Event, text, and technology, before the
fourth section pursues the implications of such an alteration to the concept of time. In doing so,
we argue for viewing critical theory’s tendency toward de-ontologization in favor of
epistemologization. With this epistemologization, and its related temporality in mind, we
enumerate the consequences of such a maneuver and contextualize critical theory within the
milieu generated by this change to the conceptualization of temporality.

A. The Ghost of Wyndham Lewis
The first two chapters herein provide a relatively brief overview of the various
complexifications of temporality undertaken by Jameson and Derrida, respectively. Despite all
that seeming temporal negentropy, the underlying "something indestructible and constant behind
the phenomenal flux," to repeat Lewis' phrasing of "Platonic temporality," remains constant, and
that is underlying stasis is the phenomenal flux itself. Or, in Derridean terms, the Event, (and

100

when its importance is minimized and metonymized, the present), is the supplement of endless
Heraclitean flow of time, but it is a present that can never be said to be present, leaving us to
conceive of the present only as a form 82. When viewed in this manner, we can see how Event
closes the gap between the phenomenal flux and the unchanging: each is of the same; the
former, the always consuming head of ouroboros, and the latter, the tail always present to be
consumed. Regardless of their efforts to dissuade and obfuscate, the work of both Jameson and
Derrida remains dependent upon what, as noted elsewhere, Heidegger nominates as "the vulgar
conception of time."
If we accept Derrida and Jameson's resolution of the mystery of temporality, then we are
at an end. The question has been answered: "let be be the finale of seem," to quote Wallace
Stevens. The obvious structure of temporality was correct all along; we have achieved
consensus; the gap has closed. Lewis' distinction may also be applied to other critical
approaches. Julia Kristeva's transposition, for example, from Revolution in Poetic Language
(52-67, specifically 59-60) falls into such a pattern: the intertextual moments combine various
sign systems, with distinct past, into the moment of the current text (as does Jamesonian reading
time and Derrida the dia-synchronic knot). If we were willing to take the time, we could
establish the pattern of the synchronic and diachronic in Kristeva's transposition, and its reliance
on both the phenomenal flux and "something indestructible and constant behind" it, with the
qualification that the multiple sign systems continue behind the flux. Roland Barthes' system of
codes in S/Z function in the same manner, in which multiple diachronic systems occur within a
synchronic text. Harold Bloom's revisionary ratios tend more toward the diachronic and the flux,
but only occur in a synchronic moment when a great poet Oedipally confronts a predecessor.
82

At the risk of excessive repetition, we cannot lose sight of Derrida's metaphysical tendencies, especially with
regard to his conceptualization of time.
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Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's rhizome theory, on the other hand, emphasizes the
synchronic moment of network, so much so that time and space become purely time, but they yet
require an unstated diachrony to describe the function of the spreading of a rhizomatic network.
Michael Riffaterre's sociolect and idiolect may also be paired with diachrony and synchrony, and
Gerard Genette's own system of codes in Palimpsests relies on the same temporal bifurcation.
None of these, however, begin with the future as the past as Heidegger does; none of these
theories consider the movement of time from the future to the present; each relies on the
movement from the future to the past.). We can join with a specific iteration of Jameson and
lament the loss of the High Modernist utopian impulse, or join with Derrida in infinite deferral
and endless play; both accord with Lewis' temporality of the closed gap.
What we have not discussed is the problem of "objective" time as in the time of science,
other than to mention the time dilation inherent to Einstein's Twin Paradox. Heidegger himself
discounts the Theory of Relativity in a footnote in Being and Time, due to the inherent
assumptions and "clarifications" of temporality on which Einstein constructs the theory (397).
Antithetically, the problem with scientific time is that it is relative, but in non-Einsteinian terms.
In Being and Time, Heidegger cites the day as Dasein's fundamental experience of temporality:
the sun rises, the sun sets; Dasein's "time is finite, [therefore,] its days are already numbered"
(379). This day, however, is relative only to Earth; the length of a day varies on other planets.
Or, if we were to find ourselves, like one of Einstein's twins, on a spaceship traveling through the
seemingly infinite darkness, there would be no day as we know it outside of a purely artificial
construct. Time, as we measure it in our everydayness, is specific to this solar system, to this
planet on its particular orbit. Without much thought, the apparent stability of an hour, day, or
year falls apart: a year on Neptune lasts nearly 165 Earth years, for example, and a day on
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Jupiter lasts less than ten hours, and each measurement still maintains our sun as the center 83.
We have not even left the solar system. The second problem arises when thinking of monstrous
immensity of ontic time; if, scientifically speaking, the universe is 14 billion years old, and if we
are honest, we find ourselves baffled by such a tremendous span. While we can represent such a
measurement of time mathematically, and calculate with it, the limitations of our minds can, in
no other way, understand such a duration. By moving through the sublimity of a purely ontic
temporality and the conceptualization of time as the scientific measurement of "heavenly
bodies," as Isaac Newton called them, we soon find ourselves in another quandary, but of a much
different tenor than the underlying perplexity masked by Jameson's and Derrida's respective
simplifications. In ways that, hopefully, will become more apparent, we find ourselves in
ourselves. We find ourselves in the third temporality, which is the temporality of Dasein, which,
we could justly posit, is the temporality of desperation as much as individuated temporality 84.
This is the temporality of being-unto-death.
To return to Valences of the Dialectic, Jameson misreads concepts from Heidegger. Here
follows Jameson's own words, concerning the conceptualization of temporality with relation to
Dasein, which Jameson confuses with das Man, and then both of which Jameson reads as
synecdoche for "history:"
But it should be noted that all these [temporal] categories of Heidegger's
presuppose mediation -- a kind of translation from the time of Dasein to the time
of history: a translation which is itself no doubt a kind of Steigerung, a kind of
83

In "The Word of Nietzsche," Heidegger connects the Nietzsche's use of the sun in Thus Spake Zarathustra beyond
the "Copernican revolution" and back to Plato's Allegory of the Cave (The Question Concerning Technology and
Other Essays 106-07). For Derrida, the sun plays important roles in both "Plato's Pharmacy," via the Allegory, and
Memoires for Paul de Man.
84
Much of the next chapter will deal with individuated temporality, with diversions to the work of both Ferdinand
Saussure and Roman Jakobson.
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lifting up and an intensification, and very possibly also an occasion for the parting
of the ways between authenticity and inauthenticity. But, in any case, such
categories also suggest a kind of continuity within experience, a natural
movement from individual to collective time, a way in which the temporality of
Dasein is already historical and collective in advance, and simply requires the
articulation and specification of categories already present in the existential (518,
emphasis mine).
We will mention, only in passing, that what Jameson calls Steigerung here -- based on
Jameson's description of a "lifting up," "intensification," and the negation of the difference
between authenticity and inauthenticity -- actually would be far more accurately represented by
the word Aufhebung, replete with its ramifications for the history of dialectical thought, and for
Jameson's attempt to present a Heidegger succinctly transmogrified into a dialectician who
argues the synthesis of various individual temporalities into "collective time," despite the
literally thousands and thousands of pages in which Heidegger argues the contrary 85.
Jameson's methodology, in Valences of the Dialectic, for bringing Heidegger to this point
where a collective diachronic temporality triumphs is a long and complicated affair discussed to
a certain extent in the first chapter herein. With regard to Jameson's argument, however, two
successive and relevant paragraphs from of Being and Time must be presented, against which
Jameson's reconfiguration of the temporality in Valences of the Dialectic will be read:
We have shown earlier how the public "surrounding world" is always
already at hand and taken care of in the surrounding world nearest to us. In
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Merely as a brief aside, the ghost of Herbert Marcuse seems to haunt Jameson's vision of a collectivist Heidegger,
with the corollary of utopianism implied.
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utilizing public transportation, in the use of information services such as the
newspaper, every other is like the next. This being-with-one-another dissolves
one's own Dasein completely into the kind of being of "the others" in such a way
that the others, as indistinguishable and explicit, disappear more and more. In this
inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the they [das Man] unfolds its true
dictatorship. We enjoy ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy themselves.
We read, see, and judge literature and art the way they see and judge. But we also
withdraw from the "great mass" the way they withdraw, we find "shocking" what
they find shocking. The they, which is nothing definite and which all are, though
not as a sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness.
The they has its own ways to be. The tendency of being-with which we
called distantiality is based on the fact that being-with-one-another as such creates
averageness. It is an existential characteristic of the they. In its being, the they is
essentially concerned with averageness. Thus, the they maintains itself factically
in the averageness of what belongs to it, what it does and does not consider valid,
and what it grants or denies success. This averageness, which prescribes what can
and may be ventured, watches over every exception which thrusts itself to the
fore. Every priority is noiselessly squashed. Overnight, everything that is
original is flattened down as something long since known. Everything won
through struggle becomes something manageable. Every mystery loses its power.
The care of averageness reveals, in turn, an essential tendency of Dasein, which
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we call the leveling down of all possibilities of Being 86 (119, emphasis Heidegger,
emphasis mine).
Before turning to the issues this passage creates for Jameson's reading of Heidegger's
temporality as cited above, many of the issues that would plague critical theory throughout the
twentieth century can be found in Heidegger's summation of what we could call, in simple terms,
society. Lurking here in the shadows, as shadows, as nothing specific, as nothing detailed, we
can find hints from both the past and what was to be the future, texts against which we can read
Heidegger's words. From the past, Friedrich Nietzsche's Last Men from the speech known as
"The Prologue" in Thus Spake Zarathustra, only without the bitter comedy87. Beyond Nietzsche,
it would likely be a productive endeavor to compare the passage from Heidegger to any and all
of the following: the collectivism of Marxism and its various offshoots, with its own contempt
for the bourgeoisie, and especially the petite bourgeoisie, a type of self-satisfied Last Men
themselves, at least for certain configurations of Marxism; Theodor Adorno and Max
Horkheimer's culture industry; the discourse on self and others and the Habermasian public
sphere; the managed society of Hebert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man; even Ayn Rand's
objectivist fantasies. A text such as Guy Debord's Society of Spectacle may be read against
Heidegger's identification of the loss of the power of mystery with the purely passive mass
reception and mass consumption of images gained without effort. Which is not to identify
Heidegger's work as a source, but merely to note the common concerns that extend across
ideologies and find some kind of expression involving the end of metaphysics.
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In footnote 141 of the next chapter herein, the argument appears that Jameson requires exactly such a leveling
down for even any imagining of utopia.
87
Heidegger devotes much of Volume II of his lectures on Nietzsche to Thus Spake Zarathustra. While we will not
pursue it here, The Last Men demonstrates a strong anti-utopian sentiment. Zarathustra characterizes them as
declaring, "formerly the whole world was insane" and that "we have invented happiness" before blinking in unison
(10).
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Heidegger, however, distrusts the collectivist aspect of das Man, regardless of Jameson's
assessment that the transformation of "the temporality of Dasein" requires only the "articulation
and specification of categories already present." Unlike Nietzsche and his Last Men, however,
Heidegger avoids Nietzsche's quasi-apocalyptic tone of Zarathustra's voice crying from the
wilderness and making the way crooked; Heidegger implicitly refutes that kind of Romantic (or
post-Romantic) dialectic of the visionary at odds with the complacent world by acknowledging
the ubiquity of everydayness, and its existence as a seemingly omnipresent social condition
almost completely inexorcisable from Dasein's being-in-the-world. The they cannot be ablated,
even though the presence of das Man functions, literally, to efface the members of the they. In
other words, Heidegger could not be clearer in his resistance to incorporating Dasein into das
Man, and it is precisely that incorporation Jameson relies upon to construct his argument, and, if
we concede Jameson this point, we have lost Dasein, and with it, its temporality. This particular
closing of the gap between a diachronic version of "Platonic temporality" and synchronic version
of an "Ionian naturalism" crushes Dasein in between; Jamesonian History becomes the eidos that
simultaneously flows and remains still, much like Derrida's eidetic of the present.
Whether Adorno and Horkheimer's implicit, and Habermas' explicit, praise for bourgeois
values 88, or Marcuse's one-dimensional version of the Last Men, or Debord's Society of
Spectacle, a shared belief in collectivism and the possibility of collectivist action for change -change that has happened as fall, change that will happen as correction -- loosely binds these
disparate philosophies together here, at least momentarily for brief comparison. Jameson's
reading of Heidegger also belongs with these others, despite its egregious misrepresentation.

88

This is especially apparent in all of Adorno's writing on music and the acceptable bourgeois form of music we
now call "classical."
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The steps of the dance, even if each contains different figures and occur in different tempos,
share similarities.
To make clear the further ramification of Jameson's attempt to construct a collectivist
Heidegger, we will turn to Being and Time again, to a section in which Heidegger explicates
Hegel's views on space and time. For Hegel, "space is the abstract multiplicity of points
distinguishable in it. Space is not interrupted by these points, but neither does it first arise from
them by way of joining them together. Space remains in its turn undifferentiated, differentiated
by the differentiable points that are themselves space" (407-08). As a metonymical thought
experiment, reread the immediately preceding quotation, and replace each occurrence of "space"
with "time:" We find temporality with a structure Heidegger calls "the vulgar conception of
time" elsewhere, and here in Being and Time with regard to Hegel. Reread the passage again,
only on this occasion, replace "space" with "humanity" (or any other collectivist noun), and
replace "point" with "person." We now possess, admittedly at best, some kind of inkling as to
Jameson's desire to collectivize the temporality of Dasein.
Heidegger continues:
the point is a negation of space in that it differentiates something in space, though
in such a way that it itself remains in space as this negation (the point is, after all,
space). The point does not lift itself out of space as something other than space.
Space is the undifferentiated outside-one-another of the multiplicity of points.
But space is not a point; it is rather as Hegel says, a "punctuality." This is the
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basis of the statement in which Hegel thinks space in its truth, that is, as time 89
(408).
Heidegger surmises that, through this negation of space via the negativity of a singular point,
"Hegel can define the essence of spirit formally and apophantically as the negation of a
negation," which "gives a logically formalized interpretation of Descartes' cogito me cogitare
rem in which he [Hegel] sees the essence of conscientia" (411). Heidegger90 finds the
"primordial kinship" of spirit and time because "the connection of spirit and time can be ventured
at all" (412). Heidegger, then, will do his own turning of Hegel on his head, and deny that spirit
first falls into time, but that spirit exists as the "primordial temporalizing of temporality" that
factically thrown Dasein reveals at the temporality that "makes [its] existence primordially
possible" (413). To accept Jameson's reading of the collectivity of the temporality of Dasein
would be to ignore the functionally pre-emptive argument that Heidegger makes against exactly
such a collectivization that conceives time as a being to be manipulated. If we were to follow
Jameson's call for the collectivization of the temporality of Dasein, we could then focus on
humanity and Event, rather than Dasein and its event.

B. Is There a There There?
Or, in other words, and to begin an extended digression away from the question of event,
from a Jamesonian perspective, we only have to turn to Jean-Paul Sartre. For Heidegger,
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We can read Heidegger's reading of Hegel against his own concept of the over-against as Gegenstand. As will
appear in the next chapter herein, Derrida will, seemingly, make the same movement toward space as Heidegger,
only strip from space punctuality, any importance of individuation, or temporality, and, instead, dwell in the khora.
90
In his own work on Hegel at this point in Being and Time, Heidegger presents the Hegelian "spirit" within
quotation marks. While these have been removed for clarity, it should be noted that Heidegger does not accept
"spirit" at face value, but only, essentially, as a poorly chosen semi-near synonym.
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individuation arises from death: "the nonrelational character of death individualizes Dasein
down to itself" (Being and Time 252). This is death as the horizon of possibility for Dasein, for
being-toward-death, the thinking of which, for Heidegger, determines the difference between
inauthencity and authenticity. While this idea will be further developed in the forthcoming
section on trope, what we have sketched briefly here is not only Jameson's formalization of
metonymy in the form of the collective, but, rather, Jameson's adherence to Jean-Paul Sartre's
concept of the negative seriality and the positive group-in-fusion91 in Critique of Dialectical
Reason. Sartre, much like Heidegger in the block quotation above from Being and Time, turns
to public transportation to illustrate seriality. A "group of people waiting for a bus" (221)
becomes the dominant analogy in Sartre's explanation of seriality, the "negative principle of
unity" which "[determines] everyone's fate as Other by every Other as Other" (261):
the small gathering which slowly forms around the bus stop, apparently by a
process of mere aggregation, already has a serial structure. It was produced in
advance as the structure of some unknown group by the ticket machine attached
to the bus stop. Everyone realizes it for himself and confirms it for Others
through his own individual praxis and his own ends. This does not mean that he
helps to create an active group by freely determining, with other individuals, the
end, the means, and the division of tasks; it means he actualizes his being-outsidehimself as a reality shared by several people and which already exists, and awaits
him by means of an inert practice, endowed by instrumentality, whose meaning is

91

Jameson uses the term "group-in-fusion" rather than Alan Sheridan-Smith's translation of "fused group."
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that it integrates him into an ordered multiplicity by assigning him a place in a
prefabricated seriality92 (265, emphasis original)
Simply, in Heideggerean terms, Sartre refuses the possibility of Dasein because Dasein's relation
to das Man. As response to Sartre's concept that may seem insouciant, but is not: each
passenger will die. Dasein remains as long as death remains, and with death, the possibility of
authenticity. Jameson, in his "Foreword" to Sartre's volume, does not read Heidegger as ever
having written of das Man, everydayness, or public time. The Heidegger, with regard to
authenticity, whom Jameson presents is caricature:
For (as in Heidegger), authenticity is never, for Sartre, a state one can somehow
achieve, and in which one can then dwell and persevere; it is a precarious space
conquered from the swamp of inauthenticity itself, into which it then fatally
lapses. If one can speak, indeed, of anything like human nature, then one must
say that that nature is first and foremost inauthentic, in which moments of
authenticity are but fitful and evanescent episodes 93 (xxxii).
The only possibility for authenticity, then, since Dasein has been disqualified by waiting
for a bus, is the group-in-fusion, when a seriality transforms itself under its own direction, with
each individual member functioning as a "third party" for each other member of the group 94
(363). As Derrida does, Sartre presents an uncredited version of Russell's Paradox as the
foundation, "impossible...a totalizing praxis cannot totalize itself as a totalized element 95" (373),
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See footnote 173 in Chapter Four herein on Bernard Stiegler and disindividualization for comparison.
Briefly, to return to Chapter One herein, Jameson here presents authenticity in exactly the same manner as Žižek
describes the creation of a Platonic form that emerges only ephemerally on the surface of the endless, churning flow
of time.
94
Sartre devotes the first chapter of the second book of the first volume of The Critique of Dialectical Reason to
detailing the fused group dependent on the third party.
95
A set cannot contain itself.
93
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with the solution arriving at the end of the thought of the sociological relation of "individualcommunity" (374). This third party phenomenon creates the group,
because the Other, by totalizing the practical community through his regulatory
action, effects for me which I myself should have realized but was unable to.
Through him, in fact, my being-in-the-group becomes immanence; I am amongst
third parties and I have no privileged statute. But this operation does not
transform me into an object, because totalization by a third party only reveals a
free praxis as a common unity which is already there and already qualifies him
(379, emphasis original).
Heidegger, famously, in "The Letter on Humanism," rejects Sartre's work because of
what Heidegger sees as its foundation in metaphysics. In this passage on the fused group, which
minimizes each Dasein to merely a third party who is not there-being, but is dependent on the
other third parties of the fused group for his existence as a member of the group, which is a
difficult movement away from Dasein and away from das Man/seriality simultaneously, Sartre
arguably turns to the undergirding concept of the Platonic form: the "free praxis as common
unity which is already there." Do we mangle Heidegger and place Sartre's form here within the
discourse of alethia, the form that was always existing as waiting to be unconcealed? That
seems both problematic and untenable for numerous reasons. Sartre has much more to say on
the question, but we must follow him on this same path of the third party.
More relevantly here, Jameson realizes the contradiction of merely replacing the "form"
of Dasein with the collectivist "form" of the group-in-fusion dictated by the third party. To
sidestep such a contradiction, Jameson insists "the group-in-fusion is hardly a social form at all,
but rather an emergence and an event, the formation of a guerilla unit, the sudden crystallization
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of an 'in-group'" (xxvi-xxvii). And with that, our answer lies with the concept of Event from
Žižek presented in the first chapter herein of the rising up of idea, or, to requotes Jameson from
Valences of the Dialectic, "Event is the ephemeral rising up and coming to appearance of Time
and History as such" (453). While Sartre uses the example of a small group of potential bus
passengers, he moves toward the institutionalization of the fused group. The collective
recognition of the danger of the disintegration fused group back into seriality caused the group to
institutionalize itself, which, ultimately and ironically, only once again "actually reproduce
alterity [of seriality] in itself" (588-91). This is the swamp of which Jameson writes; this is the
Event that rises to the surface, as Žižekian Idea or Jamesonian Time and History, and then
dissipates, leaving us to await the next event.
We are left with, it seems, either Sartre or Heidegger in this reduction, a choice between
the individual -- already twice removed from Dasein as the third party -- or Dasein itself; we are
left with two variations on the Husserlian infinite task of philosophy, collectivism without
alienation or the Seinsfrage96.
The great difficulty of Heidegger, great temptation of the desire to collectivize Heidegger
arrives through Heidegger's surety in the absolute individuation of Dasein: "Dasein exists97.
Furthermore, Dasein is the being which I myself always am. Mineness belongs to existing
Dasein as the condition of the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity. Dasein exists
always in one of these modes, or else in the modal indifference to them" (Being and Time 53).
Although, because of Jameson's more direct relation to Sartre, we have passed through Sartre to
arrive at this point; we could have, alternately, passed through the work of Herbert Marcuse, who

96
97

S.

At this point, recall Jameson's suggestion that the temporality of Dasein begs collectivization.
Although this footnote reads as absurdly cryptic now, the next chapter moves in this direction: for Heidegger, S is
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begins Heideggerian Marxism with this rationalization: "The historicity of Dasein demands that
phenomenology reorient itself according to the bearings of the dialectical method -- a method
that shows itself to be the appropriate approach for all historical objects" (2). Whether Sartre or
Marcuse, (or Jameson), what rises to the surface in each of these manipulations of Heidegger's
work is the conceptualization of time as diachrony as it relates to the materialist dialectic. To
eliminate Dasein is to extirpate ecstatic temporality; to extirpate ecstatic temporality is to
annihilate resistance to the diachrony of the dialectic.
As we have noted, however, even Jameson's stance on utopia -- specifically as the telos
for a Marxian project -- has softened. Nonetheless, the stance on temporality that accompanies
the desire for utopia has not. We would now like to posit a different name for one of the
underlying problems of the utopian desire, what we will call the Inescapable I. Whether in
Sartrean terms of seriality or fused group, or Jameson's version of seriality with his late turn to
affect theory, or, as we will see in the next chapter herein, Derrida's formulation of the self-quakhora, the Inescapable I never ceases to be problematic, and, arguably, never ceases to remain 98.
Even above, in the last block quotation from Critique of the Dialectical Reason, Sartre, even
during his minimization of the individual to the status of a third party, finds he must employ the
first person: "effects for me which I myself should have realized." This Inescapable I
essentially appears, as well, in Marcuse, but in a discussion relating, ultimately, to false
consciousness:
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For Heidegger, of course, the only escape of Dasein is death. In essentially all major religious traditions, there is
some kind of possible eschewing of the Inescapable I as transcendence, whether through self-negation or the
complete submission to divine will. If the initial presumption concerning the insistence of a generalized critical
theory for the Inescapable I, we have the foundation of a comparison between various strains of dogma, whether
arising from critical theory or religious tradition.
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happiness is not the mere feeling of satisfaction but in the reality of freedom and
satisfaction. Happiness involves knowledge; it is the prerogative of the animal
rationale. With the decline in consciousness, with the control of information,
with the absorption of individual into mass communication, knowledge is
administered and confined. The individual does not really know what is going on;
the overpowering machine of education and entertainment unites him with all the
others in a state of anesthesia from which all detrimental ideas tend to be
excluded. And since knowledge of the whole truth is hardly conducive to
happiness, such general anesthesia makes individuals happy (Eros and
Civilization 104).
Marcuse's Freudianism overwhelms Heidegger in this text; Marcuse's solution, in a way,
is pure dissolution of the Inescapable I, and its transformation into an Impossible I: "In a world
of alienation, the liberation of Eros would necessarily operate as a destructive, fatal force -- as
the total negation of the principle which governs the repressive reality" (95). That, in its way,
seems an elegant solution the anesthetizing function of a repressive social situation, except, as
we know from history, Marcuse's theory, in the more familiar form of "free love" failed
absolutely spectacularly to effect any change, if this repressive society is hierarchical, at any
level beyond the interpersonal. Most importantly here, however, we see Marcuse explicate the
winnowing down of the I to almost nothing, but yet, we still find the Inescapable I.
For Ricoeur, Levinas, and Martin Buber, the I-Thou relationship cannot be escaped; nor
can it, essentially, for Sartre and Marcuse, even if the I has been degraded to a mere third party in
a fused group or a shriveled, dessicated seed encapsulated in an adamantine hull and then
surrounded by the copious fibrous husk of false consciousness. In differing ways, the movement
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to deconstruction, to cultural criticism, to the Foucauldian episteme attempts to elide, finally, this
Inescapable I, but, seemingly, has failed. The personal offense Derrida took at Searle's relating
of Foucault's judgment on Derrida's work as obscurantisme terroriste99 surpasses the
grammatical function of the first person. The mention of this spat does not appear here as some
kind of character judgment on either Derrida or Searle (or Foucault), but, rather, to point out, that
even after the death of the author, and especially after the promulgation of citational substitution,
the author -- this author, Derrida -- remains trapped within the Inescapable I. The naming of the
affront names the I.
As will be discussed in the next chapter under the aegis of Thomas Hobbes, the generally
Western political Right, inasmuch as it relates to classical liberalism, always diminished the
individual with regard to the desire of the state, unless we are to read classical liberalism without
the foundation of Hobbes. The generally Western Left, as seen here in Marcuse, laments this
diminished I, but, regardless, turns toward abstraction as liberation, eros, here, specifically. With
the advent of many strains of critical theory, themselves ostensibly on the Western Left, the
diminishment of the I continued, buffeted only by identity politics, which, in some ways, finds a
commonality with the Sartrean fused group. In other words, despite the Inescapable I, a common
approach has been to assume its non-existence, under some rubric of a guiding ideology: the
Impossible I. But, if the I is the Inescapable I, it remains, and when synthesized with the
Impossible I, we have the foundation for oblivion. For now, the only possible I is my I; all other
instances of I are false. This, as any student of history with a bent toward the horrific already
understands, has long been the case. The human species, in its most successful attempts at
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"In this regard I certainly do at time disapprove of the politics of this practice...to attempt in newspaper articles...to
turn gossip into an argument in order to accuse me, and with me all those interested in my work, of 'terrorist
obscurantism.'" (Limited Inc 139).
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generating what we could name, perhaps should name, evil begins with this radical
dehumanization of the Other, usually along racial, ethnic, religious, and/or gender lines. The
solution of much critical theory, it seems, is not an attempt to combat this, but to further it, first
by attempting to escape the Inescapable I by various, and thus far, always unsuccessful means,
ranging from collectivism to nomadology, and, secondly, and most damaging, by extending the
status of the Impossible I to every Other and oneself, which, nevertheless, finds itself
inextricably bound within the Inescapable I.
For Sartre, for example, by the time he reaches the Critique of Dialectical Reason, every
Other, even in a fused group, is an Impossible I, a third party, twice removed from Dasein. We
must read Sartre's reconfiguration against his words on bad faith and the life project in Being and
Nothingness:
Thus if I am rowing on the river 100, I am nothing -- either here or in any other
world -- save this concrete project of rowing. But this project itself inasmuch
as it is the totality of my being, expresses my particular choice in particular
circumstances; it is nothing other than the choice of myself as a totality in these
circumstances. That is why a special method must aim at detaching the
fundamental meaning which the project admits and which can be only the
individual secret of the subject's being-in-the-world. It is then rather by a
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An example involving a river, of course. Diachrony flows. Sartre's rower rows, gently or not, down that stream;
Camus' Rieux, on the other hand, spends a significant amount of The Plague floating in the ocean. Sartre quantifies
Heidegger in Being and Nothingness as follows: "as Past, Present, and Future -- all at the same time -- the For-itself
dispensing its being in three dimensions is temporal due to the very fact that it nihilates itself. No one of these
dimensions is has any ontological priority over the other; none of them can exist without the other two. Yet in spite
of all this, it is best to put the accent on the present ekstasis and not on the future ekstasis as Heidegger does"
(142, emphasis mine). In his refutation of Heideggerean temporality, Sartre makes a common move toward a
variety of presentism. Sartre's being-for-itself replaces and obfuscates the Heideggerean interplay of the three
ecstasies, which, as we will see in the next chapter in relation to the copula, has a number of significant
consequences.
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comparison of the various empirical drives of a subject that we try to
discover and disengage the fundamental project which is common to them all
-- and not by a simple summation or reconstruction of these tendencies; each
drive or tendency is the entire person (564, emphasis original; emphasis mine).
First, in this earlier work, Sartre presents an individual closer to Dasein, not as the twiceremoved third party, but as Dasein-as-project, as the action that Sartre emphasizes. Secondly,
even with this individual only once-removed from Dasein, the movement is yet to the
formulation of a "special method" for the discovery of the "fundamental project which is
common to them all." Even though Dasein has been once-removed from itself, the next
movement Sartre explains is toward the twice-removed collectivity, which will later appear in
Sartre's work as the fused group, so that what is common to all is limited to the group, but not
common to all. As Sartre continues, we cannot accept Heideggerean categories of authenticity
and inauthenticity, first, because of their implicit ethical judgment, and, secondly, because
if death causes anguish, and if consequently we can either flee the anguish or
throw ourselves resolutely into it, it is a truism to say that this is because we wish
to hold on to life. Consequently anguish before death and resolute decision or
flight into inauthenticity cannot be considered as fundamental projects of our
being. On the contrary, they can be understood only on the foundation of an
original project of living; that is, on an original choice of our being. It is right
then in each case to pass beyond the results of Heidegger's interpretation toward a
still more fundamental project (ibid.)
The question that arise is one of comparison, in a sense not entirely distinction from the
manner in which Sartre uses the word. First, if we were to compare the projects of two
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individuals, would we be able to tell the difference if one were acting in bad faith or
inauthenticity and one was acting authentically? Sartre's famous example of acting in bad faith
is one of bad acting, that is, of a waiter in a café who overacts in his role as waiter, and, in doing
so posits the Other (of the customer in this scenario) only to negate the existence of the
consciousness of the Other through first acting in bad faith (59-63). As Sartre explains the
process, "the consciousness of the Other is posited in order to disappear in negativity and in
freedom: consciousness of the Other is as not-being; its being-in-itself 'here and now' is not-tobe" (62). It would seem that Sartre finds agreement with Heidegger, that from Dasein there is a
movement toward Heideggerean Mitsein, the being-with others. Sartre, however, denies this
explicitly based on the impossibility of "sincerity" in such a situation (65). In other words, there
is always this distance between individuals created by the ability of the self to lie to the self 101.
Here, long before its formulation, we can see the fomentation of what Sartre may view as the
advantage of the third party in the fused group: a bypass of the question of bad faith due to the
presence of outside observers102.
Secondly, Sartre example thoroughly depends on aesthetic criteria on which he judges the
waiter's performance: "In vain to I fulfill the functions of a café waiter. I can only be he in the
neutralized mode, as the actor is Hamlet" (60). Without noting that he has done so, Sartre has
shifted Heidegger's entire question of fundamental ontology into a discourse of protoperformativity. Sartre erases the basic statement, Dasein exists, with this very gesture, and asks
a radically different question that precludes Sartre's comparisons of his own work with
Heidegger's. Although discussing usefulness and Zuhandenheit of things, Heidegger offers this,
101

This Impossible I, that is, who, according to Derrida, cannot even talk to itself in full presence.
Sartre, of course, will address this later in Being and Nothingness with his lengthy discussion of the gaze and the
lack of freedom for those dependent upon the gaze of an Other for meaning, a dependence which we can imagine -following Sartre -- being lessened by expansion to a multiplicity of gazes from a number of third parties. Or,
alternately, we could imagine even less freedom and an increase on the dependence of the gaze of Others.
102
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which we can read against Sartre's examination of the waiter: "observation is a kind of taking
care just as primordially as action has its own kind of seeing. Theoretical behavior is looking,
noncircumspectly. Because it is noncircumspect, looking is not without rules; its canon takes
shape in method" (Being and Time 69). The immediate objection should be the application of
Heidegger's notions concerning things present-at-hand and ready-to-hand to a human being. In
comparison to Sartre's gaze, however, we find neither taking care nor the risk that comes with
observation, but only the "theoretical behavior" that risks nothing and "takes shape in method,"
and the critique of the essentially aesthetic -- and theoretical -- experience of watching a poor
performance103.
Although quoted above before the turn toward Sartre and Marcuse104, it bears repeating
for it may be the single moment in Heidegger that most thoroughly disqualifies his work from
any discourse that prioritizes collectivity: "Dasein exists. Dasein is the being which I myself
always am. Mineness belongs to existing Dasein as the condition of the possibility of
authenticity and inauthenticity" (Being and Time 53). Further, as will return in the next chapter,
in The Concept of Time, Heidegger, in the relation between Dasein and temporality, bluntly
names temporality the principium individuationis (21). The work that Sartre does on Heidegger
through Marx, or the work that Marcuse does on Heidegger through Freud, in some way, at least
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In "Why Poets?", Heidegger proffers this concerning "the ones who risk more than the Being of beings. They
risk the precinct of Being. They risk language. All beings, the objects of consciousness and the things of the heart,
the self-asserting men and the men who risk more, all creatures, each in its own way, are (as beings) in the precinct
of language. That is why only in this precinct, if anywhere, can the reversal from the region of objects and their
representation into the innermost of the heart's space be realized" (Off the Beaten Track 233, emphasis original).
Sartre risks neither poetry nor beings, neither language nor Being, but only a theoretical critique that forms the basis
for bad faith, and its role in his theorization of his version of the Impossible I. We do not have the time to explore
this as we should. Suffice it to say that Heidegger's hammer, within Zuhandenheit, receives, in a certain sense,
greater consideration than Sartre's waiter. (Prior to this, Heidegger's thought concerning risk in relation to poets
appears in Holderlin's Hymn: The Ister to the extent that the risking of beings, and the risk of nonbeings, are why
"the human being is the most uncanny as being" (89). We will return to this section of Holderlin's Hymn: The Ister
in the next chapter in relation to the copula.)
104
These ghosts haunt Jameson as much as Heidegger and Freud haunt Derrida, as we will see in the next chapter.
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partially originates from Heidegger's adamant insistence on the existence of Dasein as an
essential element of his fundamental ontology.
As already mentioned in the last section, Dasein loses itself in immersion in the everyday
of das Man, that state in which "everyone is the Other, and no one is himself. Das Man, which
supplies the answer to the who of everyday Dasein is the nobody to whom every Dasein has
already surrendered itself, in its being-among-one-another (Being and Time 124, emphasis
original). We have, now, Heidegger's pre-emptive variation on Sartre's proposed solution of the
fused group, but in Sartre's solution, we must yield Dasein to das Man. We can only make a
choice here, to follow forth under the postulate that Dasein exists, or flow with Sartre down the
river of the Impossible I.

C. Not Species/Genus
To return to the question of Dasein and event, Heidegger, in Contributions, unlike Žižek,
Derrida, and Jameson, does not avoid causality nor does he advocate the depersonalized Event.
Ereignis is the event itself, and that event has a cause: "Being 105 essentially occurs at the event
of the grounding of the 'there' and itself determines the truth of the essence out of the essential
occurrence of the truth" (144, emphasis original). And what is the cause of this "grounding of
the there?" To continue with the thought quoted from Being and Time in the last paragraph,
beings themselves: "Being needs humans in order to occur essentially, and humans belong to
Being so that they might fulfill their ultimate destiny in Dasein" (198). This summation of this
point from Contributions here is nearly incompetent. The issue with using Contributions is the
105

By this point, Heidegger had begun to write Being as "Seyn" and Dasein as "Da-sein," before eventually writing
Being sous rature. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, Being and Dasein will be used throughout herein.
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interrelated and nested structure of ideas and concepts, which make it difficult to read the book
linearly as a sequential argument, and, in effect points toward a demand for a different
temporality that demands not only distentio and intentio, but also their simultaneity with the
present, or, rather, and more accurately within Heidegger's work, the interplay of the three
temporal ecstasies discussed in Being and Time. Part of the omission from this brief use of
Contributions, as is extremely relevant to the criticisms of Žižek, Derrida, and Jameson thus far,
is Heidegger's nomination of the "first beginning" inaugurated with the birth of Western
metaphysics and ended by the work of Friedrich Nietzsche (135-38); the second beginning,
according to the younger Heidegger of Contributions, occurs after the transitional figure of
Nietzsche and his ending to metaphysics. According to an older Heidegger, famously, "only a
god can save us," which phrase, spoken in the Der Spiegel interview, dealt with how "philosophy
will not be able to bring about a direct change of the present state of the world. This is true not
only of philosophy, but of all merely human meditations and endeavors." While many have cited
this passage for various reasons, what it implies here is the end of the second beginning, or its
failure, or its suspension, or Heidegger's mistake in having argued that it had been inaugurated
when it had not, or at least its minimization.
This does not mean, however, that Ereignis does not continue to occur. It does present,
however, a possible reason why much critical theory, whether that proposed by Derrida, de Man,
-- even Jameson, in ways we will see -- or various others, exerts so much energy for such an
extended duration in arguing against any philosophy of presence, and specifically the casting of
Heideggerean Being as part of the "metaphysics of pure presence," a phrase Derrida employs
repeatedly throughout his work (and especially with regard to Heidegger, but also with regard to
others), despite Heidegger's lengthy meditations on alethia, or unconcealment (and the state of
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concealment that cannot be termed presence or absence, exactly, in Derridean terms), throughout
his work. Heidegger, if his goal was to enact some sort of "change in the present state of the
world," admits his failure as a philosopher. In this way, to continue the thought of Heideggerean
Being, would be, ostensibly and arguably, to continue the thought of failure, if, indeed, only a
god can save us.
The central point, however, remains: with Ereignis, the event of appropriation,
Heidegger provides us with a beginning that, in essence, has no beginning in a chronological
sense, which inherently presents a differing and complex conceptualization of temporality, and
conceptualization incompatible with the conceptualization of temporality required by Derrida,
Jameson, and many others. Before we continue with Contributions and the event of
appropriation, we must leap forward in Heidegger's canon to Introduction to Metaphysics. With
regard to that which emerges, that which occurs, Heidegger translates fragment 53 of Heraclitus
in the following manner: "Confrontation is indeed for all (that comes to presence) the sire (who
lets emerge), but (also) for all the preserver that holds sway. For it lets some appear as gods,
others as human being, some it produces (sets forth) as slaves, but others as the free" (65,
parenthetical additions Heidegger 106).
Rather than "confrontation," Heidegger, elsewhere on this page and in many other
works, prefers to use the Greek word polemos presented, as usual in translations of Heidegger's
work, in Greek script. It is this polemos, this "originary struggle" that first "allows those that
struggle to originate in the first place; it is not a mere assault on the present-at-hand. Struggle
first projects and develops the un-heard, the hitherto un-said and un-thought. This struggle is
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In a footnote, translators Gregory Fried and Richard Polt provide this "more conventional translation of the
fragment:" "War is the father of all and the king of all, and it has shown some as gods and others as human beings,
made some slaves and others free" (ibid.).
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then sustained by the creators, by the poets, thinkers, and statesmen" (ibid.). Before we continue,
we must first address a few points. First, this sustaining of the struggle could be read as being
essentially the same as Derridean citationality, but with Derrida having diminished Heidegger's
grandiosity relating to the struggle and its heirs. To do so, however, would, again, be to elide
Dasein, which itself, regardless of whether it is among the "poets, thinkers, and statesmen" or
not, involves itself in this struggle, as will we see in Contributions. Secondly, and with
Heidegger's assessment of Hegelian space from Being and Time still in mind, we can see a
remarkable consistency in this thought that generally circles around the Gegenstand -- in the
terms of "objects" or tradition -- but that Heidegger never quite relates it in the same way twice,
for, certainly, we could read Heidegger's recapitulation of Hegel's punctuality as a "negation of a
negation" against, and in concordance with, the "originary struggle" of polemos, but not as a
singular species against a genus. Thirdly, and this concept will return in the next chapter with
regard to Heidegger's supposedly parousial aspects, polemos generates what is yet "unheard...un-said and un-thought," or rather, that which, in Derridean terms, is absent, or in
Heideggerean terms, that which is concealed.
Before we return to Contributions, however, we must make another foray through
Derrida. Let us begin with the famous claim in Of Grammatology that "there is nothing outside
of the text" (158) and his later revision in "Afterward: Toward an Ethic of Discussion" in
Limited Inc that "there is nothing outside context" (136), a statement we may wish to qualify
with: as long as context is text. Rather, if can argue that in Derrida language precedes
language107, then "text" is but the supplement of "context," and "context" is but the substitution
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See footnote XXX in Chapter 5 below.
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for "text," which is literally what Derrida does: substitutes "context" for "text" in the later
revision.
And therefore, one could argue that con/text is the center to which deconstruction
happens, which Derrida both denied and proposed. In a New York Times article from 1998,
Derrida reinforces the provisional definition above with this definition of deconstruction: "I
often describe deconstruction as something which happens. It's not purely linguistic, involving a
text or books. You can deconstruct gestures, choreography. That's why I enlarged the concept of
the text." Derrida's insistence on the expansion of the concept of con/text betrays the movement
with regard to the complete replacement of temporality with pure spatiality, and a totalization
(all is con/text) and universalization (anything can be a con/text to be deconstructed) common to
both High Modernism and postmodernism.
Three decades earlier in "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human
Sciences," Derrida offers this definition of the non-present center:
Thus it has always been thought that the center, which is by definition unique,
constituted that very thing within a structure which governs the structure, while
escaping structurality. This is why classical thought concerning structure could
say that the center is, paradoxically, within the structure and outside it. The center
is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the
totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center elsewhere. The center
is not the center. The concept of centered structure -- although it represents
coherence itself, the condition of the episteme as philosophy or science -- is
contradictorily coherent. And, as always, coherence in contradiction expresses
the force of a desire. The concept of centered structure is in fact the concept of a

125

freeplay based on a fundamental ground, a freeplay which is constituted upon a
fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the
reach of the freeplay. With this certitude anxiety can be mastered, for anxiety is
invariably the result of a certain mode of being implicated in the game, of being
caught by the game, of being as it were from the very beginning at stake in the
game. From the basis of what we therefore call the center (and which, because it
can be either inside or outside, is as readily called the origin as the end, as readily
arche as telos), the repetitions, the substitutions. the transformations, and the
permutations are always taken from a history of meaning -- that is, a history,
period -- whose origin may always be revealed or whose end may always be
anticipated in the form of presence. This is why one could perhaps say that the
movement of any archeology, like that of any eschatology, is an accomplice of
this reduction of the structurality of structure and always attempts to conceive of
structure from the basis of a full presence which is beyond play (Writing and
Difference 279, emphasis original, emphasis mine).
That is: the infinite play of language; the center is play; language is the center; the center
is language is play is the center. Language is arche (not arche-writing), the trace that precedes
the determination of Being. Language entails teleology, in that language is death. Derrida has
resuscitated a center; he has resuscitated metaphysics as linguistics, as deconstruction, with a
sidelong teleology and seriality. When Derrida writes of the "democracy to come" throughout
Specters of Marx, Derrida flatly denies any utopian impulse, and invokes, instead, the sense of
waiting without expectation that he will further in "Hostipitality" (81-82). There is waiting;
there is sequential temporal passage; there is a named form ("democracy to come") that once
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named implies that which has been named has some teleological aspect, even if it is to be
ignored. Derrida, in fact, will qualify, in revision, the teleological implication of that which has
been named in his discussion of khora in On the Name, published in English a year after
Specters of Marx. In On the Name, a work of decidedly theological tenor, Derrida ultimately
renders the name as something to be lost in order to respect the name as name (58). One must
forget in order to remember, in other words, and in that way, the forgetting becomes the
remembrance. We must forget the name "democracy" for the "democracy to come." We must
mention the work in the previous chapter herein in which Derrida effectively conflates the
Absolute, as polar Telos, and passage by denying the polar Telos, which is self would be a center
-- as telos or arche -- for the movement of time.
In deconstruction, language is not "the house of Being" as Heidegger suggested in the
"Letter on 'Humanism'" (Pathmarks 254), but, by Derrida's schema, we find that we can think our
way, within Derrida's own terms, without the violence of resorting to outside concepts, to the
conclusion that for Derrida language, while not Being itself, is its substitution, the new epoch is
the epoch of language, or at least, the epoch of deconstruction. Or, rather, we find another path
to justify this reading of Derrida in his phrase, "deconstruction is justice" as Derrida stated in
"Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority'" (Acts of Religion 243, emphasis
Derrida). That is, we find another path toward considering, in Derrida's terms, the possible
implication that language is Being if we consider Derrida's perpetual and constant relationship to
Heidegger. "Justice," often, serves as the English translation for the Greek dike, as evinced in
numerous translations of Book V of Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. Dike, however, plays an
important role for Heidegger in Introduction to Metaphysics. Polemos, as drawn from Heraclitus
by Heidegger as already mentioned, is the "originary struggle" that enables all subsequent
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struggle to exist (Introduction to Metaphysics 65). While being willing to bracket off any search
for the source of polemos, Heidegger does proffer the concept of the uncanniest being (deinon,
Dasein) as arising from the confrontation between techne, here translated as "knowing," and
dike, or "fittingness" (Introduction to Metaphysics 170-71).
Now we will work through a set of equivalencies, or, rather, in terms drawn from
Derrida, engage in a series of metonymical substitutions. If we can read Derrida's "justice" as
being commensurate with Heidegger's dike, then we may also consider (if not accept) that
Derrida's "deconstruction" finds its metonymical antecedent in the chain of substitution of the
Heideggerean polemos and that chain's iterations of confrontation between techne and dike108.
And, if we continue this work backward, treating Heidegger's terminology as the anterior text in
a chain of substitution, then we must find a Derridean term symmetrical, but not quite 109, with
polemos, while remembering that Heidegger also stated in Introduction to Metaphysics that
"polemos and logos are the same110" (65). Therefore, if, as Derrida insists, a text contains the
seeds of its own deconstruction, and if a text comprises language, then deconstruction language
are the same. Deconstruction is language, justice, eris, dike, polemos.
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With regard to only the opening adverbial clause of this sentence, Gregory Fried makes a similar argument in
Heidegger's Polemos: From Being to Politics: "If deconstruction is justice, then so is polemos. After all, Heidegger
agrees with Heraclitus that dike is eris, that justice is strife" (226). Fried, here, conflates polemos, dike, and eris, by
letting them stand, in a Derridean, but not Heideggerean, fashion, as seemingly interchangeable terms, each capable
of being translated as "justice." This, in its way, has much to do with Fried's condemnation of postmodernist politics
and its basis in Heidegger via a distrust of metaphysics, which denies "even the possibility of an appeal to a
transcendent universalism" (239). The conflation of polemos, dike, and eris into justice is the first error, which is
then compounded by his choice to ignore Heidegger's explanation of the necessity of metaphysics as the leaping off
point in The Principle of Reason. In brief, to point out Heidegger's compartmentalization of metaphysics differs
from postmodernism ob-literation of metaphysics and to point out the frequent rebukes of Derrida and de Man of
Heidegger for being too tied to metaphysics would blur Fried's clean, clear line of damnation.
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In an imperfect inversion by adirreD a, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
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In the final paragraph of "Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida assert that "the polemic is language itself," an
unattributed paraphrase of Heidegger's "polemos and logos are the same, with the emphasis in Derrida occurring in
the title, metaphysics, but more specifically, the violence of the metaphysics of the writing of history (Writing and
Difference (117).
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If we accept this movement, we can provisionally expose three essential differences
between Heidegger's work, and the work of Derrida: first, Derrida's continuous and expansive
further revision of arche-writing elides the Heideggerean difference between techne and dike; or,
rather, determines how we should read the closing of "Différance" in Margins of Philosophy
with Derrida's open conflate of Being-qua-language drawn from Heidegger's postulation, as
Derrida quotes from "The Anaximander Fragment" that Being speaks through language (27); or,
rather, this elision directs us teleologically at the same time, as Derrida's insists at the same point
in "Violence and Metaphysics," language itself directs us teleologically: thus a double
determination, an overdetermination of rhetorical proof for his own theorization.
Secondly, in that elision, if we follow Derrida, we are left with only language, not even
Being; Being-qua-language -- but never language-qua-Being -- however, even in its lack of
stability, approaches pure presence, an approach (or actualization) that can only be frustrated to
the extent that we are capable of accepting, seemingly on faith, the uniqueness of the word
"différance," in relation to deconstruction, as "neither a word nor a concept" (Margins 4).
Thirdly, Derrida read polemos tout court; its meaning in Derrida is not manifold and
indeterminate, but an utterly simplistic equivocation: polemos is violence in every, and only the,
conventional sense of violence. Fourthly, not only are we confronted with a paradox resolvable
only by faith in Derrida's explanatory non-explanation, but we are moved away from any notion
of polemos, away from techne and dike, toward the Derridean iteration of citationality, an always
imperfect, and almost essentially meaningless, substitution in an endless "economy of violence."
In other words, to demonstrate a different path to the same conclusion, following Derrida
through the elision of techne and dike into polemos as deconstruction moves us from metaphor to
metonymy.
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According to Heidegger in "Why Poets?" (and elsewhere), Being exists simultaneously as
presence and absence: "since presence simultaneously conceals itself, it is itself already
absence" (Off the Beaten Track 202). Not only does this one example severely problematize
Derrida's (and de Man's) myriad attempts to cast Heidegger as a thinker of pure presence and
parousia, but Heidegger's work has refused the Derridean presence of language as center as play
in advance. Language, for Heidegger at least momentarily, may be the house of Being, the place
where Being dwells, but it is not Being itself. For Derrida, language is a chain of substitutions
for a non-existent center, a non-existent transcendental signifier, which, nonetheless, is itself a
center.
And others have made similar arguments concerning Derrida. Applying Derrida's work
to itself creates a nihility that is so a nihility because his work does amounts to disproving his
own work. It is, in this case, presence and absence simultaneously, a condition which Heidegger
already had formulated, but under the concept of alethia, or deconcealment. The underlying
moment of importance here is the chain of substitution, its movement that can only be described
linearly, through serial temporality, through what Heidegger calls "the vulgar interpretation of
time" that "level[s] down" time (Being and Time 403). Deconstruction, despite its confounding
confusion of its position on presence, and despite Derrida's myriad denials, holds fast to one
mode of temporality at its core: seriality. In "Différance," Derrida reminds us that the substitute
is always secondary, the sign always a replacement (9), but we must remember that the substitute
for language is language itself, and that process is exactly a process. It can unfold only over a
rigid concept of time as a sequence of now points 111.
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When the argument herein has progressed to the correct point in the next chapter, we will return to this concept of
replacement in relation to Kant, temporality, the copula, Dasein, and metaphor.
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Regardless of Derrida's explanation concerning the phonemes of différance, the word
always functions with the trace of difference with an "e," and always points toward the question
of ontology, if not the unknown point of origin itself, in the infinite regression that occurs when
we ask after the source of arche-writing. In this gesture toward origin, not only does Derrida
prise open again metaphysics, but also provides another important distinction between his work
and that of Martin Heidegger. In some ways, discussed at length in a number of other works
such as "Marx's Purloined Letter," Jameson's review of Derrida's The Specters of Marx,
Heidegger's work functions as an object of cathexis for Derrida. Jameson's specific example in
this case appears in the form of Heidegger's "great essay on Anaximander which is virtually the
dead center of all Derrida's meditations on Heidegger" (Valences 148); what would the
Derridean oeuvre contain if not for Heidegger? The importance of Heidegger's work to Derrida's
work exists beyond parasitology. Heidegger, however, instead of différance, instead of insisting
on a starting point that then indicates an end, or at least a vector toward an end on a metaphysical
scale, turns towards the zoon logon echon, the animal that speaks itself into Being in Being and
Time, and again in Parmenides, before turning toward Ereignis in Contributions to Philosophy.
The character of différance, as a concept full of implications, would, in Heideggerean terms, be
onto-theological. Although indirectly, through a method of absence not precisely distinct from
the via negativa, différance always points toward an ultimate source without directly pointing,
even as or through its supplement or trace (regardless of Derrida's insistence of the magic of the
word that is neither passive nor active due to its construction). Whereas Heidegger is content, in
Contributions to Philosophy, to point toward the pre-Socratics as the first origin, and, frequently,
to bracket off the rest of the question, unless specifically discussing metaphysics. Although
Derrida will eventually ask after the question of origin, ethics, and responsibility much more
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openly after his own Kehre, especially in The Gift of Death, the Derrida who formulated
différance refuses to ask the onto-theological question, but yet insists on answering it; Heidegger
refuses to ask it, bracketing it off, offering a "first beginning" of the pre-Socratic philosophers, or
from the more abstract "originary polemos," in which we can find a parallel in the Gegenstand
with regard to Dasein.
Finally, to return to the Heidegger of Contributions, we must keep in mind this foregoing
recapitulation and expansion of the temporality of différance while reading the following
quotation from Heidegger presented at length to preserve the complexity of context.
How very many (all) now talk of "being" and mean only being and
perhaps only those beings that provide an opportunity for evasion and
reassurance.
To speak of the relation of the human being to Being and, conversely, of
the relation of Being to the human being makes it seem as if Being essentially
occurred, with the regard to the human being, as something over and against, as
an object.
But the human being as Da-sein is ap-propriated by Being as the event and
thus belongs to the event itself.
Being "is" neither round about humans nor does it merely vibrate right
through them as through beings. Instead, Being appropriates Dasein and thus
only essentially occurs as event.
By no means, however, may the event be represented as an "incident" or a
"novelty." Its truth, i.e. the truth itself, essentially occurs only if sheltered in art,
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thinking, poetry, deed. It therefore requires the steadfastness of the Da-sein that
repudiates all the semblant immediacy of mere representation112.
Being essentially occurs as the event. That is the ground and abyss of the
god's availing of the human being, or, conversely, of the availability of the human
being for god. But this availability is withstood only in Da-sein (201, emphasis
original; emphasis original; all hyphenation, and lack thereof, in Da-sein and
Dasein original; brevity of paragraphs original; parenthetical material original).
"Being appropriates Dasein" as we find here in Contributions. Being is not the
Gegenstand, the over against, nor does it function as the genus of which all beings are species in
a synecdochic relation. To expand here on the implications of Heidegger's thought, with each
Dasein, however, in its appropriation by Being, the event occurs in individuated form. As will
be pursued in the next chapter, Heidegger, in The Concept of Time considers temporality the
principium individuationis (21). With that individuation in mind, and with the appropriation of
the human by Being in mind, we find in Heidegger an effective sort of speed limit, a
conceptualization of temporality -- without moving to ecstatic temporality as we will in the next
chapter -- that can only occur at the speed of the human. While this may seem like a cryptic
statement approaching nonsense, we posit that one of the hallmarks of the critical theory
surrounding postmodernism, whether that theory nears the contemptuous or remains laudatory,
depends, in some form or fashion on the increase of speed of human events that outstrips the
speed of the human. In each of the following works, the theorist identifies exactly this type of
speed as responsible in the formation of this postmodern condition.
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This criterion will be repeated in the future discussion of the poetry of Robert Lowell.

133

For example, Jean Baudrillard throughout his corpus, but relevant here, in America where
he argues that speed "runs ahead of time to annul time itself" (6-7). Derrida also presents this
idea throughout his corpus, but specifically the speed of the "techno-tele-media" in Specters of
Marx (98). Paul Virilio names speed as the defining characteristic of dromodology, to which he
devotes Speed and Politics. Alain Badiou, especially in the essay "The Desire for Philosophy and
the Contemporary World" offers the following summation as the basis for his argument for a
"slowing down process" to be enacted by philosophy:
Our world, you know, is marked by its speed: the speed of historical change, the
speed of technical change, the speed of communications, of transmissions, and
even the speed with which human beings establish connections with one another.
This speed exposes us to the danger of a very great incoherency. It is because
things, images, and relations circulate very quickly that we do not even have the
time to measure to what extent all that is incoherent. Speed is the mask of
inconsistency.
But we are not finished. Bernard Stiegler, notably in the "General Introduction" and
"Introduction," respectively, to Time and Technics, I: The Fault of Epimetheus (1-28), founds
his argument on the centrality of the consequences for human life of technics on "the speed of its
evolution, which has led us to the conjugation of the question of technics with the question of
time" (23). David Harvey, in The Condition of Postmodernity, links the "speed-up" of
production, consumption, and "flexible accumulation" to the "rapid deployment of new
organizational forms and new technologies in production" (284) in relation to "time-space
compression" as it is involved in "the postmodern condition" (The Condition of Postmodernity
240-323, for a sustained discussion of the effects of the "speed-up"). Marshall McLuhan,
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throughout his work as well, but succinctly in the lecture "Living at the Speed of Light,"
collected in Understanding Me (225-43). This is only to name a few who portray speed as a
prime suspect in our malaise or liberation in postmodernity.
Without belaboring the point at this moment, and with recognition of a somewhat similar
argument Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont make in Fashionable Nonsense against Paul Virilio's
confusion of velocity with acceleration (170), neither speed nor acceleration is time itself, and
the measurement of speed or acceleration is not strictly synonymous with the measurement of
time within the laws of Newtonian physics, which may or may not matter. This faulty metaphor
of speed, common to those listed above, becomes extraordinarily problematic when used, as each
theorist does, as the justification for various pronouncements concerning the nature of reality, the
human condition, the state of the world, or whatever generalizing phrase one wishes to use.
When comparing different conceptualizations of temporality, this Newtonian metaphor of speed
implies unidirectionality, and in that way, defines the structure of time; or, inversely, the
unidirectionality of time had been defined, which enables the use of the metaphor of speed, and
through that metaphor, place create a taxonomy in which all species of event belong to the genus
of speed.
When the metaphor of speed no longer remains Newtonian, but is recast within the world
of quantum mechanics under the aegis of Werner Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, the
underlying assumption of the structure of temporality becomes even more pronounced. The
Uncertainty Principle states, "one can never know with perfect accuracy both of those two
important factors which determine the movement of one of the smallest particles—its position
and its velocity. It is impossible to determine accurately both the position and the direction and
speed of a particle at the same instant (Nuclear Physics 30, emphasis original). When we follow
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Heisenberg's determination, and our focus falls on speed, then we only further diminish the
ontological aspects, if Being has anything at all to do with topos113, which in Heidegger's
fundamental ontology, with its emphasis on world and There-being, it certainly does. From
there, after having ridded ourselves of ontology in favor of epistemology, we can begin, from
this same vantage, to rid ourselves of epistemology, which is precisely the quintessential
indeterminacy of postmodernism. None of this functions as an argument against science, but as
against science as the simplification of the human to the purely ontic, and as the overwhelmingly
dominant metanarrative that Jean-Francois Lyotard utterly failed to see in The Postmodern
Condition. To impose this metaphor of speed and its implied conceptualization of temporality
upon Heidegger's work, as Derrida, Jameson, and Stiegler each do variously in arguing against
Heidegger, is, fundamentally, to misrepresent Heidegger's stance on temporality, which is to say
nothing of the Augustine's admission found in the epigraph.
And Baudrillard, Derrida, Virilio, Badiou, Stiegler, Harvey, and McLuhan may be
correct, partially, if we remove all questions of ontology in favor of epistemology, whether in
terms of the ontology in the tradition of Western metaphysics or in the terms of Heidegger's
ontic-ontological difference with regard to Dasein. We cannot deny that certain aspects of
human life happen at a more rapid pace. We know, sometimes within minutes, when a horrible
catastrophe occurs half a world away. Yet, the speed at which we become aware of our
knowledge of a terrible event does not significantly increase our speed to act. We are still within
the ontic, and fall under the same limitations. We can know in an instant, and, of course, we
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See final paragraph of footnote 173, Chapter Four herein.
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could set out immediately and arrive in mere days at the stricken location to succor the
victims114.
But we should notice the disparity here, and with it, posit the distinction: this alternately
much feared and much celebrated speed predominantly pertains to epistemological concerns; we
cannot make the mistake of assuming that to know is to do, unless thought is deed 115, 116. In that
way, speed only alters ontological concerns in as much as epistemological concerns dominate;
currently, we could argue that epistemological concerns dominate almost completely. The
domination of the epistemological is so complete that those in philosophy and critical theory who
find themselves vexed by the effects of postmodernism do not realize that they often share the
same assumption of epistemological dominance, and with it, a generalizable stance on time and
the human.
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Although, we should mention, commercial jet flights have occurred for over sixty years, which means that we
could arrive to provide aid essentially no faster than in 1960. Flights on commercial supersonic passenger jets have
ceased to be available with the end of commercial Concorde flights, which only further problematizes the narrative
of the exponential increase of speed in all forms.
115
In this confusion of knowledge and action, we glimpse the reification of technology. In another place, we could
trace the ways in which various strains of thought, if it's the speed of the "tele-techno-media" in Derrida, conflate the
possibilities of technology with the actuality of technology. For example, although no human being has been
cloned, or, although no human consciousness has been uploaded into a computerized atmosphere, we can, in certain
sectors, garner a sense of inevitability, whether in anticipatory joy or anxiety. The insistence on inevitability is
exactly reification. Futurist Ray Kurzweil's tome on Artificial Intelligence, The Singularity Is Near, and the not
insignificant numbers of those who accept his ideas, provide an perfect example of this reification of technology.
To enact such a reification, however, contradicts the dominant conceptualization of temporality inherent to science;
Kurzweil's future, via reification, projects the present. This, of course, is the temporality of Dasein in being-towarddeath. If we follow Kurzweil, we find ourselves within a technocratic discourse absolutely reliant on a
Heideggerean conceptualization of temporality. If we follow Kurzweil, we find ourselves again with a polar Telos;
we find ourselves neither in science nor philosophy, but, through the reification of the potentiality of technology,
faith.
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And to continue with faith, perhaps the most famous example of the confusion of thought and deed is President
Jimmy Carter's admission to having "committed adultery in [his] heart many times" in paraphrase of a
commandment from the Sermon on the Mount. To confuse thought and deed, then, in the Western tradition is to
assume a theological, and not necessarily philosophical, context.
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As for speed, within the last decade, a poorly named phenomenon has been coined by
people involved in the production of consumer technology: "Good Enough 117." Good Enough
describes a relatively recent development wherein a consumer chooses not to upgrade, chooses
not to consume, in favor of continuing to use an device already owned. For example, during the
advent of personal computing, to maintain functionality, a home user would find it necessary to
purchase a new computer every few years in order to run newer programs written for machines
with more memory and faster, or multiple, processors. That consumers opt to follow the
principle of Good Enough indicates that we are approaching, at least in personal electronic
devices, an upper limit of practical functionality. Unless a new technology emerges that
radically alters the ontic, or our experience of it, no need for a new device exists as long as the
old one remains in working order; in other words, the selling of new devices may depend entirely
upon some variation of commodity fetishism, or, in more consumer-friendly terms, a cult
following.
In that way, beyond the particulars of personal electronic devices, we can provisionally
posit a possibility that differs radically from the narrative of speed and technology. Instead of
assuming that technology would continue to expand at an exponential rate -- which is the
position of the critical theorists mentioned as well as Jameson -- we instead find we have
recourse to another model: Stephen Jay Gould's punctuated equilibrium theory, which states that
in the evolution of a species, relatively short periods of rapid change are interspersed into much
longer periods of relative stasis 118. Good Enough, then, suggests not only the possibility, but the
nascent actuality, of such a period of equilibrium. In other words, if the speed of human life
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For a concise explanation, see "The Good Enough Revolution: When Cheap and Simple Is Just Fine," published
on August 24, 2009, on Wired at < http://archive.wired.com/gadgets/miscellaneous/magazine/1709/ff_goodenough?currentPage=all >.
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This is both synchrony/diachrony and synchrony/seizure, with diachrony defined in terms of time beyond human
conception, except in numerical terms.
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depends on technological advancement, and that technological advancement slows -- because we
have reached a limit of practical functionality and/or consumer desire no longer drives research
and development -- does not our rate of speed achieve stasis, or a significant slowing, or even a
decline? Or, robbed of constant innovations in personal electronic devices to demonstrate
endlessly increasing speed, do we simply find another set of objects, such as medical technology,
to support our desire to proclaim the constantly increasing speed?
Or do we historicize much critical theory itself as the expression of a historical period
that did, in fact, see enormous change, especially with regard to technology, but mistakenly
assumed that from the change that defined that era, or from the era itself, they could draw eternal
truths applicable across all time in the future, given that the inherent view of time for these
theoretical endeavors all share the same conceptualization of temporality? For Derrida, what
could possibly come after deconstruction? For Jameson, the prohibition against periodization in
A Singular Modernity effects the endlessness of this period.

D. The Death of Deathless Being
To advance further into the implications here, to take our guiding principle from the
example of Heisenberg, and to return to an idea already mentioned, we grasp a movement toward
epistemology, which is the basic mode of scientific exploration. This epistemologization,
however, depends on what we could name a de-ontologization. Deconstruction, as semiology,
invokes this same movement, only to the move further again toward de-epistemologization,
before Derrida invokes a reontologization, in a text like On the Name119, which involves an
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See next chapter.
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ontology beyond Dasein, without topos, as khora. Jameson, as well, implicitly utilizes the same
movement of de-ontologization exactly as much as any other variation dependent upon on the
dialectic of historical materialism.
As Heidegger writes in "The Anaximander Fragment:" "Knowledge is the remembrance
of Being. That is why Mnemosyne is the mother of muses. Knowledge is not science in the
modern sense. Knowledge is thoughtful maintenance of Being's preserve (Early Greek Thinking
36). Problematically, with Heidegger, an entire terminology must be learned. "Being,"
"thoughtful," "maintenance," "preserve" each emit complex resonances with regard to the rest of
Heidegger's work. Even without an excessive digression of the explanation of these terms, we
can read, without entering fully into the totality of Heideggerean thought, that "knowledge is the
remembrance of Being." In that, we can read the dominance of ontology, in which Being
subsumes epistemology into a hierarchy, or we can read epistemology presented in a relation120
to ontology in which there can never be complete synthesis. If, as Jameson argues, that Derrida
seeks the first antinomies of tradition, then we find a larger search for antinomies that extends
beyond Derrida's work, unless, of course, we refuse to consider, unlike Heidegger, that ontology
and epistemology rest in even quasi-antinomic relationship.
Which is not the case, given the preponderance of evidence to the contrary. The evidence
is not directly of the antinomic relation between ontology and epistemology, but only becomes
clear when we view the ascendancy of epistemology. To imagine Jameson or Derrida using the
quotation from Heidegger above in any way to support one of their respective arguments scans
as ludicrous. We can speak, then, of a certain bifurcation. First, the condition of postmodernity
contains these elements of epistemologization concurrent with de-ontologization, and then a
120

With regard to the next chapter, a shorthand notation: S is P. With regard to Chapter 5, this is "seeing as."
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subsequent de-epistemologization; secondly, the critique of the condition of postmodernity, as
demonstrated here with the respective discourses of Derrida and Jameson, also depend upon the
very same elements of epistemologization concurrent with de-ontologization, and then a
subsequent de-epistemologization121.
Take, for another example, Jameson's discussion of epistemology in his "Foreword" to
Francois Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition. In that text, Jameson cites the "crisis of
representation in which an essentially realistic epistemology...conceives of representation as the
reproduction for subjectivity, of an objectivity that lies outside it" (xiii). Jameson will tie this
concept of "realistic epistemology" to "'realism' of the Lukàcsean variety," before praising
Lyotard for saving science from the crisis of representation by "recasting its now seemingly nonor postreferential 'epistemology' in terms of linguistics, and in particular theories of the
performative...for which the justification of scientific work is not to produce an adequate model
or replication of some outside reality, but simply to produce more work...again and again to
"make it new" (ix). Compare Jameson's definition of "realistic epistemology" as the
"representation...of an objectivity that lies outside it" to Heidegger's arguments involving the
"over against," the Gegenstand, and the ontological implications from The Principle of
Reason122:
Now, it is always easy to show that particular beings, for example the earth, the
sea, the mountains, the flora and fauna at all times lie overtly over against us.
That is why they are familiar and immediately accessible to us. But contrary to
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See footnote 173 in Chapter Four for an expansion of this concept with regard, primarily, to the work of Bernard
Stiegler.
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The "over against" and variations of Gegen- appear in a great number of Heidegger's works. Because of the
example used here, we cannot think that the "over against" is limited to The Principle of Reason; the "over against"
is an essential -- and frequently discussed -- component in Heidegger's explorations of fundamental ontology.
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this, that wherethrough all this -- that is, all that which comes to presence on its
own -- emerges and comes to presence never lies over against us as do particular
beings that are present here and there. Being is in no way as immediately familiar
and overt to us as are particular beings. It is not as if Being keeps itself
completely concealed. If this happened, then even beings could not lie over
against and be familiar to us (63).
The crisis of representation occurs only after the movement toward a totalizing
epistemologization. For Heidegger here, Heidegger the fundamental ontologist, the word is
"familiar," not "scientifically analysis" through qualitative chemistry, physics, and so forth. The
limitations in understanding the Gegenstand are pronounced and inconvertibly distinct from
science, as we will soon see in relation to the Bestand of "The Question Concerning
Technology." Science destroys ontology in a totalizing epistemologization; science causes the
crisis of representation, or de-epistemologizes even itself, and then, according to Jameson,
Lyotard "saves" science from its own de-epistemologization by reinventing science as,
essentially, the iteration of citational substitutions, "simply to produce more work...'to make it
new.'" This reading of Ezra Pound is problematic to say the least, and should be addressed
elsewhere, but what Jameson describes, a procession without telos, with the future infinitely
deferred, in which the work itself in itself verges on meaninglessness and only the process
matters: this is citationality via Jameson via Lyotard. The genius of Derrida lies in his ability to
describe this process, even if he does so only in order to promote the process as the lone fact of a
de-epistemologized world.
What Jameson describes as the objectivity outside of the subject is the Heideggerean
"over against," but with any and all connections to fundamental ontology completely severed.
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From there, we have the epistemologization of "realism" and science, which leads to the crisis of
representation, then a wholesale de-epistemologization, and Lyotard's (or Derrida's or many
others') arguments on the centrality of language as the constructor of reality. Event becomes a
purely epistemological phenomenon beyond that of fundamental ontological appropriation, until
the moment when Event is de-epistemologized. Then, Event, as a passing form, only appears -after Jameson, Derrida, Žižek -- ephemerally on the surface of the endless river of time.
To continue with the interrelationship of speed and event, we return to Žižek's Event,
which bears a resemblance to both Derrida's and Jameson's event, as well as event as postulated
by a number of others. Speed, in these formulations, functions in some sort antithetical
relationship to the Event, as is evidenced in Žižek's explicit statement of such a formulation in
the final, summary chapter of Event:
In an Event, things not only change: what changes is the very parameter by which
we measure the facts of change, i.e., a turning point changes an entire field within
which facts appear. This is crucial to bear in mind today when things change all
the time, at an unheard-of frantic speed. However, beneath all this constant
change, it is not difficult to discern a rather dull sameness, as if things change so
that everything can remain the same (178-79).
The completion of the process of de-ontologization seems apparent here; facts have no
involvement with facticity, let alone any movement from that to Dasein and Being. Instead, we
find de-ontologization in the obnoxious "dull sameness," which we can read as Being stripped of
its import, or, more likely, the completed forgetting of Being, and the "dull sameness" of
materiality that often seems to serve as justification for Žižek's frequent calls for the radical
restructuring of some aspect of human life, if not the human itself. Žižek follows this

143

continuance of epistemologization closely with its antithesis: the change in "the very parameter
by which we measure the facts of change," which presents de-epistemologization. We hear here
an echo of Baudrillard in Žižek's implicit, and somewhat sympathetic, critique and usage of
Baudrillard's "accelerated circulation" of the Beaubourg Effect and hyperreality from Simulacra
and Simulation (61-78, specifically 67-70). We would not be remiss in using "dull sameness" as
a near, but yet imperfect, synonym for Baudrillardian circulation. Baudrillard, on his own, will
ramp up this rhetoric to open The Illusion of the End, in which he surmises,
through the impulse for total dissemination and circulation, every event is granted
its own liberation; every fact becomes atomic, nuclear, and pursues its trajectory
into the void...No human language can withstand the speed of light. No event can
withstand being beamed across the whole planet. No meaning can withstand
acceleration. No history can withstand the centrifugation of facts or their being
short-circuited in real-time (2).
Again, de-ontologization, as it relates to the ontology of traditional metaphysics or
Heideggerean fundamental ontology, has already occurred, and is present here as an underlying
assumption. From there, we find Baudrillard's lament over the de-epistemologization of an
already epistemologized "planet" beyond meaning, beyond linguistic representation, completely
beyond the reach of any schema of conceptualization that could order atomized facts. And while
Žižek maintains his speed, the primary difference here between Žižek and Baudrillard, lies in the
meaning of Event. Žižek follows the inverted Platonic formalism noted in Chapter One, and
refuses to permit the concept of Event to fall completely into the endless flux, whether that flux
be described as linear or circular. The "dull sameness" of the procession of events remains
beneath, from which rises the form of Event. For Baudrillard, even Event itself succumbs to
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circulation123. Of greater importance here, however, is a furtherance of the burgeoning
consensus on the role of speed. Speed, as used by Žižek, Baudrillard, Derrida, Jameson, Virilio,
Badiou, Stiegler, Harvey, and McLuhan, however, can only be measured against some
standardized time, a linear time, clock time, which is, in other words, and following Heidegger's
explanation in Being and Time with which none of the critical theorists listed essentially
disagree, epistemologized time.
Here in this juxtaposition between Žižek and Baudrillard, we can glimpse clearly the
variation possible once we have (facetiously) resolved the mystery of temporality. Although this
point has been made in other ways, it bears repetition: on one hand, we have Baudrillard for
which the Event contains no formal status, and even in almost every case, is merely one
simulation among the rest; on the other hand, we have not only the inverted Platonism of Žižek,
in which the form not only appears on the surface of the flux as noted above, but as an element
of some kind of tripartite Platonism, wherein form appears as a fugacious eddy on the surface of
the river of time, which is a river that runs on an unchanging bed of a "dull sameness" in an
abhorrent constancy. All which, circularly, then affords an intimation of Baudrillardian
circulation, or, rather, arguably demonstrates the phenomenon of circulation functioning within
critical theory itself, with the distinction being that for Baudrillard there may be no real Event,
while Žižek locates the Event, problematically, in the Lacanian subject, which may or may not
exist, and certainly differs profoundly from Dasein. Again, this repetition, this theme and
variation as staged here between Baudrillard and Žižek, occurs only after temporality has been
thoroughly depersonalized-cum-de-ontologized, so that time, event, and speed have, seemingly,
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We find support for this statement in how the status of Event will change for Baudrillard, however. From the
9/11 attacks, Baudrillard will generate his unfortunate critique of the attacks in Le Monde, in which he condemns
the attacks, but also nearly praises them on the grounds that they are, finally, a pure Event that transcends simulacra
and circulation.
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nothing to do with human beings, but each have come to be conceptualized as operating as
independent manifestations and/or causes of the condition of de-epistemologized postmodernity.
Here, three interrelated suggestions that will not be expanded at this moment, but are
presented for consideration: first, the death of the subject (or self, Dasein, ego, individual) is
essential for the birth the reification of the twinned concepts of speed and Event, in their current
forms, and that death and subsequent birth point toward what Heidegger called the "enframing"
(Gestell) of the "standing reserve" (Bestand) in "The Question Concerning Technology." In that
essay, Heidegger posits that the basic relation of the human toward objects has been radically
altered. Instead of the definition of the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand in Being and Time,
which indicates thought relating to use, or not, the enframing of the standing reserve finds
expression in, one way, stockpiling (Question 15) and in a more general sense, the ordering of
the "real." Since, as Heidegger argues, techne is poesis, technology contains the possibility of
"revealing the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing reserve" (Question 24), a point often lost
in critiques of Heidegger that casts him as a technophobic troglodyte. What Heidegger finds
impossible is the possibility that human beings themselves could become part of this standing
reserve, ordered, and prepared for use124 since "process of ordering challenges man," human
beings can never become part of the standing reserve (Question 18). This, for Heidegger, stands
as a profoundly optimistic view.
What Heidegger does consider are the following consequences of atomic physics:
physics, in all its retreating from the representation turned only toward objects
that has alone been standard till recently, will never be able to renounce this one
thing: that nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through
124
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calculation and that it remains orderable as a system of information. This system
is determined, then, out of a causality that has changed once again. Causality now
displays neither the character of the occasioning that brings forth nor the nature of
the causa efficiens, let alone that of the causa formalis. It seem as though
causality is shrinking into a reporting -- a reporting challenged forth -- of standing
reserves that must be guaranteed either simultaneously or in sequence (Question
23).
Heidegger could not predict the future for he did not see the looming crisis of
representation so central to Jameson's rationalization of Lyotard's work as mentioned above, in
which scientific research becomes the standing reserve of itself. Nor did Heidegger imagine the
extent to which causality would be disregarded, such as the discussion in Chapter One herein
with relation to Žižek's proposal of emergence essentially ex nihilo. Nor did Heidegger postulate
that the concept of the standing reserve would be applied to time.
But it was. Heidegger grasped the fundamental movement here in "either simultaneously
or in sequence." We have, in other words, synchrony and diachrony, which, as procession, is
dia-synchrony. With the expansion of technology and the scientific world view, time becomes
merely another object to be manipulated. It becomes, eventually, a commodity no one wants.
Before it ceases to be a concern, ceases to deserve concern, the fundamental temporality of the
standing reserve (simultaneity/sequence; synchrony/diachrony) extends to all time. In that
process, ecstatic temporality vanishes; with the disappearance of ecstatic temporality, so
disappears Dasein. Or, we could reverse the order of causality, and approach through the death
of the subject: with the disappearance of Dasein, so disappears ecstatic temporality. We have
indeterminacy that functions simultaneously and in sequence, a variation on the question of the
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priority of the chicken or the egg. Heidegger, in other words, could not conceive of the extent of
the implications of the creation of the standing reserve. Heidegger, simply, was wrong, vis-a-vis
Being, about the possible redemptive aspects of techne as poesis.
Secondly, Event -- at least the definition presented here from Žižek -- seemingly stands
as the antithesis of the Derridean trace. They are not, however. Both Event and trace feature
some generative aspect; the former arises from material reality and is then narrativized to
fantasize "some primordial unity and harmony125" (Event 53), while trace precedes Being and is
that which ends such primordial unity at the moment of scission. The moment of scission is
itself arbitrary, which then indicates that for all intents and purposes, even though we can name
apeiron as that primordial unity of chaos, apeiron functions, like scission, as a constructed
fiction; both Event and trace fill the position of necessary catalyst to avoid the absolute repetition
of the Same126. The difference between Event and trace, however, is temporality: Event arises
during the course of the flux, maintains itself as a concept, and then casts its glance backwards
while forever caught in the current; trace generates the current on which it plays, maintains itself
as a concept, and casts its glance at the present state of the current. Or, to move dialectically, the
impulse, in a present, to explain origin as Event leaves unnamed, and therefore of central
importance, a future telos; the impulse toward the Living Present of trace, that is the continuance
of the past, also leaves unnamed a future telos. Both Event and trace then are invariably oriented
toward the future, and belie their respective foundations in conceptualization of temporality as
the serial movement of moments.
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Quoted at length in Chapter One herein.
In the next chapter, this idea will return in discussion of Bernard Stiegler attempted recuperation of Derrida's
pharmakon.
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And thirdly, we can find a parallel, that can only be presented metaphorically rather than
metonymically, between Žižek's definition of Event, with its tripartite structure, and Jameson's
insistence on the primacy of allegory, in which allegory is the event spawned by the interaction
between diachronic flux and synchronic reading time.

E. The Moving Finger of Stream of Consciousness Critical Theory
In the next chapter, we will move to Heidegger's explication of ecstatic temporality in
Being and Time, but for now, we turn our attention to "The Anaximander Fragment," and more
specifically Derrida's and Jameson's specific readings of it.
To begin this engagement we must first quote at length one of Jameson's most egregious
misreadings of Heidegger. As quoted earlier in this chapter, Jameson views "The Anaximander
Fragment" as "virtually the dead center of all Derrida's meditations on Heidegger [in Specters of
Marx]." Jameson, as well, defines the importance of "The Anaximander Fragment" as being
"one of the rare places in which Heidegger is willing directly to evoke a spatio-temporal system
radically different from our own" (Valences 149.) The first flaw is plain enough: to consider
Anaximandrine temporality as "spatio-temporal" is to read Heidegger's work completely out of
the context of Dasein, from which away we move if we allow Jameson to hoodwink us into a
discussion of "system." Heidegger, in "The Anaximander Fragment," clearly ties his entire
nexus of shepherd/seer, as they relate to the "preservation of Being" and Anaximandrine
temporality, respectively, to Dasein: "Man can do both only within the openness of Dasein"
(Early Greek Thinking 36).
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The second flaw also stands straightforward: "The Anaximander Fragment absolutely is
not "one of the rare places" where Heidegger details ecstatic temporality. As will be discussed in
the next chapter, Heidegger devotes the entirety of sixth chapter of the second division of Being
and Time to the explication of ecstatic temporality, unless, of course, Jameson intends that
Anaximandrine temporality is "radically different from our own" ecstatic temporality, which he
clearly does not, as we will see shortly.
We find next the third flaw in Jameson's reading: as we have spent a significant amount
of time in explaining, Derrida's dia-synchrony stands in radical, insuperable contradistinction
from Anaximandrine temporality, which is structurally synonymous with Heidegger's ecstatic
temporality. Despite Jameson's blase attempt, the difference cannot be so simply elided. If we
are to believe Jameson, we can consider "The Anaximander Fragment" as the center of Derrida's
mediations on Heidegger only by positing Derrida's formulation of dia-synchrony as the
antithesis to Heidegger's thesis of ecstatic temporality. In conjunction with Jameson's assertion,
we must also read another insistence, also quoted in the first chapter herein, that, according to
Jameson, Derrida's method consists of "tirelessly dissolving all the reified thoughts he encounters
in the tradition back into the first impossibilities and antinomies from which they sprang." We
now have a contradiction in critique. If Derrida provides an antithesis to Heidegger's thesis, the
movement is dialectic; he absolutely dissolves nothing, but, rather, adds via negation, which
proves Jameson mistaken in his summation of Derrida's method of dissolution. If Jameson is
correct and Derrida dissolves the "reified thought" of Heideggerean ecstatic temporality, then
Jameson stands as simply and irrevocably wrong as to the judgment of Anaximandrine
temporality being "radically different from our own," unless the radically other can somehow
remain radically other and yet be reified into the quotidian.
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Jameson, though, continues in discussing Anaximandrine temporality: "There is a logical
contradiction involved in positing a phenomenon whose fundamental formal trait lies in its
radical difference from everything we know, its resistance to all the categories by which we
currently think our own world: something that raises the suspicion that it is little more than a
subjective or ideological projection from our own present (Valences 149). The fourth flaw
comprises Jameson's insistence of time as phenomenon; Heidegger opens On Time and Being
with the definition that "time is not a thing" (3). To read a Marxian use of the word
"phenomenon" is to read, justifiably, "thing," unless Jameson has long harbored a secret Kantian
core. Even if that were the case, and we could never reach the Ding-an-sich of temporality, we
are then dealing with our perceptions of time. Which brings us to the fifth flaw in Jameson's
argument: apparently, contrary to Augustine of Confessions, and contrary not only to Augustine,
we know exactly, precisely, incontrovertibly what time is.
And that brings us to the sixth flaw, Jameson's accusation that Anaximandrine
temporality deviates from "all the categories by which we currently think our own world." The
basic structure of ecstatic temporality is familiar to everyone, even it is in not known by that
name. And for an example, we turn toward a story foundational to all the Abrahamic faiths, the
Exodus narrative that begins with Moses and the Burning Bush. From the Burning Bush, of
course, issues the voice of I AM THAT I AM. In Exodus 3, Moses only sees a burning bush,
which burns but is not consumed, and we see an image of divine temporality in fire that does not
consume, which is, as well, time that does not flow. The voice of eternal God sounds, fades, and
disappears like all human voices within the sequence of moments. In the bush, though, we see
the figuration of eternity.
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God commands Moses to lead his people out of slavery in Egypt. Moses protests. God
wills it. Eternity and seriality, the future ("Go to Pharoah, Moses" 7:26), the past ("I am the God
of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob" 3:6), and the present,
in which Moses covers his eyes to refuse even to witness the representation of the Divine, all
converge here in interplay. We find seriality and Eternity, movement and stillness, and the
human time, that of the tasks of Moses, and the future projecting itself back to the past to define
the present, and the past that lingers in the unconcealment of the present. As Heidegger writes of
another prophet, Kalchas from The Iliad:
The seer stands in sight of what is present, in its unconcealment, which has at the
same time cast light on the concealment of what is absent as being absent. The
seer sees as much as he has seen everything as present...the seer...is...the madman.
But in what does the essence of madness consist? A madman is beside himself 127,
outside himself: he is away. We ask: away? Where to and where from? Away
from the sheer oppression of what lies before us, which is only presently present,
away to what is absent...The seer is outside himself in the solitary region of the
presencing of everything that in some way becomes present...All things present
and absent are gathered and preserve in one presencing for the seer (Early Greek
Thinking 35-36).
Heidegger's direct discussion of Biblical themes are sparse, and those opposed to his
work surely could detect something nefariously anti-Semitic in Heidegger never having used this
moment to demonstrate the interplay of the temporal ecstasies. On the other hand, for Heidegger
to have read this as an analogy for ecstatic temporality would have unnecessarily clouded his
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work, and well as performed a number of unsavory comparisons in which Heidegger would
replace God, Dasein would replace the most important Old Testament prophet, death would
replace freedom from bondage, and Being and Time would replace the Bible. Heidegger would
likely have viewed such an analogy as very poor philosophy.
And this analogy also elides several key points of ecstatic temporality by having recourse
to the diachrony of narrative that is the entirety of Exodus as opposed to remaining only within
the moment of the Burning Bush. But as presented here, this is not philosophy per se, but a
demonstration that ecstatic temporality is not some inconceivably esoteric structuration of time
nearly completely alien to human consciousness, but one with which we are exceedingly well
acquainted if we have any familiarity with Exodus. We are, as well, exceedingly familiar with a
general, imprecise sense of the structure of ecstatic temporality if we are familiar with any
narrative that involves the fulfillment of a prophecy, known in advance, by a scion, which would
include such commonplaces as The Matrix films and the Harry Potter books.
As the seventh flaw, Jameson provides his own translation of what he sees as relevant
sections from "The Anaximander Fragment." First follows Heidegger's original German:
{1}Auch das Vergangene und Zukünftige ist Anwesendes, nämlich außerhalb der
Gegend der Unverborgenheit. {2}Das ungegenwärtig Anwesende ist das Abwesende. {3}Als dieses bleibt es wesensmäßig auf das gegenwärtig Anwesende
bezogen, insofern es entweder in die Gegend der Unverborgenheit hervorkommt
oder aus ihr weggeht. {4}Auch das Abwesende is Anwesendes un, als
Abwesendes aus ihr, in die Unverborgenheit anwesend (Holzwege 320, emphasis
original, {enumeration mine}).
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Now follows Jameson's translation of this passage:
{1}The past and the future are also forms of presence [Anwesendes] but forms
outside of the realm of deconcealment. {2}The non-present present [an
Anwesendes not governed by the sheerly temporal present, or in other words nonGegewärtiges] is the absent. {3}As such it remains relative to the present
presence, whether in the sense in which it is about to unfold or be concealed with
that temporal present or is moving away from having done so. {4}The absent is
also present, and, qua absent, absenting itself from the realm of unfolding, it is
present in that very unfolding or deconcealment (Valences 148-49, bracketed
material Jameson, {enumeration mine}).
For comparison, here is the same passage as translated by David Farrell Krell:
{1}What is past and what is to come also become present, namely as outside the
expanse of unconcealment. {2}What presents itself as non-present is what is
absent. {3}As such as it remains essentially related to what is presently present,
inasmuch as it either comes forward into the expanse of unconcealment or
withdraws from it. {4}Even what is absent is something present, for as absent
from the expanse, it presents itself in unconcealment (Early Greek Thinking 3435, emphasis original).
In the first sentence, Jameson completely disregards the Heideggerean concept of alethia
by reconfiguring Heidegger's discussion of temporality within the terms of creation. Objects
form outside of the present. As well in the first sentence, Jameson viciously simplifies
Heidegger's "what is past and what is to come," which could include beings, events, and the
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Gegenstand, to simply the past and future. Jameson, on one hand, objectifies temporality. On
the other hand, he removes any possibility that Heidegger intended to discuss anything other than
temporality. Additionally, Jameson supplies a verb, "forms," in his translation that has no analog
in Heidegger's passage. Jameson's addition enables Heidegger to be read as advocating a strictly
delineated tripartite temporality, which is antithetical to Heidegger's conceptualization of
temporality as the interplay of the three temporal ecstasies.
In the second sentence, Jameson performs the same reconfiguration. And with the
bracketed explanation that includes Gegenwärtiges 128, that which exists in the present, which as
Jameson reads it, is the present, Jameson reconfigures Heidegger's Anaximandrine temporality as
a presentism129, despite Heidegger's explicit warning against presentism in the very same essay:
"whatever is presently present in not a slice of something shoved in between what is not
presently present" (Early Greek Thinking 44).
In the third sentence, Jameson relativizes that which is not presently present to being
dependent upon that which it presently presents, which reinforces Jameson's reconfiguration of
Anaximandrine temporality as presentism, as does Jameson's choice of the past perfect "having
done so" to describe what has presented. In the same lines translated by Krell, we are directed
toward the full complexity of the interplay of the temporal ecstasies as that which is present
128

Heidegger does not use the noun Gegenwärtiges at this point in Holzwege, but the adjectival form, which
modifies the noun "present."
129
Recall Sartre's definition from Being and Nothingness as quoted above: as Past, Present, and Future -- all at the
same time -- the For-itself dispensing its being in three dimensions is temporal due to the very fact that it nihilates
itself. No one of these dimensions has any ontological priority over the other; none of them can exist without the
other two. Yet in spite of all this, it is best to put the accent on the present ekstasis and not on the future ekstasis as
Heidegger does" (142). Jameson disserted on Sartre. To imagine that Jameson does not know this section of Being
and Nothingness well seems unlikely. That unlikeliness engenders a sense of disbelief when one reads the following
from Valences of the Dialectic: in Specters of Marx, "Heidegger is here used by Derrida as the name for all those
temptations (which the German philosopher himself can be seen both as denouncing and succumbing to all at once)
to perpetuate some unmixed conception of time, some notion of a present that has won itself free of the past and
future and stands, gleaming and self-contained, as a kind of parousia" (157). To paraphrase Jameson's assertions
about Heidegger here by paraphrasing Sartre: when I am rowing, I am rowing.

155

either comes forward or withdraws. In Jameson's translation, we have only the completed act
and a phrasing of "about to unfold" to indicate an imminent event in the unfolding of the present.
And finally, in the fourth sentence, we find that for Heidegger, what is "absent from the
expanse" yet "presents itself in unconcealment." As Jameson translates the very same line, the
absent "is present in that very unfolding or deconcealment" (emphasis mine). In this movement,
we find two errors additional to the faulty emphasis on absence itself. First, Jameson reifies
absence into its own object, and as already pointed out, temporality in general, whether under the
Jamesonian versions of absence and presence, is not a thing for Heidegger. Secondly, for
Heidegger, that which is absent presents in unconcealment. In other words, even though absent,
that which is absent is yet present. For Jameson, the emphasis again falls on presentism via the
choice of "unfolding" and "deconcealment," which renders unconcealment not as a Heideggerean
noun, but as a verb. The difference, of course, lies in Heideggerean being versus Jamesonian
doing. Although an enormous amount of time could be devoted to all the implications of
Jameson's mistranslation, the central purpose appears to be clear: Jameson radically reconfigures
Anaximandrine temporality, and with it, Heideggerean ecstatic temporality, to fit the narrative of
Saussurean synchrony and diachrony as it belongs to dialectical thought.
Additionally, and most damning, Jameson omits the next line from Heidegger: "Auch
das Vergangene und das Zukünftige sind eonta" (ibid.), which Krell renders as: "what is past
and what is to come are also eonta [beings]130" (Early Greek Thinking 35). We should require

130

See footnote 209 in the next chapter for a continuation of the discussion of eonta.
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no further proof of what we could bluntly name as Jameson's blatant deception 131, but we yet
offer more: for Heidegger, the present is not presentism, a single now in the flux.
As a reminder, Jameson's discussion of Anaximandrine temporality occurs in his review
of Derrida's Specters of Marx, which will now form a digression within this analysis of
Jameson's analysis of Derrida's analysis of Heidegger's analysis of Anaximander. In that work,
Derrida reads ecstatic temporality as follows: "Presence is enjoined, ordered, distributed in the
two directions of absence, at the articulation of what no longer is and what is not yet" (29-30).
Although he does not use the term "dia-synchrony," it certainly is the temporality of hauntology:
"Repetition and first time, but also repetition and last time, since the singularity of any first time,
makes of it also a last time. Each time it is the event itself 132 (10, emphasis original, emphasis
mine). We should recall, immediately, Heidegger's remonstration from "The Anaximander
Fragment" quoted only a few paragraphs above: "whatever is presently present in not a slice of
something shoved in between what is not presently present." We should, as well, read these
words from Heidegger on the present: "'here is the now,' and the no-longer-now and the not-yetnow are then the two arms which extend in time, as the now, into the respective directions of
non-being" (The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic 207). We have here in Heidegger exactly
what Derrida describes as the jointure of the present in Specters of Marx. Heidegger, however,
continues in his analysis of Henri Bergson's work on temporality: "This image, and the time
analysis derived from it, become unavoidable as soon as one overlooks the ecstatic character of
131

If we are moved by the spirit of generosity, we could judge Jameson's adventure in mistranslation as a lamentable
peccadillo; if we are not so moved, we may view it as pitiable and tawdry. The core difference between Jameson's
creative translation and Heidegger's many creative translations resides in the fact that Heidegger never dissembles;
that is, the entire point of long passages from Heidegger with regard to his translations is his rationalization of his
translation. Jameson presents his mistranslation with no such qualification, and his omission of the context of eonta
only exacerbates the misstep. Most sympathetically, we could view this as an expression of Jameson's own
"nostalgia for the present" in ways that will not be stated here.
132
To quote the above discussion of Event in this chapter: "this is the Event that rises to the surface, as Žižekian
Idea or Jamesonian Time and History, and then dissipates, leaving us to await the next event."
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temporality and does not inquire into the unity of temporality as that which temporalizes itself
ecstatically" (ibid.). In other words, Heidegger rebuts Derrida's analysis in advance by
demonstrating that Derrida has utterly misrepresented ecstatic temporality.
And with it, the following insistence that dike should be reconsidered as belonging to the
Derridean discourse of giving rather than remaining in Heideggerean fundamental ontology, as a
justice that sets things right (30). This is the foundation for Derrida's entire exploration of the
phrase "time is out of joint" in Specters of Marx, which then forms the foundation of hauntology,
which would be "not merely larger and more powerful than an ontology or a thinking of
Being...It [hauntology] would harbor in itself, but like circumscribed places or particular effects,
eschatology and teleology themselves" (10). The specter, as presence in absence, absence in
presence, always already haunts the present from the past, and comprehends the limit of the
future. As well, if we follow Derrida's implied reading of Heidegger's concept of the seer from
"The Anaximander Fragment," the past, the specter, always already determines the future, as
demonstrated by the phrase, in Derrida's discussion of a text by Maurice Blanchot, "'since Marx'
names a future-to-come as much as a past" (Specters 19). We find a hauntology that extends
beyond the present in some complex relation to justice. But Derrida bases that justice on his
reading of Heidegger's adikia not only completely temporally different from Heidegger, but with
broadly "social" terms in relation to the collectivism of Marxism rather than as pertains to
beings.
In an truncated overview, likely problematic due to its brevity, as drawn from "The
Anaximander Fragment," Being and Time, Parmenides (specific to Heidegger's extended
discussion of oblivion therein), and Introduction to Metaphysics, we can present this summation
of adikia: a being defines, and is defined by, being-in-the-world and the over against; this being
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exists as time out of joint as a being with facticity and historicity, yet as a being within ecstatic
temporality; this is an aspect of the injustice, the adikia. The conflict between a being and
Being, the Being of beings is polemos; the conflict generates eris, in one sense the
"homelessness" of belonging to Being and yet not (Basic Concepts 75). A being whiles, a being
lingers a while. Dike, justice, then is meted out. The resolution of polemos and the vanishment
of eris occur with the death or end of a being, its effective oblivion within concealment. As
justice, a being pays for its existence with its extermination from beings. As Derrida reads dike,
it is the "adjoining, adjustment, articulation of accord or harmony. As it is thought on the basis
of presence, dike harmoniously conjoins, in some way" (Specters 27). Through the
reconfiguration of temporality, through the alteration of Being into presence/absence, through
the ignoring of the Being of beings, through the forgetting of polemos and eris, Derrida has again
radically revised the basic tenor of Heideggerean dike from having to do with the oblivion of a
being to a statement concerning an abstract concept of harmonious justice. All of this Derrida
has done within a Marxian social context, which Derrida as well reconfigures by myriad
"spirit[s] of Marxism…to appeal even to their multiplicity, or more serious still, to the
heterogeneity" (Specters 2).
And beneath, behind, under, and through, whether Heidegger or Marx, hauntology
haunts. With the attempt to transform ecstatic temporality into dia-synchrony already incurred,
the gesture away from the Being of beings articulated and expanded by ignoring Dasein in
relation to dike133,134, even the Heideggerean difference between present-at-hand and ready-at-
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Along these lines, Derrida will attack human individuation in his reading of a combination of Marx and Max
Stirner to offer the following: "Ego, this living individual would itself be inhabited and invaded by its own specter.
It would be constituted by specters of which it becomes the host and which it assembles in the haunted community
of a single body. Ego=ghost. Therefore 'I am' would mean 'I am haunted': I am haunted by myself who am"
(Specters 166, emphasis Derrida).
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hand elided in favor of bricolage 135. Derrida expands hauntology along the lines of it being
"larger and more powerful than an ontology or a thinking of Being." This is how Derrida
describes the formal and rhetorical strategies of The German Ideology:
These simulacra of identity are classed according to a logic that uses every means
to confound the adversary. Both the grouping of sets and the discrete and
ordered...serialization of spectral singularities. There is in sum, no doubt, but a
single ghost, a ghost of ghosts, and it is but a concept, not even a concept...more
englobing than all the others, indeed it is but a name, a metonymy that lends itself
to any and all substitutions (the part for the whole 136 that it then exceeds, the
effect for the cause of which it is in turn the cause)" (Specters 173).
We have here the intersection of sets and seriality, which, temporally, reads as synchrony
and diachrony. We have, as we will see in the next chapter, the khora and the self-qua-khora,
and we have the centrality of the metonymical qualities of citational substitution. The
underlying and constant use of metonymy in Derrida cannot be underestimated. It is
citationality, and it is deconstruction as much as citationality is deconstruction. Here, metonymy
is the figure of the movement that enables Derrida to find the rationalization for hauntology,
certain yet another name for deconstruction, in Marx. And metonymy, in a sweep back to
Jameson's reading of "The Anaximander Fragment," is what allows Derrida to admonish all
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See footnote 205 in the next chapter, as well as the discussion of the following from "The Supplement of the
Copula:" "Here Freud and Heidegger, I conjoin them within me like the two great ghosts" in the second section of
the next chapter herein. Derrida concludes, "the phenomenal Ego (Me, You, and so forth) is a specter" (169). The
most interesting aspect, perhaps, is that Derrida has gone through Marx in order to get to a point of disindividuation
he usually achieves through Heidegger. Again, see, footnote 173 in the next chapter that details Bernard Stiegler's
attempt to argue that the pharmakon counteracts disindividuation.
135
"Anything close at hand is made to serve as arrow for the bow" (Specters 150).
136
Here metonymy overwhelms synecdoche. Or, we could say, this is metonymy haunted by the ghost of
synecdoche. Why? As a simple explanation, to admit synecdoche would be to admit individuation, which is
countercurrent to many of Derrida's discourses, but especially the denial of Dasein.
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readers, both current and prospective, against reading Heidegger in "Heidegger's Ear:
Philopolemology." To begin, Derrida announces a movement out of the call of conscience as
belonging to Dasein and pushes the inquiry toward being-with-others via metonymy: "Dasein
'carries' the friend itself, but not the friend in its totality, in flesh and blood" (Reading Heidegger:
Commemorations 164). We do not have to strain to find in this first quotation from
"Philopolemology" the Derridean spectrality of hauntology; whereas Derrida is haunted by Freud
and Heidegger, Dasein finds itself haunted by the generalized other of the "friend." As Derrida
immediately continues, "Dasein carries it, one might say, in the figure of its voice, its metonymic
figure (a part for the whole) 137" (ibid.) Derrida, as well, will soon further define metonymy, and
explain how metonymy has subsumed synecdoche: "the friend itself is not the one named...not
the friend in itself and in toto138; by metonymy, so to speak, by figure, [the friend] is evoked just
[as] a part of the figure of the friend, in the general sense of the word 'figure' and in the sense in
French of figure as 'face,' visage: evoked not in itself, en soi, such as it is, this figure, this face,
the figure of the friend such as the friend is in itself, but the voice of the friend by me, by the
Dasein I am139, by a certain ear of the Dasein each of us is 140" (166, emphasis original).
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Again, the ghost of synecdoche haunts metonymy.
For the totality of the friend itself would indicate the individuation of synecdoche. Instead, we have Derrida's
modified quasi-synecdochical metonymy of friend-qua-face-qua-voice. Not only does this keep with Derrida's
extensive meditations on the work of Levinas' face, but we almost must ask ourselves that if we cannot speak to
ourselves in full presence, how could the friend possibly manage to do so? In other words, metonymy here
functions for Derrida's friend as both a spatial and a temporal determinant.
139
We should compare this immediately to that quoted above from Specters of Marx in which Derrida corrects
himself by denying the possibility of the individual as anything but a ghost. As an aside, Specters of Marx, Derrida
first introduces his idea of the impossible, messianic "democracy to come" in relation to the impossible, messianic
communism to come during a discussion of the work of Francis Fukuyama (81). In "Philopolemology," Derrida
offers this bit on the future shape of democracy: "democracy to come should give to be thought an equality that is
not incompatible with a certain dissymmetry, with heterogeneity, or absolute singularity" (183). To be fair, this
belongs to Derrida's discourse on the politics of friendship, and he presents it in that context. But the form of
democracy we find here is either a koan-like paradox, or, in its dissymmetry that could approach absolute
singularity, an authoritarian form ranging from oligarchy to dictatorship. What else, in the meaning, within political
science, of the word "dictatorship," could a democracy as absolute singularity be?
140
This insistence by Derrida here, contrary to everything Heidegger wrote on the subject, not only figures Dasein
as synecdochical iteration of the form of Dasein, but creates a genus/species relationship in doing so.
138
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Throughout that essay, Derrida equivocates Heidegger's "call of conscience" that
summons one "to one's own self," or, rather, Dasein's recognition of itself as Dasein, as
individuated (Being and Time 262), with call of voluntarism as culpable in the formation of
National Socialism by suggesting, beyond the call, the susceptibility of the hearer of the call, as
Derrida twists in his proposing of the metonymical relationship between Heidegger's use of the
word dumm in The Principle of Reason to Heidegger's supposed rebuke of himself and his
involvement with Nazism as "eine große Dummheit" (189). This essay is one of the densest in
Derrida's corpus of density, so this summation is woefully incomplete, and a full summation
would incorporate many elements with nothing to do with the current question. Most
importantly, however, is Derrida's initial configuration of Dasein and the voice of the friend and
its parallel in Heidegger and the "voice" of National Socialism. With this in mind, Derrida
closes his essay with the caution for the reader of Heidegger: "let the hearer beware" (216).
Jameson, in his review of Specters of Marx strolls on a different path to the same
clearing. We continue at the same place in Jameson's review of Specters of Marx, and enumerate
each defect in Jameson's untrustworthy translation as a single flaw, and so arrive at the eighth.
As mentioned, Derrida finds the hearing of the call to be potentially dangerous, and cites
Heidegger's great stupidity as proof. Jameson does the same:
Heidegger's conception of a "history" of metaphysics is there to document the
feeling that late nineteenth-century cultural and historical relativism of this
historicist type is still very much with us: namely, the idealist notion that, within
a general systemic determination by linear time, we can still somehow imagine a
radically different temporal experience. The implication -- and it is above all this
which is "idealistic" about such historicism -- is that if we are able to imagine
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temporality of such radical otherness, we ought to be able to bring it into being as
a concrete social possibility and thereby replace the current system altogether.
In this way, an idealism which conceives of the mind as being free enough
to range among the possibilities and sovereignly to choose to think a form
radically excluded by the dominant system, leads on into a voluntarism that
encourages us to attempt to impose that alternative system on the present one by
fiat and violence141. In Heidegger's case, this fantasy clearly found its fulfillment
in the Nazi 'revolution,' with its promise of radical social regeneration...this
idealist voluntarism is equally at work in other (extreme leftist) versions of radical
social change (149-50, parenthetical Jameson, emphasis mine).
Since the work herein concerns itself primarily with time and trope, we begin with time.
For Jameson, our world, our collective social system, our impossibly individuated selves, clearly
exist with a the "general systemic" determined by "linear time." As the second chapter herein
took great, and perhaps unnecessary, pains to point out, Derrida's deconstruction absolutely
cannot function without the initial assumption of the sequential linear series of moments, nor, as
we saw, can Jameson's variation on dialectical thought. If we read this point from Valences
against Augustine's admission of ignorance concerning time in Confessions, we have in Jameson
reification. The irresolvable mystery of time, again, comes to be understood as an excruciatingly
mundane, facile, and uncomplicated fact with a consensus agreement, not only between Derrida
and Jameson, but also, as mentioned earlier, with Žižek, Baudrillard, Virilio, Badiou, Stiegler,
Harvey, and McLuhan, to name only a few. We can postulate, fairly, that critical theory, if not
as a whole, but in some significant manner, depends upon the hypostatization of time as linear.
141

Caveat auditor!
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We will allow Jameson, also from Valences, to explain, from what was, prima facie, a discussion
of Žižek's method of analysis, the flaw in theory's determination of an absolute system of time:
[T]he dialectic belongs to theory rather than philosophy; the latter is always
haunted by the dream of some foolproof, self-sufficient, autonomous system, a set
of interlocking concepts which are their own cause...Theory, on the other hand,
has no vested interests inasmuch as it never lays claim to an absolute system, a
non-ideological formulation of itself and its "truths"; indeed always itself
complicit in the being of current language, it has only the never-ending, neverfinished task and vocation of undermining philosophy as such, of unraveling
affirmative statements and propositions of all kinds (59, emphasis mine).
It would seem that theory has done poorly in interrogating its own "affirmative
statements and propositions." In this very passage that decrees theory to be "non-ideological"
and unwilling to propose "an absolute system," we confront both: the former as the "task" of
theory, which is as ideological in its way as any other voluntarism, and approaches a mutated
Kantian duty as expressed here; the latter as the implied temporality in which theory undertakes
its task, which we could, without reservation, name as the serial sequence of moments, or, to use
Heidegger's phrase, the vulgar conception of time. We, as well, could replace the Jamesonian
"never-finished task," with the Derridean term, infinite deferral. We can choose not to notice
that the dialectic method of thought carries with it an entire history, a history imbued with
ideology. Or we may, instead, offer a different summarization of theory: it occurs, and can only
occur, once the question of time has come to be thought to have been resolved. Theory, in that
way, and despite its more torturous elaborations, is nothing other than simplified philosophy, a
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philosophy, that, by the removal of the aporia of temporality, then enables itself to flourish
floridly in any other direction142.
To return to the penultimate block quotation from Jameson, he there historicizes
Heidegger via historicism, and in doing so, periodizes as well. That is not of particular import
unless we follow the prohibitions of A Singular Modernity. But that Jameson warns us away
from Heidegger, specifically in the form of ecstatic temporality, concerns us. In building to this
moment, Jameson ignores the ontic-ontological difference, again, and, again, transforms
Heidegger from a philosopher concerned with Dasein to social theorist: "if we are able to
imagine temporality of such radical otherness, we ought to be able to bring it into being as a
concrete social possibility." Equally as problematic, in that statement, Jameson places
Heidegger's head into Hume's guillotine: is becomes ought. We have misstatement compounded
by mishandling. And Jameson's imagined, thoroughly misrepresented Heidegger will lead us
down the path to genocide. Jameson, as quoted above, does acknowledge the possibility of the
Left143 abusing the utopian impulse. As we will note, however, Jameson, the thinker of utopia,
does not mention utopia at all in this context. It is clear, however, that any utopian scheme
requires, above all else, "to attempt to impose that alternative system on the present one."
142

The work herein is the basis for another work in another direction. The simplification of temporality in critical
theory, as an expression of the postmodern condition, presents its own version of the utopian impulse. That impulse,
rather that involving the seizure of temporality that utopia entails, transforms itself into the purely spatial, which it
can do since time has become an absolutely known quantity in the equation. Jameson, also in Valences, draws from
Henry Lefebvre the concept of the "spatial dialectic" as the next step in theory (66-70); Derrida, in his late career
direction, turns toward the negation of space in khora, especially in On the Name, as we will see in the next chapter.
In ways that can only be mentioned very briefly, we can view this in the movement toward spatialization,
and its subsequent negation: in the theoretical prevalence for the visual over the auditory, especially as found in
Derrida's reading of Heidegger; in the combination of "space over time," and "the visual over the auditory," we can
generate a reading on the implications on the diminishing use of the word "beholden" and its temporal and spatial
complexity that counters Derridean notions of debt.
143
In various ways, as will be demonstrated later through Thomas Hobbes, to work within this simplistic binary of
Right and Left in the discussion of Heidegger, often falls flat without the prop of righteous indignation, especially
when we read anything other than "The Rectorship Address." Even so, with regard to Heidegger, when "Right" is
applied to him, it is done so always as pejorative, and done by critics with some relationship to the New Left, which,
to generalize, admittedly hastily, in the form of a footnote, not infrequently tends to view any variety of nationalism
and jingoism as a distinction without a difference.
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Whether we do so by "fiat and violence," is another story144. Alternately, Jameson,
disqualification of all of Heidegger's thought on the grounds of his great stupidity, fails to
recognize the inherent utopianism of Nazism presented itself as the desire for the
Tausendjähriges Reich, which is exactly the seizure of temporality of the utopian impulse found
in all forms of millennialism.
Whereas as Derrida turns to metonymy, Jameson frequently finds recourse to allegory,
and so places Derridean spectrality under the aegis of allegory: "the emergence of a different
kind of thinking would then clearly seem to demand a theorization of allegory as the attempt of
the image itself to think, in a situation in which abstract conceptual thought is somehow blocked"
(Valences 152). These specific attacks on Heidegger's works are simply iterations of the general
attack on Heidegger's work. If critical theory requires a highly simplified temporality so that
one's metonymization may function, and another's alleogization may yield results, the logical
option is to discredit any theory of temporality that stands counter to this pursuit. We will return
to the tropical aspect of this endeavor in the fifth chapter herein, but before that, we must begin
to examine is. Is as copula, is as equivocation, is with more functions than indicated by this
simple binary.

144

The utopian dreamers, and acolytes of Marx, Stalin and Mao certainly did, however. There are no innocent
philosophers. Hobbes as the proponent of empire, and John Locke, rationalizer of colonialism, certainly must
disqualify any philosophy heir to empiricism; Augustine's defense of slavery problematizes the whole of philosophy
relating to Christian theology. We should disqualify everything, including deconstruction, which, in as much as it is
an inverted dialectic, depends on Marx in the same manner as Marx depends on the German idealism of Hegel.
Here, Jameson falsely recasts Heidegger as a utopian thinker, then provides evidence as dystopic contrast
via the decidedly and indisputably atrocious Nazi Germany, only then to attempt to create fear of Heidegger's
alleged utopian impulse. This snippet of Jameson could offer a third point in his brief analysis of George Orwell's
1984 and Yevgeny Zamyatin's We in Archaeologies of the Future (200-02). For 1984, Jameson declares that Orwell
creates fear concerning utopia by presenting a horrifying dystopia. There is no substantial difference between
Jameson's claims concerning Orwell's novel and Jameson's claims concerning Heidegger's supposed utopianism.
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Chapter 4: The Use of Specific Tropes to Represent and Supplement Varying
Conceptualizations of Temporality, and the Relation of Those Tropes to the Copula
The fourth chapter begins with an initial outlay of the relationship between trope,
temporality, and the copula by examining the Derrida’s implicit rebuttal of these questions in his
own theorizations of khora. The second section, within the frame created by arguing against
Derrida, to consider more specifically the differing underlying temporality of metonymy and
metaphor, and the third section continues with a not insubstantial overview of the question of the
copula in the history of philosophy, with, added herein, the effects of the conceptualization of
temporality under which the copula had been conceptualized by various thinkers. The fourth and
final section of this chapter returns to the question of the de-ontologization performed by critical
theory, and puts forth the argument that the epistemologized copula is simply, in Heideggerean
terms, a technicized copula, which carries with it the implication of a conceptualization of
technicized temporality as is expressed, for Jameson, in his preference for a type of
synecdochical allegory, and, for Derrida, in his reliance on metonymy.

A. A Core of Time: "A hierarchy which can be attained, I think"145
Many, if not all, of the readings of Derrida's work rendered in the last two chapters herein
could have been drawn from a single source, "Sauf le nom." Written after his own ethical turn,
Derrida's essay covers many the same areas of concerns, but does so in a truncated manner.
145

These lines appear in Williams Carlos Williams' "Asphodel, That Greeny Flower" in which the poet addresses his
wife, Cora. The purpose here is play. The play depends on a tripartite movement on the difference between the
Greek khora and the Latin cor; the confusion of the two -- so that the heart rests in undefined space and so that the
heart is an empty space devoid of topos; and the juxtaposition of a few lines from Williams with Derrida that
exposes a marked difference -- the admission of love in the former, and the expulsion of love, practically, from the
latter. Not only a difference, however, arises, but also the similarity of each having thought himself to a hierarchy
beyond.
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Shortly, we will examine Derrida's appropriation and modification of the concept of the
shibboleth; "Sauf le nom," in its brevity -- functioning essentially as a series of shibboleths -repeatedly affords opportunities to hear for those who know how to listen, at least how to listen
to Derrida. That brevity of conceptual presentation in "Sauf le nom," which is presented as an
imagined question and answer session as the capstone of a conference to which Derrida was
invited but could not attend, stands as the initial reason why the second chapter did not consist of
a reading of that essay, a reading completed with the rest of the material from Derrida's oeuvre
supplied as supporting material.
More importantly, to present now a brief reading of "Sauf le nom" enables the focus to
remain on Derrida's consistency and repetition of ideas, rather than, as was a danger in the last
chapter, becoming lost in the ideas themselves. And this consistency and repetition points
toward the issue that holds ore importance his: Derrida's engagement (or lack thereof) with
Heidegger, and a delineation of deconstruction from Destruktion. As already mentioned in the
second chapter, Heidegger limited the scope of his Destruktion in The Metaphysical Foundations
of Logic, clearly expressing his resistance to his work serving as an absolute replacement for the
whole of Western metaphysics (155). If we ask ourselves the same question about Derrida's
work146, we cannot find the same limit in Derrida that we find in Heidegger, the same restraint
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Does Derrida present deconstruction as a supplantation, the latest knot on the string? What can the "after" of
deconstruction be, if we accept the concept of infinite deferral? Are we not then at the "last" knot on the string?
Why are we discussing this concept within the spatio-temporal implications of Derrida's metaphor of knots on a
string? In doing so, haven't we been lead to assume a specific conceptualization of temporality? And if we consent
to such an approbation of a specific conceptualization of temporality, do we not find ourselves tempted to agree with
Derrida, or to resist by redoubling our argument for another tradition? (In essence, John Searle's criticisms of
Derrida stemmed from Searle's insistence that Derrida's work did not comply with elements of the overarching
logical superstructure of the analytical tradition.) Further, if we remove the element of serial temporality, if we
merely bring into question Derrida's assumption of a Heraclitean conceptualization of temporality that comprises
only a series of moments, does not deconstruction collapse upon itself? Derrida, by his own failure to continue the
line of thought, thoroughly rejects his own postulate of "pluri-dimensionality" from Of Grammatology.
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that thwarts universalization and totalization; deconstruction applies to each text and to all texts,
and beyond147.
To turn to the text of "Sauf le nom" specifically, the second chapter herein spent time
offering a reading of Derrida's work from across his oeuvre. With regard to Violence and
Metaphysics and Margins of Philosophy, the emphasis lay on a comparison of différance to the
divergent concepts of Russell's Paradox from the analytical tradition and the God beyond the
Demiurge of Gnosticism. "Sauf le nom" focuses on the work of Angelus Silesius, the cathexis
around which Derrida generates this moment's version of the via negativa. With regard to the
previous work concerning Russell and Gnosticism herein, Derrida begins "Sauf le nom" by
briefly defining a portion of the method of the via negativa: "when one claims to speak about
God according to what they call apophasis...in other words, according to the voiceless voice...the
way of theology called or so-called negative. This voice multiplies itself, dividing within itself:
it says one thing and its contrary, God that is without being or God that (is) beyond being 148 (On
the Name 35).
On one hand, we find here the empty set that is not a set, and thus does not violate
Russell's Paradox: "God that is without being." This God that is nothing cannot contain itself,
cannot create a logical contradiction. On the other hand, the "God that (is) beyond being," the
God that is not necessarily nothing, but stands outside of creation, beyond the flawed materiality
of the faulty creation of the Demiurge. Not only does this essay published in French in 1993
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In an interview in the New York Times in 1998, Derrida succinctly expands the concept of text beyond the page
to the generality of human life. Although all of Derrida's work implies or openly does this, and although Derrida is
certainly not alone as the myriad academic variations -- from the psychological to the sociological to the
anthropological to the purely political -- on performativity and the construction of identity attest, perhaps never do
we find the position of the universalized and totalized application of deconstruction more clearly stated than in this
bit of journalistic puffery.
148
Or, to paraphrase these statements in a manner fitting for the anti-Anselm: "God is less than that which can be
conceived.")
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reinforce the earlier reading of Derrida herein, but it also demonstrates a remarkable consistency;
with enough effort, one suspects, Derrida's work could be broken down into categories, complete
with the chains of signifiers that occur within his process of polynomination. Not only could the
variations introduced with each renaming be established, but so could the relation between
signifiers in passage, even if the purpose is to deny consistency.
In other words, we again find ourselves with another remarkable consistency, and that
consistency of vision affords the center itself. Further, for example, from only that quoted
immediately above, we may also view what the second chapter herein referred to as Derrida's
forced binarism. Derrida presents a matched set, drawn from the application of an established
process that always prefers the negation, the terms of the antinomy reversed and rendered as
denials. To expand "God that is without being" and "God that (is) beyond being," we could offer
their positives via the negation of a negation: God that has being and God that is within being.
Therefore, we now find a fourfold, if we resist Derrida's admonishments and consider a via
positiva, so to speak. Although the structure of a four-fold preferred by Heidegger, or a Greimas
rectangle preferred by Jameson, offers a pleasant symmetry, neither Derrida's negations, or the
negating reversals derived from Derrida's negations, approach the simplicity of God's words to
Moses in Exodus, "I AM THAT I AM." We have left the symmetrical, one doubly antithetical:
"I AM NOT THAT I AM NOT," which only generates the liar's paradox; the other qualified by a
predicate negation "I AM THAT I AM NOT," which passably summarizes Derrida's argument
by oversimplification.
None of this, however, exists here as a theological debate; these examples demonstrate
the extent to which one must refuse exploration and accept the terms of deconstruction without
question, including Derrida's insistence on time as a linear series of moments that, if Derrida
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were, at a moment, not writing against Heidegger, we could rephrase the quotations above as
"God that is without time" and "God that (is) beyond time."
To digress for a moment in order to point out a third reinforcement of the readings of the
second chapter herein, this simple substitution of the interrelated concepts of Being and time lead
us exactly to a traditional metaphysical conception from Augustine. Augustine provides an
excellent point of comparison. While he freely admits that he does not know what time is, as
Augustine addresses God149:
It is not in time that you precede time 150. Otherwise, you would not precede all
times. In the sublimity of an eternity which is always in the present, you are
before all things past and transcend all things future, because they are still to
come, and when they have come they are past...Your "years" neither go nor come.
Our years come and go so that all may come in succession 151. All your "years"
subsist in simultaneity, because they do not change; those going away are not
thrust out by those coming in...Your Today is eternity...You created all times and
you exist before all times. Nor was there any time when time did not exist. (230)
149

Or, as Derrida insists in "Sauf le nom," as Augustine addresses his readers, Confessions "were already, in their
wildest present, in their date, in their place, an act of memory" (On the Name 40).
150
Simply and clearly, Derrida's own deconstructive explorations via the via negativa that have led Derrida to a
"God that (is) beyond time" and a "God that is without time" have also led him to an exceedingly traditional
conceptualization of the relationship between God and eternity expressed by a single sentence of Confessions.
Given the quotation in the preceding footnote, however, we find a confusion. If we adhere to Augustine's judgment
that God's today is eternity, the Confessions are the present for God; if we following Derrida's summation, the
Confessions were always already a postscriptum. In this difference, we catch another glimpse of Derrida's
theosophical system: God may be without and beyond time, but, in terms of human acts, whether in writing or
speech, ceaseless Heraclitean temporality dominates and transcends all others. To follow this thought to its end,
with regard to Derrida's work, would create manifold oddities and contradictions; here, simply, we can again
reinforce the implication that khora, and the God that may or may not precede it, stand outside the ontic ruled by the
ceaseless flux of time, are metaphysical.
151
Shortly in Book XI, Augustine will offer that there are three times, a present of things past, a present of things
present, a present of things to come. Augustine, in his admission of his lack of knowledge concerning temporality,
maintains this contradiction built upon contradiction: eternity contrasted with succession, and, despite this endless
succession, the human quality of contemplating the three times he names. This will return later with regard to the
work of Paul Ricoeur.
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Recall the footnote from the first chapter herein on what appears to be the, at least, four
common deployments of the word "eternity:" Depending on context, "eternity" denotes – at least
– the following, both as occasionally discrete terms and in various combinations, in not only
philosophical, but also conversational usage: (A.) an unending series; (B.) absolute and
unchanging stasis; (C.) the complete absence of time; or (D.) the presence of all time as
simultaneity. Here, if we accept some sort of implication of Being for time, and time for beings,
Derrida finds God to be without time (the complete absence of time) and beyond time (absolute
and unchanging stasis). By this schema, Derrida's own explorations of the via negativa have led
him to an exceedingly traditional conceptualization of the relationship between God and eternity
that is not unlike Augustine's "you created all times" (the implication of the complete absence of
time) and "you exist before all times" (absolute and unchanging stasis)." To this, however,
Augustine adds "Your Today is eternity," which is eternity as the simultaneity of all time.
This analysis depends upon the ability to conflate Being and time. Other than the
obvious source of Heidegger, Augustine provides us with that rationalization. In Book XII of
Confessions, he describes a bifurcated (or in Derridean terms, doubled) Being: that which is
creation as we generally understand it, and the other, "the Lord's 'heaven of heaven 152'" which is
"not Being itself" for the "House of God…transcends all distention between past and future, and
all the fleeting transience of time 153." (Confessions 256-57). In other words, this "heaven of
heaven," according to Augustine, existed always after the eternity of God, but "we do not find
there was time before it, because it precedes the creation of time, yet is created first of all

152

Here Augustine cites Psalm 113:16 of the Douay-Rheims.
We could hear Heidegger's echo of this in "language is the house of Being" from the "Letter on Humanism" and
manipulate this resonance to sound out either Heidegger's underlying religiosity, as Derrida and de Man contend, or
to demonstrate Heidegger's self-imposed limitations as discussed immediately above.
153
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things154 (256). Augustine has led us to this space that exists before Being, but this is a space
"younger" than God, yet is coeternal.
If we accept neither Heidegger's nor Augustine's commingling of Being and time, we can
turn to Derrida himself, from "Violence and Metaphysics" as quoted in the second chapter
herein:
"If there is any history, then historicity can be only the passage of Speech
[Parole], the pure tradition of a primordial Logos toward a polar Telos. But since
there can be nothing outside of the pure historicity of that passage, since there is
no Being which has sense outside of this historicity or escapes its infinite horizon,
since the Logos and Telos are nothing outside of the interplay (Wechselspiel) of
their reciprocal inspiration, this signifies then that the Absolute is Passage
(Writing and Difference 149, emphasis Derrida).
Derrida subordinates Being to time in a hierarchy in which, as we will see very shortly,
then subsumes the "absolute" of temporal passage to its spatialized negation. As for Being and
time, according to Derrida, there essentially cannot be any Being without time: Being depends
upon time, which is an inversion of Heidegger. To speak of Being, for this Derrida (the Derrida
of Writing and Difference), is to imply Being's interrelationship with time; to speak of God as
without or beyond Being would be to imply God as without or beyond Being's interrelationship
with time or God as the negation beyond the Absolute of Passage, which is exactly the
Augustinian God. As for the Logos, which for Derrida is here inseparable from the Telos (the
polar Telos we should well assume), Augustine offers this: "That word is spoken eternally, and

154

Here, a marked difference between Augustine and any thought that insists time and space are interwoven and/or a
priori conditions; in this bit of Augustine, we find that the space of the "heaven of heaven" precedes time.
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by it all things are uttered eternally. It is not the case that what was being said comes to an end,
and something else is then said, so that everything is uttered in a succession with a conclusion,
but everything is said in the simultaneity of eternity155" (Confessions 226).
Later Derrida, with his proclivity for polynomination, replaces apeiron, with its attendant
scission as previously discussed, with khora, which obviates any explanation of scission.
Whereas apeiron afforded an unformed and generative chaos existing prior to the moment of
scission, Derrida has effectively inverted this foundational concept, but in the same sidelong
manner that will be discussed shortly. Derrida borrows khora from Plato, as he had borrowed
apeiron, ultimately, from Anaximander. Apeiron and khora certainly differ from each other;
within Derrida, we may read the former as the absolute totality of the source for all potential
presence, the latter as absolute absence as the source for all potential presence. Both, however,
rest in the position of origin156. Derrida, as well, will reverse his own insistence that the
"Absolute is Passage" (and the key word is "Absolute") via the spatialization and negation of
passage into timeless space (or spacing, as he frequently prefers). To read khora or the "heaven
of heaven" in Augustinian terms, however, would mean that khora results from the Word, and
remains through the Word, or, perhaps, is the Word. As further proof of Derrida's seeming
proximity to Augustine here, and his necessary confutation, we will also shortly view Derrida's
contention, via unsubstantiated assertion, that the "heaven of heaven" may (of course, may)
precede God.

155

Here we may recall the Burning Bush, and its inconsumable nature contrasted with the sounding of words that
fade.
156
One is tempted here to draw a parallel as Derrida employs these concepts between henosis (apeiron) and kenosis
(khora) vis-à-vis "creation." This, when thought in this way, points toward a self-correction by Derrida. Even as
formless chaos, apeiron, like Heideggerean Being, can easily be understood as presence; the absolute emptying out
of, and by, deconstruction demands the khora. If this is the case, the all of Derrida founded all of his work prior to
his turn toward the khora on a flaw so fundamental that he himself corrected it. As well, the changing of the name
of the source also changes the nature of the source, but not its position as source.
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If the "Absolute is Passage," Derrida now posits a supersession of such an absolute. In
other words, "on one side...a profound and abyssal eternity, fundamental but accessible to
messianism in general, to the teleo-eschatological narrative and to a certain experience or
historical (or historial) revelation 157; on the other side...the nontemporality of an abyss without
bottom or surface, an absolute impassability (neither life or death), that gives rise to everything
that is not158." (On the Name 77). We find a tremendous similarity between Augustine's
description of the "heaven of heaven" and the quotation that begins this paragraph with the abyss
of the eternity of God rendered in conjunction with the atemporal abyss, or even as the temporal
abyss, a space without time. As Derrida will define khora in the closing essay ("Khora") of the
same volume: "there is only one khora, and that is indeed how we understand it; there is only
one, however divisible it be...It does not have the characteristics of an existent. There is khora,
but the khora does not exist159 (On the Name 97, emphasis Derrida).
This realization of the Being of beings in this nothingness then leads to two questions.
First, for Heidegger, is "What is Being?" or the Seinsfrage160, which Being and Time attempts to
answer always under the sign of fundamental ontology outside of metaphysics. The second

157

Or, rather, the Derrida of Writing and Difference.
Or, rather, the Derrida after his turn, the Derrida of the khora. The question for Derrida would be how this two
formulations of abyss differ from Heidegger's discussion of abyss and ground that occurs throughout his corpus. For
example, in Parmenides, Heidegger states the relationship between abyss, ground, and Being in this manner:
"Being, however, is not a ground but the groundless…This seems to be a lack, though only if calculated in terms of
beings, and it appears as an abyss in which we founder without support in our relentless pursuit of beings. In fact
we surely fall into the abyss, we find no ground, as long as we know and seek a ground only in the form of a being
and hence never carry out the leap into Being or leave the familiar landscape of the oblivion of Being" (150).
Derrida, then, dwells in the familiarity of oblivion.
159
Compare this to Heidegger's formulation of the difference between Being and beings from the "Postscript to
'What Is Metaphysics?'": "Unlike beings, Being cannot be represented or brought forth in the manner of an object.
As that which is altogether other than all beings, Being is that which is not. But this nothing essentially prevails as
Being" (Pathmarks 233). To again metonymize, we would not do Derrida's definition a gross injustice if we were to
replace every instance of Being in the quotation from Heidegger with khora.
160
Perhaps we could render this S is?, and, in doing so, highlight again and differently, the necessary rigidity of
Derrida's eidoi from which he will deconstruct.
158
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question, which historically precedes the Seinsfrage161, Heidegger poses succinctly in
Introduction to Metaphysics, as the first line of the opening chapter, "The Fundamental Question
of Metaphysics:" "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?" (1).
On the other hand that holds neither the Seinsfrage nor the fundamental question of
metaphysics, for Derrida's exposition of khora, we could substitute every instance of khora with
"Being" and approach a solid paraphrase of the quotation from Heidegger that opens this
footnote. Likewise, in this exposition from Heidegger initially presented in this footnote, we
could substitute every instance of "Being" with khora, and lose nothing as a paraphrase of the
quotation from Derrida. The difference is the underlying absence; for Derrida, absence-quaabsence-qua-"Being," for Heidegger, absence-qua-Being. While this is not the time and place to
enter into a lengthy digression on Derrida's formulation of khora as he openly draws from Plato's
Timaeus, it should be recalled that Timaeus is from whence Heidegger draws the "vulgar
conception of time," as noted in the first chapter herein (Being and Time 402). Whether khora
or appropriation, we arrive at the furthest remove from beings: a return, or an advance, to that
which is not, as both clearly state 162. The difference, however, is that while Heidegger, after his
turn, continues to attempt to escape metaphysics, and demonstrates a recognition of the
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That the metaphysical question precedes the Seinsfrage is a statement antithetical to Heidegger's work, and has
been arranged in this manner only for clarity. A central position of Heidegger's work is that, beginning with Plato,
we have forgotten Being, although the question of Being was the question of the pre-Socratic philosophers.
162
With regard to the upcoming examination of literary works, Heidegger, after his turn, in his moments of his
attempt at a strict and absolute forbearance from metaphysics via beings, offers less than those other moments -such as the later "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" and the earlier The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, for
example -- than those that treat beings in relation to Being and temporality. In that way, our use of Heidegger is
limited; or, rather, in that way, we cannot make any claim in any forthcoming discussion, that any author is a
Heideggerean, not even a failed Heideggerean. Heidegger provides a frame other than that type of frame Heidegger
derides in "The Question Concerning Technology" and elsewhere of beings treated as the "standing reserve" to be
calculated and manipulated. While not a being, as Heidegger held, temporality, as we assert here, falls under the
same process of technicization. To remember Heidegger's work, then, is to remember temporality not vulgar, not
that of either Derridean citationality or versions of the dialectic.
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difficulty, Derrida simply adopts a Platonic concept with little to no qualification163. Derrida's
definition of khora here, however, functions in the negative, as the inverse of Being. As we have
already seen and will further view, Derrida's metaphysics hierarchizes khora variously as being
prior to Being, space, and time. Additionally, as noted in another context in the second chapter
herein, Derrida's deployment of the ultimacy of khora, effectively as origin and telos, inherently
elides Heidegger's ontic-ontological difference; Being is rendered as the ontic by Derrida, to
which Derrida opposes the inversion of khora. Whereas as Augustine argues to some point of
surety vis-à-vis the "heaven of heaven," Derrida, via the questions of his imaginary interlocuter,
simultaneously affirms and denies Augustine's thought, without explicitly mentioning
Augustine164. Other than Derrida's nearly Wordsworthian overtones, with regard to Confessions
virtually as "emotion recollected in tranquility," we should note, again, Derrida's adherence to
the absolute and inalterable unidirectional movement of time, even when discussing Augustine,
the formulater of distention (37-42), and while posing the sign of khora:
Is this place created by God? Or is it part of the play? Or else is it God himself?
Or even what precedes, in order to make them possible, both God and his Play?
In other words it remains to be known if this nonsensible (invisible and inaudible)
163

As far as self-correction and alteration of central positions, Heidegger was no stranger to that process, either.
Once Heidegger works through his transformation from Being to beyng to writing the word "being" sous rature, to
changing his focus to Es gibt and appropriation, Heidegger offers this definition of appropriation to close "Time and
Being:" "there lurks the view that Appropriation must, after all, 'be' something. However, Appropriation neither is,
nor is Appropriation there...The task of our thinking has always been to trace Being to its own from Appropriation -by looking through time without regard to the relation of Being to beings. To think Being without beings means: to
think Being without regard to metaphysics" (On Time and Being 23-24, emphasis Heidegger). Being, as name,
does not remain stable. What we may question, though, is how radically did Heidegger alter his conception of that
which is named? Is the movement as drastic as Derrida's movement from henosis to kenosis, from apeiron to
khora?
164
At this point in "Sauf le nom," Derrida has already deployed Augustine's Confessions as a frame for his
discussion of Angelus Silesius in implied relation to Heidegger, and has already reached the conclusion that the
whole of the Confessions is a "post-scriptum" to the act of Augustine's confession, which has already taken place
between Augustine and God (On the Name 40). The simplified movement of the sequential series of moments
absolutely demands Confessions to be considered a post-scriptum. Augustine may have departed from Ostia, but,
according to Derrida, he did not sail to Byzantium.
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place is opened by God, by the name of God (which would again be some other
thing, perhaps), or if it is "older" than the time of creation, than time itself, than
history, narrative, word, etc. It remains to be known (beyond knowing) if the
place is opened by appeal (response, the even that calls for response, revelation,
history, etc.), or if it remains impassively foreign, like Khora, to everything that
takes its place and replaces itself and plays within this place, including what is
named God. Let's call this the test of Khora... (On the Name 75-76)
Theologically, Derrida reverses Augustine's order, perhaps: the "heaven of heaven" may
precede God. In the terms of Event, even though Derrida has directed us to this point, we still
have recourse to the multiplicity of scission as described in Dissemination and cited in the
second chapter herein Those, again, are theological points. More relevantly here, we have
another example of the methodology that we can attribute a Derrida. Like that brief French
phrase, this reversal does not lead to a perfect inversion: we find for ourselves within Derrida's
inversion of Augustine's thought, as with adirreD a, a figure than hints at a pure palindrome,
even encourages us to make that leap, but also inherently chastises us for such a thought; like
citationality, the resemblance may seem familial, but is empty165. Despite this inversion of
Augustine, the philosopher of temporal distention, it is not a question for Derrida, however, of
thinking of temporality in any other way other than the sequential movement of a series of
moments; it is only a matter of questioning which movement came first, and that order, as noted
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Without extending this footnote to great lengths, to think of deconstruction another way, this process Derrida so
frequently employs arguably, and often simultaneously, contains elements of all six of the revisionary ratios Harold
Bloom proposes in The Anxiety of Influence. Here we could briefly, and merely, propose that part of the obscurity
of Derrida's work arises from the simultaneity of types of relations between his "interminable analysis" and the texts
he analyzes. In thinking of deconstruction this way, we are left, depending on our view, with an indirect
confirmation of Bloom's work, and/or with a further explanation of Derrida's methodology, and/or an opportunity to
view interesting, even impressive, intellectual feat.
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in the second chapter with regard to the binary of God and death, Derrida now attempts to render
shockingly suspicious.
And to turn to the idea of the family resemblance, exactly as he obliquely does with
Augustine as demonstrated above, in "Sauf le nom," Derrida less briefly discusses Wittgenstein.
In Derrida's question and answer format of this essay, the quotation that follows begins with an
answer:
--Negative theology means (to say) very little, almost nothing, perhaps something
other than something. Whence its inexhaustible exhaustion.
--...What we are identifying under these two words [negative theology], today,
isn't it first of all a corpus, at once open and closed, given, well-ordered, a set of
statements...recognizable either by their family resemblance [English
parenthetical gloss in the original -- Ed.] or because they come under a regular
logicodiscursive type whose recurrence lends itself to a formalization. This
formalization can become mechanical...
--All the more mechanizable and easily reproducible, falsifiable, exposed to
forgery and counterfeit since the statement of negative theology empties itself by
definition, by vocation, of all intuitive plentitude. Kenosis of discourse. If a
phenomenological type of rule is followed for distinguishing between a full
intuition and an empty or symbolic intending...forgetful of the originary
perception supporting it, then the apophatic statement are, must be166 on the side
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At this moment, Derrida's false dichotomy frames the choice as one between the impersonal movement of the
repetition of text as a function of the sequential movement of time, and group dynamics of the sort that give rise to
founding, or retroactively formulating, schools of poetry or painting, for example. The singular account of the
individual artist, such as Bloom maintains under his highly restrictive rubric of "greatness," does not appear here. If
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of the empty and then of mechanical, indeed purely verbal, repetition of phrases
without actual or full intentional meaning. [first brackets mine] [second brackets
original] (On the Name 50).
How closely can Derrida approach a teleological function -- the re-establishment,
recuperation, or simple continuation of metaphysics -- before we cannot but admit a "family
resemblance" described by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations (31-32)? What
stops us? Derrida's prohibition on doing so? The obfuscation? A refusal to decide as an act of
faith? In the passage presented immediately above, the only rationalization presented to us for
choosing citationality (the "easily reproducible, falsifiable") instead of following the family
resemblance is that the tenets of negative theology dictate the choice "come under a regular
logicodiscursive type whose recurrence lends itself to a formalization." So do, if we read Of
Grammatology, all other discourses in Derrida's estimation; so do other semiological acts if we
read Wittgenstein, who uses games as his example. In essence and simplicity, we can read
Derrida in a very simple fashion: because an act is repeated, it is citational.
We could chastise ourselves in Derrida's name for a lack of nuance in our thought, but
that nuance in Derrida appears to lie, as the selection from On the Name demonstrates, in the
name itself, or, rather, in language. While this is an obvious point central to deconstruction,
Derrida, having begun with citationality in Of Grammatology, has found his way to the via
negativa in "Sauf le nom." From the negative theology that begins this quotation, he returns to
citationality, the "kenosis of discourse," the "mechanical, indeed purely verbal, repetition of
phrases without actual or full intentional meaning." What should we say of this circularity, of
this Möbius strip, which for all Derrida's talk of doubling, always leaves one on the same side?
we follow Derrida, even to the point of this present binary, we have already implicitly accepted the deaths of both
the author, not only in the current state of artistic production, but for all time.
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The radical disjuncture of the via negativa, or of a Gnostic God beyond time and Being, beyond
the Demiurge, or of Augustine's modulation, has been subsumed and subverted as the
rationalization of citationality. Citationality leads to negative theology, which "verifies"
citationality, which leads to negative theology. We find ourselves at the end of philosophy,
which is it beginning, which is its end, and so forth, if philosophy has only ever been beholden to
presence: we find ourselves with Derrida's succinct formulation of an apocalypse, the hidden
teleology of the methodology he repeatedly denied. We should remember, however, that Derrida
undermines apocalypse as well, except, it seems, for his own proclamations: "among the
numerous traits characterising an apocalyptic type of writing (ecrit), let us provisionally isolate
predication and eschatological preaching (predication), the fact of telling, foretelling, or
preaching the ends, the extreme limit, the imminence of the last ("Of an Apocalyptic Tone
Recently Adopted in Philosophy" 20, emphasis mine). Again, what can emerge to follow
deconstruction if we follow deconstruction 167?
And again, we view adirreD a's imperfect inversion168, contradiction without completion.
While other ideas, such as the polar Telos, always remain lost, Derrida accepts that finality to
further his argument. In writing of Husserl's crisis and his phenomenology, Derrida surmises
that "apophatic statements...in revealing the originary and final necessity of this
crisis169...destabilize the very axiomatics of the phenomenological, which is also the ontological
and transcendental critique" ("Sauf le nom" 50-51). Derrida then suggests that these critiques
167

Below, mention will be made of Derrida's formulation of epochs and sub-epochs, which is a tactic of
classification shared with Heidegger. For Heidegger, the final epoch, in "The Question Concerning Technology" at
least, was the understanding of Being purely through technological means, rather than an understanding of techne
that indicates both art and science as it once had. Derrida implicitly posits the poststructuralist sub-epoch outside of
the endless march of sub-epochs, and in that manner, his work is thoroughly apocalyptic.
168
To continue on the footnote concerning the application of Bloom thought to Derrida's work, here, we could argue
that in this Derridean inversion, Derrida's relation to Heidegger, in Bloomian terms, functions as a combination of
clinamen, tessera, kenosis, and daemonization, for example.
169
Again, another "extreme limit," which Derrida, at this moment, holds to be valid, and not apocalyptic hyperbole.
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(phenomenological, ontological, transcendental) demand apophatic emptiness to function, and
these critiques only function as a relation "stretched between two poles, one of which must be
that of positivity de-negated170." Through "Sauf le nom," we have arrived again at adirreD a's
earliest work on Husserl. Derrida even suggests that of "transcendental phenomenology" and
"negative theology:" "One would be a good propaedeutic for the other" (On the Name 67). We
have arrived again at a metaphysics born from a rigid and absolute, even imperious,
conceptualization of temporality.
Text, too, gets citationally swept along in the Heraclitean river of time; and with text, too,
the name, any name, all names, The Name. To forget the name is to save the name is to forget
the name, and to recall "the nameable beyond the name, the unnameable nameable" (On the
Name 58). The negation that is forgetting removes the name from time, we have then "text that
is without time," and "text that is beyond time," text beyond citationality for those who can hear
it171. To think our way back through deconstruction to text as a lingering presence, rather than as
both a mechanistic reproduction and something to be forgotten, we must work our way through
the relationship between the copula, temporality, and the implied tropes involved.

B. The Impossible Copula and the Impossible I
Of the withdrawal of the unnamed God, in "Sauf le nom," Derrida proffers the following:
"'God' 'is' the name of this bottomless collapse, of this endless desertification of language. But
the trace of this negative operation is inscribed in and on and as the event172 (55-56, italics

170

And we would not be remiss in assuming the other pole must then be the arbitrarily chosen moment of scission.
Derrida's reconfiguration of the shibboleth will return with regard to metaphor.
172
Compare this to Heidegger's formulation of the event of Being quoted from Contributions in the last chapter.
There, Heidegger argues that "Being essentially occurs as the event...the ground and the abyss of god's availing of
171

182

original). As cited in the second chapter herein, according to Derrida, "God is nothing
(determined), is not life, because he is everything? and therefore is at once All and Nothing, Life
and Death. Within difference, and at bottom as Difference itself. This Difference is what is
called History. God is inscribed in it" (Writing and Difference 116, emphasis Derrida). From
the former quotation, we have a set of equivalencies: withdrawal via "internal onto-logicosemantic auto-destruction" (55) is the abyss is God is the name is deconstruction (the
desertification of language) is the Event. And from the second quotation, we also learn that God
is nothing is everything is all and nothing simultaneously is life and death simultaneously is
Difference is history. Therefore, from these two quotations, if "is" is a sign of an imperfect
equivalency and not a copula, and if the relationships between nouns here do not depend upon a
sequential reading as Derrida has written them (and certainly, logically an equivalency does not
demand a serial order, although "is" as a copula does contain, in conjunction with noun with an
article, an implicit hierarchy of subject and appositive, regardless of the position in the sentence:
The sky is blue, or, Blue is the sky.) In Derrida, if we limit ourselves to only these two
quotations, we find a set in which each element is the imperfect equivalent of each other
element173.

the human being, or, conversely, the availability of the human being for god. But this availability is withstood only
in Da-sein." In this event, where Heidegger had ground and abyss, Derrida has only abyss; where Heidegger had
god and Dasein, Derrida has only God mediated through language, and Dasein obliviated. Heidegger's and
Derrida's respective formulation are essentially the same with regard to the occurrence of the event, but the general
disposition of Derrida's substitutions and reconfigurations offers another example that speaks volumes about the
difference between Heidegger's work and Derrida's.
173
See section on Heidegger and Thomas Hobbes below.
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Withdrawal

abyss

God

Name

Deconstruction

desertification of
language

Event

Nothing

Everything

nothing and
everything
simultaneously

Life

Death

life and death
simultaneously

Difference

History

Grammatically, even if the equivalencies are occasionally disguised as copulae, we must
remember Derrida insists on metonymy, we can only assume the function of equivocation. What
is the name of this set, however? If we follow the overarching argument of "Sauf le nom," the
name must be either "Name" or "God" or "Nameless" or "post-khora", or, perhaps best, "[ ]." As
Derrida argues,
As if it was necessary both to save the name and to save everything except the
name, save the name [sauf le nom], as if it was necessary to lose the name in order
to save what bears the name, or that toward which one goes through the name.
But to lose the name is not to attack it, to destroy it or wound it. On the contrary,
to lose the name is quite simply to respect it: as name. That is to say, to
pronounce it, which comes down to traversing it toward the other, the other whom
it names and who bears it. To pronounce it without pronouncing it. To forget it
by calling it, by recalling it (to oneself), which comes down to calling or recalling
the other (On the Name 58).
In another word, via negation and equivalence, Derrida has reached the same fascinating point
that had been reached by early Hebrew scholars, via positivation and absolute inequivocability:
an insistence on the inutterability of the Tetragrammaton, YHWH. The name, at its source, in
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the Western tradition with its reliance on a "metaphysics of presence" that must be deconstructed
(according to Derrida), is the same as the name after decades of deconstructive inversion.
Through Derrida, again, we have reached a metaphysics of absence 174.

174

Tentatively here, and only in the relatively brief form of an extended footnote, it could be said that this
metaphysics of absence, and its accompanying politics, have led to a stasis-via-fragmentation and a stasis-viaagnostos. Bernard Stiegler, in his most recent work, States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st Century,
makes this same point in a different manner. With regard to the issues presented by the critique of Derrida herein,
Stiegler continues as a long-established advocate of certain ideas Derridean and Heideggerean, as long as we
understand Heidegger, mostly, as having been read through Derrida. At his most audacious, Stiegler damns
Derrida's work, and poststructuralism as a whole, for promulgating political paralysis and economic and political
suicide on the Left, only to, in very short order, set about attempting to recuperate Derrida as deconstruction
continues to fade from relevancy. Time and Technics, Vol. 1 appears briefly elsewhere herein; in that work, as well
as in States of Shock, Stiegler chooses the simplified "vulgar conception of time," that is, the time to which Derrida
adheres, over any kind of complex ecstatic temporality. In doing so, the question of Dasein, or, more simply, the
question of the subject, remains a question of metonymy, which Stiegler discusses at length in States of Shock under
the Marxist term, proletarianization. When that metonymy is collectivized from without within a hierarchical
political system, the process creates "disindividuation," which, according to Stiegler, has played a significant role in
our current global socio-economico-political situation of "Neoliberal Jihad" (States of Shock 56-61, with regard to
the process of disindividuation; 168-70, for Neoliberal Jihad).
Again, at worst and in an ungenerously critical (and, therefore, perhaps, more useful) reading, Stiegler
never precisely clarifies how we should revive Derrida's originary pharmakon-- neither through an exact set of
instructions, nor through a rationalization of the inherent paradox created by Stiegler's suggestion that we should
reappropriate the very same poststructuralism that killed both the author and the subject as a foundational, systemic
presupposition often related to an illusory postulation of inevitable liberation, such as in the form of Derrida's
pleasure of the infinite play of deferral, as cited above from The Post Card. But Derrida was not the only advocate
of this death. Famously, we could cite Roland Barthes. Or Julia Kristeva's openly political posture of liberation she
ties to the process of transposition, the mixing of signifying systems, so that "its complexity unfolded by its
practices, the signifying process joins the social revolution" with transposition, of course, as "the place of the
production of a subject" (Revolution in Poetic Language 61) rather than the topos in which an already thrown
Dasein expresses herself. Or we could find another openly political posture, with regard to subject formation and
the possibilities of discursivity, as found in Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish and "What Is an Author?".
To be fair, Stiegler's strongest point is his formulation of the movement from reason to rationalization as
one of the hallmarks of our current situation as read through Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment
(3). To provide instructions, perhaps, would be to rationalize and contradict his own work. To provide instructions,
as well, would also be to establish a number of what Stiegler calls "predicative propositions," from which to
rationalize. His examples of these "predicative propositions" follow the form S is P, and are as problematic, in the
same manner, as the Derridean "copula." According to Steigler, in a chapter on Hegel: "Insofar as it is
philosophical, predicative proposition is written. But predicative proposition, by solidifying and freezing
determinations, short-circuits knowledge, given that the latter is always, first and foremost, the individuation of the
subject becoming-mature, not by receiving knowledge, but by trans-forming it through (trans-) forming oneself"
(119). Later in this chapter, we will turn to Heidegger's examination of the copula; for Stiegler, not only does the
copula disindividuate, but does so by seizing the flow of the sequence of moments by "freezing determinations." In
other words, to freeze determinations would be to risk disrupting the citational chain of substitution, even when that
endless substitution is applied to the self, which, as we will see soon through Derrida, is the synecdochical-cummetonymical relationship of the self-qua-khora.
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Derrida's "forgetting the name to save the name" appears throughout his work in essential
form175. Différance, trace, the pharmakon, absence, the via negativa, citationality, deferral, the

What prescriptions Stiegler does offer stem from différance. Instead of being hopelessly and irrevocably
involved with the trace of the citational chain of substitution that Derrida describes in Of Grammatology, Stiegler
reads différance -- not unlike so many other claims regarding Derrida's work -- as originarily liberatory, only if we
remember the positive potential of the pharmakon, which we are required to do anew "because academics have
given up thinking pharmakon in its positivity -- and hence given up any critique of the legacy of idealist and
materialist dialectics" (169). In other words, most are no longer are capable of hearing Derrida's shibboleth on the
pharmakon, even though Derrida's use of the pharmakon in its many forms as a grounds for rejection and negation
significantly outstrip Derrida's mentions of the positive ("I am teaching you pleasure" as quoted in the second
chapter herein from The Post Card [66], but that pleasure stems from the play of deconstruction, the pyromaniacal
joy of watching a burning library). The first problem with Stiegler's suggestion, however, is that we must first create
a "predicative proposition" concerning the pharmakon to denote the negative and positive aspects, S is P1 and P2...
Aside from academics having voluntarily suffered withdrawal from the positive pharmakon, the "economic
milieu of consumption" stands as the villain here, with Stiegler creating a strong point as drawn from Andy Warhol's
famous rationalization of what Warhol viewed as the glorious universality of Coca-Cola (215-16). Stiegler does not
mention that, as with seemingly everything Warhol said in response to questions from the media, Warhol's statement
could well be tongue-in-cheek, or simultaneously ironic and sincere. In other words, Stiegler draws a predicative
proposition from Warhol's statement, which likely served multiple purposes at the same time. What Stiegler so
profoundly fails to consider is any option beyond the purview of the binarism required for deconstruction to function
in any matter. In this case, Stiegler juxtaposes the pharmakon to the Neoliberal Jihad, which disregards the very real
possibility that the conditions of the pharmakon are exactly the same conditions as those of the Neoliberal Jihad in
that both, whether through the citational death of the subject or the transmogrification of human beings into
machines of consumption defined by economic function, disindividuate. And if we take any sort of philosophical,
or even theological, position that one of the qualifications of being human is some level of individuation -- even if it
is not pure cogito or even the functionality of the transcendental ego -- then both sides of Stiegler's binary of
pharmakon and Neoliberal Jihad essentially dehumanize, which, very well could have everything to do with our
current seeming to be paralyzed. Most importantly here, within this brief discussion, we espy, in this recent work by
Stiegler, the difficulty that arises when human beings are thought solely within a temporality that occurs as a
sequential series of moments; at any given moment, the subject could possibly be completely reconstructed. If time,
as Heidegger argues, is the interplay of the three temporal ecstasies, meaning the future stands forth, the present
presents, and the past lingers, then the subject could not be completely reconfigured in a synchronic moment, that is,
any synchronic moment (to separate this usage here from the Heideggerean moment of the Augenblick). That which
lingers would be more than simply a trace. In relying so thoroughly on Derrida's concepts, Stiegler's work suffers
the same pitfalls of temporality as Derrida's.
And beyond the specifics of the discussion here of Stiegler's work, we can provisionally posit, at least the
possibility, of a kind of observer effect with regard to temporality. This would be distinct from the technology of
the interrogative, but interrelated. We, provisionally as well, could name this more thoroughly philosophical -- and
less scientific -- version of the observer effect, the technology of temporality. The assumptions about time, with
which we begin, determine our answers, at least partially, from the outset as much as asking "Who?" as opposed to
"What?" or "Why?" or "How?" or "When?". Heidegger's The Principle of Reason, in fact, concerns itself with the
argument for, and the implications of, moving from "why" to "because" in reading Leibniz's Nihil est sine ratio.
175
In many ways that we do not have the space to explore, Jameson's article "The Politics of Utopia"
examines these issues (synecdochic self in diachronic, metonymic relation; his pejorative nostalgia he finds to be an
imbecilic desire for impossibility; synchronic transformation of the individual and society; the becoming of matter
into form and the ceasing of time), and, in language common to both pop psychology and operant conditioning,
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postal principle, dia-synchrony, deconstruction: all name the same kind of process, all point
toward that which is not, all demand the same rigid conceptualization of temporality to function.
Given Derrida's own repeated prohibitions against viewing deconstruction as a system to be
applied, the idea of a "strict Derridean" must be seen as an oxymoron. We can easily imagine,
however, that such a strict Derridean would find the conflation of Différance, trace, the
pharmakon, absence, the via negativa, citationality, deferral, the postal principle, dia-synchrony,
and deconstruction, to be problematic to say the least. Here, however, the shared rigid
demands we confront these fears by exploring them so that we may possibly march our way toward utopia. As he
closes his argument in his penultimate paragraph:
In this sense, it is only too humanly comprehensible that we might draw back from that utopia
which Adorno described as a community of 'good animals' [in Negative Dialectics]. On the other
hand, it also seems possible that a genuine confrontation with utopia demands just such anxieties,
and that without them our visions of alternative futures and utopian transformations remain
politically and existentially inoperative, mere thought experiments and mental games without any
visceral commitment (New Left Review).
In a number of ways, Jameson's work directs us toward the exploration of how the relation between trope, time, and
individual itself relates to the utopian impulse, and the formation, and more importantly, the codification of the
utopian impulse.
Here, again tentatively, we could argue that this is the underlying thought in Jameson's turn toward affect
theory: another way to avoid the complexity of temporality with regard to the human. In contrast, during his most
thorough, nearly obsessive, period of arguing a Greco-German connection (Holderlin's Hymn: "The Ister";
Parmenides), Heidegger, in Parmenides, enumerates the negative implications of the translation from the Greek zoon
logon echon [the animal that speaks itself into being] to the Latin animal rationale [the animal that thinks]. While
we cannot recapitulate Heidegger's argument here, it offers a comparison to Jameson and affect theory in general,
which, in a very certain way, can be conceived as the alteration of the animal rationale to the animal reactione.
Animal reactione, however, stands as a redundancy we could justifiably emend to simply animal. In a decidedly
different approach to the same essential question, in Oneself as Another, Ricoeur reads in Nietzsche's destruction of
"the exceptional character of the cogito" the following assumption by Nietzsche: "to assume the phenomenality of
the internal world is...to posit an entirely arbitrary unity, that fiction called 'thinking,' apart from the bristling
multiplicity of instincts" (15). For his part, Ricoeur "shall not consider any further these arguments...of hyperbolic
doubt" (ibid.) Of interest, with regard to Jameson and Heidegger, is the continuum we can construct of the
movement from zoon logon echon to animal rationale to cogito to constructed subject to animal reactione. As is
obvious, with each iteration, agency diminishes; that which was responsible for speaking itself into being becomes
that which merely reacts. Heidegger, in Contributions, feared the transformation of the "technicized animal" that
lacks even "originary animality" (194). The animal reactione, in its way, is a further step removed that even the
technicized animal. In this discussion of technology in Contributions, we can see Heidegger lay the groundwork of
the idea he will express in "The Question Concerning Technology" that techne ultimately is poesis, with poesis
understood as one of the basic relations -- to switch to the language of Being and Time -- of Dasein in being-in-theworld. The animal reactione, then, does not poeticize, does not create via technology, but merely reacts to it. For
all the narratives of the technological empowerment, the fundamental experience of technology, with regard to
media consumption, is a passivity with a highly diminished, or totally absent, aspect of creation. This, of course,
could be challenged with a range of ideas, from Kant's discussion of the function of aesthetic experience in relation
to the sublime to reader response criticism. But those, unlike pure affect, pure reaction, require cogitation and
articulation.
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conceptualization of temporality matters most.
And that rigid conceptualization of temporality extends to grammar. In "The Supplement
of the Copula: Philosophy Before Linguistics," Derrida focuses on the function of "is" as a
copula. This essay, while breaking little new ground, serves primarily as a summation of the
consideration of "is" as a copula in the work of Emile Benveniste and Heidegger. According to
Derrida, for both Benveniste and Heidegger, the function of "is" primarily as a copula indicates
"fall" of the verb "to be." Resistance to this fall, for Derrida, both stems from and further
generates a misguided contrition and a futile desire:
There is a strong, indeed barely repressible, temptation to consider the growing
predominance of the formal function of the copula as a process of falling, an
abstraction, degradation, or emptying of the semantic plenitude of the lexeme "to
be" and of all lexemes which, likewise, have let themselves dwindle or be
replaced. Is not to examine this "history," (but the word "history" belongs to this
process of meaning), as the history of meaning, and to ask the "question of Being"
as the question of the "meaning of Being" (Heidegger), to limit the destruction of
classical ontology to a reappropriation of the semantic plentitude of "Being," a
reactivation of the lost origin, etc.? Is it not to constitute the supplement of
copula as a historical accident, even if one considers it to be a structural
necessity? Is it not to suspect a kind of original fall in the copula, with all that
such a perspective would imply? (Margins 203, emphasis mine).
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What exactly would "such a perspective...imply?" Derrida tells us, in this paragraph, and
in doing so, reinforces those very temporal concepts required for his metaphysical system of
absence; any inherently prelapsarian desire requires time as the sequential series of moments 176.
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Another difference presents itself. For Derrida, we must work in totalities: the origin itself is that which
would be reactivated; for Heidegger, with the emphasis on Dasein, such a totalization may not be absolutely
precluded, but it could certainly be limited. For example, in "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology," from a
complicated and incredibly problematic reading of Heidegger's What Is Philosophy?, Derrida surmises, in his
approximation of Heidegger, that the loss of sophon causes nostalgia and "this nostalgia is the origin of philosophy"
(Reading Heidegger: Commemorations 190). (Admittedly, at this point in What Is Philosophy?, Heidegger, in
keeping with the theme of the book, writes concerning Being and not in relation to Dasein (47-51).)
Although we cannot devote a significant amount of time to the pursuit of this idea at the moment, the
question of Derrida's reactivation should be contrasted with remembrance-as-presence, in a manner after both
Augustine's present past and Heidegger's remembrance of the future past for the authentic existence of Dasein, as
well as Heidegger's formulation in "The Anaximander Fragment" quoted in the last chapter herein: "Knowledge is
the remembrance of Being." In a relation to the Impossible I and the Inescapable I, tentatively, we could work
within this difference to derive the distinction between the nostalgia of the Impossible I, and, to borrow the Italian
version of the word employed by Andrei Tarkovsky as a film title, the nostalghia of the Inescapable I. Nostalgia,
frequently and especially in Jameson's discourse, acts as a pejorative to indicate a ridiculous longing for an empty
past, such as that which can be expressed in "retro" fashion, for example. (Or, for another example, we could view
Jameson's reading of Tarkovsky's Nostalghia (Postmodernism 102-03), which is a moment when Jameson ceases to
exegetically critique postmodernism and function as a thoroughly postmodernist thinker himself by ignoring the
themes and plot of Tarkovsky's film and, rather, egregiously insists the film is an exemplar of "postmodern
wrapping.") Nostalghia, on the other hand and in following the plot of Tarkovsky's masterwork, expresses the grief
at the loss of what Heidegger would call a world, in which Dasein "in its familiarity with these relations...'signifies'
to itself. It primordially gives itself to understand its being and potentiality-of-being with regard to its being-in-theworld" (Being and Time 85).
Nostalgia, as Jameson demonstrates through his filmic examples, such as George Lucas' American Graffiti
as an expression of 1970s American nostalgia for the American 1950s, always operates at the collective level of the
social, and there wax and wane, flood and ebb, as spring and neap, like the oceanic tides. Nostalghia, as with
Dasein, functions via individuation. Rather than collective longing expressible in the mode of fashion, the center of
nostalghia is grief, which fades and transforms, but never precisely ceases, and irrupts into the quotidian -- and
diachronic -- narrative of the everyday. The synthesis of nostalgia and nostalghia, perhaps, would be grief for an
imagined world of the kind that finds its expression in a letter-writing campaign to revive a canceled television
series. In keeping with the distinction of the nostalghia of the Inescapable I and the nostalgia of the Impossible I,
Heidegger's nostalgia is a collective longing among multiple philosophers; Dasein is not part of the equation.
Derrida, despite "Philopolemology" concerning itself with Dasein from the outside, does not bother to indicate this
distinction in Heidegger, and allows nostalgia to stand both collectively and for individuated Dasein.
This possible distinction between nostalgia and nostalghia, however, may have already been elided beyond
remembrance; certainly, attacks on Heidegger's work as being expressly and, even more so, implicitly tied to the
Nazi rhetoric of "blood and soil" inherently find the concept of "world" problematic. The difference, though, lies in
the possibility of a topos, rather than the absolute emptiness of khora; the difference, as well, lies on the emphasis
of, to return to Stiegler's word, disindividuated consumers of Jamesonian retro nostalgia films rather than on
individuated Dasein. This, again, only points to Derrida's tendency to totalize, and Heidegger's bulwark against
totalization in Dasein. Because it depends on Dasein, this distinction between nostalgia and nostalghia thoroughly
depends from the conceptualization of temporality.
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Suddenly, while discussing Heidegger's and Benveniste's respective approaches to the
function of is as a copula, Derrida extends the state of the infinitive "to be" to "all lexemes,"
which we must certainly not only note "being" as the lexeme of greatest import given the
infinitive form, but we also must note, again, the figure that controls this process, given that
Derrida does not indicate any greater significance for the lemma: metonymy. The fallenness of
"to be" is the fallenness of "being." Within this process that presents another attempt to
disqualify Being, the argument, rather than deconstructing a concept, begins with the absolute
acceptance of an unqualified morphology, and then, via a metonymical process, applies the
"emptying of semantic plenitude" to all conjugations, and all tenses as well. Derrida's skepticism
concerning "the reactivation of the lost origin" points toward a synchronic dictum applicable
across indicated temporalities, both past and future 177
The unspoken problem here, beyond another of the myriad attacks on Being or the irony
of the surety of morphology in the service of a hazy deconstructive project, stands as Derrida's
elision of the function of is as copula, despite his naming it thusly. To recall Wittgenstein's brief
formulation from Philosophical Investigations, is appears to function both "as the copula and as
the sign of equality," a duality Wittgenstein judges to be "an accident, a mere inessential 178"
(150). In his deconstructive movement toward exposing an antinomy (as Jameson summarized
Derrida's process), Derrida synthesizes; "is" no long functions as both copula and sign of
equality, but merely becomes, contrary to all of his work on the name, simply the "copula," with
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And, of course, as cited above with regard to scission, the origin, for Derrida, must always be multiple and
arbitrary.
178
In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein addresses the point to a greater extent, but arrives at the same
conclusion of the dual function of the copula, from which he draws a few problematic statements on symbolization
and translation that, arguably in an echo of Gottlob Frege's predicate logic, judges written or spoken language as
ideal when it effectively matches the precision of symbolic logic (35-44).
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"grammatical and lexical functions" that "[bear] an essential relation to the history of
metaphysics and to everything coordinated to this history in the West" (Margins 203).
That history, however, hides the sign of equivalency. To begin "The Supplement of
Copula," Derrida outlines this history thusly: "if we consider the history of philosophy as one
great discourse, a powerful discursive chain, is not that history immersed in a reserve of
language, the systematic reserve of a lexicology, a grammar, a set of signs and values? And once
this is so, is not the history of philosophy limited by the resources and the organization of that
reserve?" (Margins 177). First, the chain, the braid, the dia-synchronic knotted string reappears
as the overarching symbol for this essay179. "Symbol" appears here, not to confuse matters, but
to avoid the use of metaphor for Derrida, with the symbol of this chain, points toward
metonymy: the history of philosophy comprises many works of philosophy, each one, in a very
de Manian sense, functioning as an allegory for philosophy itself. The Consolations of
Philosophy, for example, rests as a link in this chain; that link does not function as a metaphor
for any other link; that link is itself, but yet simply another link. The relationship between links
is metonymy; the relationship between any given link and the entirety of the chain is synecdoche,
and we can then view the synecdochial relationship under the aegis of allegory. In this way, we
can discern both equivalency and copula.
Secondly, that Derrida conflates the uses of "is" as both copula and sign of equality into a
single function he names "copula" can be further understood by his own formulation of the
"systematic reserve of a lexicology, a grammar, a set of signs and values." While lexicology and
grammar remain distinct, both fall under the systematic reserve; both while appearing distinct -as with the different uses of "is" -- ultimately only stand as links in a chain. It is not that S is P,
179

Which, of course, indicates the series of singular moments, or dia-synchrony.
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but that S is not P. An equivalency stands as impossible, but metonymy-qua-allegory does not.
The conjugation of the lemma of philosophy yields many lexemes; the chain contains myriad
links.
Not only does Derrida's "copula" now include the copula and the sign of equivalency, but
also absence. The "copula" need not even appear:
Thus is happens that the lexical absence is "supplemented" only by the absence
period, the grammatical function of "to be" then being fulfilled by the blank of a
spacing, by a somehow erased punctuation180, by a pause: an oral interruption,
that is, an arrest of the voice (is this then an oral phenomenon?), that no graphic
sign, in the usual sense of the word, no written plenitude could come to mark.
The absence of "to be," the absence of this singular lexeme, is absence itself
(Margins 201, emphasis Derrida).
Within this conflation of "is" as the copula and the sign of equivalency, Derrida also
synthesizes absence. To draw this out, then, we could argue that not only can we write that S is
P and that S is not P, but also that S is not S181 and that P is not P for, if the "copula" is absence,
and the "copula" can be indicated by and can indicate absence, then S is (absent from) S. Being,
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Despite Derrida's assessment, such a place for a vanished "copula" can be most easily viewed in an appositive
phrase, which, in written English, German, or French, frequently demands a comma after the nominative to indicate
what Derrida indiscriminately names "copula:" Rome, the capital of Italy; man, an animal; the sky, blue and clear.
The "copula" is not simply disregarded or implied, but requires a "graphic sign." In all seriousness, in English the
copula represented without a pause, and therefore, written without a comma, seems to be predominantly reserved for
pop culture representations of Frankenstein's monster and his utterance: "Fire bad," which began as "Fire no good"
in James Whale's 1935 film, The Bride of Frankenstein. That Whale uses the absence of the pause of the copula to
create the situation of the questionable humanity of Frankenstein's monster should not be overlooked.
181
If one agrees with this assessment and expansion of the implications of Derrida's ideas, then, with regard to
Stiegler, we can see why any attempt at re-individuation, via deconstruction, is doomed from the outset. If S is not
S, the subject is not the subject, even if that subject has been attenuated to its slightest form. What would constitute
that slightest form is the question. For example, even Da-sein, being-there, within a Heraclitean temporality, rather
that ecstatic temporality, would violate Derrida's implied law of S is not S. This will be furthered in the following
paragraphs.
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in the form of the "copula," can be indicated by either presence or absence, and, as Derrida's
argument obtains, to use the copula, even by its elision, is to indicate "absence itself."
Now can we posit another set of equivalencies, further drawn from Derrida, in which (not
S) is (not P) and (not S) is not (not P) for both debouch from absence. Derrida's stress on the
linguistic performs many tasks, not least of which is the abeyance of both existentia and essentia.
Without existentia and essentia, the Heideggerean ontic disappears, and without the ontic, one
cannot formulate ontic/ontological difference. Without existentia and essentia, one has no
recourse but to a metonymy in which every S is every P, and in which any S is any P. Each
equivalency indicated by the Derridean "copula" occurs in a diachronic sequence, with S and P
themselves detemporalized, rendered in a pure synchronic form.
In other words from Derrida, "S. is P., Socrates is Plato, his father and his son, therefore
the father of his father, his own grandfather and his own grandson" (The Post Card 47). While
we cannot descry with certainty the tone of the "Envois" section of The Post Card, which
includes Derrida's "reportage" of his refusal of a collect call from Heidegger's ghost (21), we can
trace this equivalency throughout Derrida's Hamletian discourse 182. This confusion between S
and P not only continues throughout The Post Card, but serves as a major theme. In fact, the
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While Hamletian may seem an odd judgment to place on The Post Card, it depends, first of all, whether one hears
the echo of James Joyce's Ulysses here. In the "Scylla and Charybdis" section, Joyce elaborates Stephen Dedalus'
argument concerning Hamlet, although it appears in jesting form in the opening section, "Telemachus:" "He proves
by algebra," states Buck Mulligan on Stephen's theory, "that Hamlet's grandson is Shakespeare's grandfather and
that he himself is the ghost of his own father" (15). When read against this well-known selection from Joyce (with
or without knowledge of Derrida's history with Joyce's work), we may surmise that Derrida, even if we cannot be
sure of the tone of "Envois," continues his algebra of absence.
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confusion can only continue as the sequence of moments of time pass away. Much later in the
"Envois" section, Hamlet/Derrida183 clarifies his system of process:
The postal principle184 does not happen to différance, and even less so to
"Being185," it destinies them from the very "first 186" envoi. Now there are also
differences, there is only that, in postal différance; one can still, by means of a
figure folded back over onto itself, name them "epochs" or sub-epochs...the great
epoch187 (whose technology188 is marked by paper, pen, the envelope, the
individual subject addressee, etc.) and...goes shall we say from Socrates to Freud
and Heidegger189 (191, emphasis Derrida)
Again, we have the diachronic repetition of the sequence of moments, the movement
from sub-epoch to sub-epoch: "the history of philosophy as one great discourse, a powerful
discursive chain" as quoted above from "The Supplement of the Copula." But immediately
following this affirmation of the serial movement of time and the diachronic process of history,
Hamlet/Derrida offers this: "Here Freud and Heidegger, I conjoin them within me like the two
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Or, perhaps, Jacques Pierre? In the "Preface" to the second edition of The Anxiety of Influence, Bloom calls
Derrida "French Joyce." To confuse the matter, and to be unable to help us any further here, Bloom then names
Michel Foucault, "French Shakespeare" (xv).
184
From citationality to the postal principle to hauntology, Derrida saves the name by forgetting the name; one
replaces the other in a chain substitution; each one is the same, yet differs; each one defers. We glimpse one of the
difficulties of Derrida's work: the metatextual claustrophobia caused by his work folding, like the soon to be named
epoch, back over on itself, but, again, to form a Möbius strip without beginning or end, and without a side interior or
side exterior.
185
While he does not do it at this point, Derrida will, elsewhere, such as demonstrated above vis-à-vis the "copula,"
disavow Heideggerean Being.
186
The quotation marks are themselves a shibboleth; if we know how to hear Derrida, we hear the multiplicity of the
arbitrary scission.
187
"The epoch of Being," as Derrida nominates it elsewhere.
188
Compare this to the brief litany herein of the critical theorists who base part of their investigations on speed as
technology, which must also include Heidegger's discourse on nearness. Derrida's distinction here of pen and paper
versus tele-techno-communications, a distinction based purely on speed of delivery.
189
This, of course, is rife with exactly the apocalyptic tone Derrida will later decry.

194

great ghosts 190 of the 'great epoch.' The two surviving grandfathers. They did not know each
other, but according to me they form a couple, and in fact just because of that, this singular
anachrony191." The ghosts of Hamlet's grandfathers survive because they are within
Derrida/Hamlet; in being within Hamlet, Hamlet fathers his grandfathers; the ghosts are Hamlet
himself; Hamlet also is his father's ghost; Hamlet fathers himself, now both son and grandson;
now, as well, father to his grandfathers. This is a single knot on the string of dia-synchrony.
Again, we risk the ridiculous. Or, we may read this against Mark 5:9: "My name is
Legion: for we are many," but, perhaps, as a lesser pandemonium. Hamlet/Derrida 192,
nonetheless, functions as khora, the space that these daimons of Freud and Heidegger occupy.
Do we continue Derrida's thought? Do we minimize the individual to one in a series of
synecdoches for the totality of khora193?
Derrida, in fact, argues exactly that. In an analysis of the function of death in "Beyond
the Pleasure Principle," Derrida slides between the Freudian and Heideggerean terminology to
arrive at the conclusion that both Freud's identification of the drive of the living to return to
inorganic material and Heidegger's authentic existence of being-toward-death are the same in
that both are "the drive of the proper," in that one appropriates oneself with regard to death,
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We must consider here whether or not this moment constitutes hauntology -- in which the past haunts the present
from the future -- in its nascent form. See footnotes 73, in the previous chapter, and 183 in this chapter. We must
also note, as well, that here the "I" yet exists in Derrida as something more substantial than the specter.
191
This quotation serves two purposes: the first expressly stated in the analysis that follows it; the second purpose
will appear later in relation to the Derridean shibboleth.
192
Of course, this is a Derridean Hamlet who would never utter "O! That this too too solid flesh would melt," but
prefers, instead, "All that is solid melts into air" removed from its original context and cited at will. We may
remember this Hamlet/Derrida/Marx combination in the upcoming consideration of hauntology.
193
Here we find the most problematic facet of Derrida's work for Stiegler's call for the revivification of the usage of
the pharmakon.
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whether in repressing the death drive or in the resoluteness of the authentic existence 194 (The
Post Card 355-56). Derrida offers his synthesis of Freud and Heidegger in the following manner,
only soon to point out the essential flaw in his version of the combination of Freud and
Heidegger:
The drive of the proper would be stronger than life and death. We must, then,
unfold the implications of such a statement. If, auto-teleguiding its (his) own
legacy, the drive of the proper is stronger than life and stronger than death, it is
because, neither living nor dead, its force does not qualify it otherwise than by its
own, proper drivenness, called the relation of the proper: the most driven drive is
the drive of the proper, in other words, the one that tends to reappropriate itself.
The movement of reappropriation is the most driven drive. The proper of
drivenness is the movement or the force of reappropriation. The proper is the
tendency to appropriate oneself. Whatever the combinatory of these tautologies
or analytic statements, never can they be reduced to the form S is P. Each
time, concerning the drive, the force, or the movement, the tendency or the
telos, a division must be maintained 195. This forbids the drive of the proper
from being designated by a pleonastic expression defining the simple relation to
itself of the inside. Heterology is involved, and this is why there is force, and this
is why there is legacy and scene of writing, distancing of oneself and delegation,
sending, envoi. The proper is not the proper, and if it appropriates itself is that it
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Derrida only very briefly mentions the difference in temporality between the death drive and being-toward-death,
only to defer the question until "Donner -- le temps," collected in and translated as part of Given Time: I.
Counterfeit Money (The Post Card 359).
195
Derrida, beyond argument, determines what he names the "copula" as a sign of equivalency that would elide any
division, rather than as a copula as Wittgenstein, for example, uses the word to intend separation and connection.
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disappropriates itself -- properly, improperly. Life and death are no longer
opposed to it (356-57, emphasis Derrida, emphasis mine).
As stated earlier in this section, for Derrida, an equivalency stands as impossible, but
metonymy-qua-allegory does not. "Each time" here intends repetition, but neither return nor
resurrection. One individual plays the part, then another, a metonymical substitution in this
process, takes her place, another khora, another stage for the allegorical play. And what is this
play, this drive of the proper beyond life and death, beyond opposition to life and death?
Différance, of course: "All the différance is lodged in the desire (desire is nothing but
[différance]) for this auto-tely. It auto-delegates itself and arrives only by itself
differing/defering itself in (its) totally-other, in a totally-other which should no longer be its own.
No more proper name, no proper name that does not call (to) itself... (The Post Card 359,
emphasis mine). In other words, S is not P for S is not S, and, therefore, P is not P196. If the
subject here is différance, we have S is P, and simultaneously, S is not P, for P is nothing; then S
is P twice, with the second iteration presented an appositive without a verb, contradicting his
earlier proclamation in Margins concerning the absence of the implied copula; then, S is S again,
followed by its negation that S is not S ("Itself, nothing," another appositive with an implied
being, an implied verb: presence implied by punctuation, absence implied by the absent verb,
which, problematically is S is S, in that absence is absence, and, further, S is all iterations of P.)
Namelessness, the figures of metonymy and allegory, khora, the impossibility of the copula:
these are also strings in the Derridean knot. We have reached the point of metaphysics again, but
we must choose between the individual as his own or as empty metonymical space. Even if we
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Or so seems the Derridean logic. As Derrida will write of the matter in Given Time: "Différance, which (is)
nothing, is (in) the thing itself. It (is) the thing itself. It, différance, the thing (itself). It, without anything other.
Itself, nothing" (40, all parentheses Derrida).
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defer, we choose, for in deferring, we choose, by implication, Derrida's system based on
différance, Derrida's singular universal in his metaphysical mononominalism.

C. Is Is
As already noted, Wittgenstein found is to be both the copula and a sign of equivalency;
Derrida, as argued herein, suggests the impossibility of is as either copula or equivalency
because of the impossibility of naming a subject and even the impossibility of a subject itself
beyond the nothing of différance. Heidegger considered this question repeatedly. In an
appendix added to the second edition of Gregory Fried and Richard Polt's translation of
Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger's presents this summation of the copula:
The particular way in which one conceives of the essence of truth, and thus
interprets the sentence (assertion -- judgment), will yield a certain interpretation
of the "is" as a copula and of "is" as "existing" and "being true." All this, in turn,
affects how one determines the essence of Be-ing in general. For instance, there
are quite different conceptions of the "is" as copula in Aristotle, Leibniz, Hobbes,
Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche (241-42).
Fifteen years before he delivered the lectures that would become Introduction to
Metaphysics, Heidegger had already explored the question with some depth in The Basic
Problems of Phenomenology. There he examines Aristotle and Thomas Hobbes from the list
quoted immediately above, and also John Stuart Mill and Hermann Lotze197 (179-201).
Numerous times, Heidegger lists the possible meanings of is in list form, first with four items,
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The entirety of Chapter 4 contains an extensive meditation on is as a copula (177-224).
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then six, then three (202, 204, 218, respectively). In comparison to Wittgenstein's observation 198,
for example, more possibilities of the copula are considered, and, with regard to some,
disregarded. As for Aristotle, Hobbes, Mill, and Lotze, Heidegger offers the following: "being
in the sense of the copula is...according to Aristotle...synthesis in the logos" (183); "for Hobbes
the 'is' and the est are synonymous with essentia, for Mill with existentia" (198); and "it is
Lotze's opinion that, if I say S is not P and deny the P of the S, then this cannot mean that I am
combining P with S...this leads Lotze to say that every judgment is a double judgment...[the
negative judgment] S does not equal P means: no, it is not true...the S equals P...is always there
as the underlying positive judgment" (199). Two caveats: First, these brief quotations do not
capture the complexity of Heidegger's considerations, but only give a sense. Secondly,
Aristotle's emphasis on synthesis connotes, according to Heidegger, that S is P and S is not P:
"taken as diairesis S = P is not only a combination but also at the same time a separation 199"
(182). The final list, as Heidegger moves in his argument of the implications of the copula for
Dasein, offers the most succinct interpretation:
"We are now in a position to focus more sharply on the problem of the "is" in the
proposition. Here, "is" can mean (1) the extantness of a being, existentia, (2) the
whatness of something extant, essentia, or (3) both together. In the proposition
"S200 is," "is" asserts being, for example, being extant. "S is P" can mean that P is
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Shortly, this examination of Heidegger's argument concerning the copula will turn to his evaluation of Hobbes; in
doing so, we will be able to see more clearly the reasons for Heidegger's fundamental difference from Wittgenstein,
which is already apparent. While we could argue that Wittgenstein's formulation of the copula can be presented
analogously to Heidegger's first two points, Heidegger's insistence on the simultaneity of both usages differs greatly
from Wittgenstein's formulation of the multiple uses of is as unrelated and "inessential."
199
The mentioning of the latter point here only stands in preparation of the presentation of Ricoeur's definition of
metaphor to come.
200
Heidegger's text has been modified. Originally, Heidegger employs the variables "A" and "B" in his example,
perhaps to extend his argument beyond the thinking within grammatical terms and/or to highlight indirectly
causality via the order of the letters, A, B. For the purpose of clarity and consistency, "S" has been substituted for
"A," and "P" for "B." Another such substitution will occur below with regard to the work of Paul Ricoeur.
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predicated of S as a determination S's being-such, where it remains
undetermined whether S is or is not actually extant. But "S is P" can also
signify that S is extant and P is a determination extant in S, so that existentia and
essentia of a being can be intended simultaneously in the proposition "S is P." In
addition, "is" signifies being-true...as unveiled201 (218, emphasis Heidegger,
emphasis mine)
To continue with Hobbes, Heidegger quotes Hobbes with regard to the copula:
The proposition, however, is a discourse consisting of two coupled names, by
which the speaker signifies he understands that the second name, or predicate, is
the name of the same thing as is named also by the first; or, what is the same, he
understands that the first name, the subject, is contained in the second. For
example, this utterance "Man is animal," in which two names are coupled by the
verb "is." This speech states a proposition 202.
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Here, we should read this in light of Heidegger's decades-long discourse on aletheia as unconcealedness, rather
than unveiledness and the variations Albert Hofstadter's chooses to use in his translation, that runs from Being and
Time through Parmenides to "The Origin of the Work of Art." As will be discussed later, Paul de Man and Derrida
will recast Heidegger's emphasis on aletheia as their determination of Heidegger's work as dependent on parousia.
Preliminarily, we should note that "it remains undetermined whether S is or is not actually extant" belies de
Man's reading that Heidegger depends on parousia, in that, according to Heidegger, S may not be unconcealed, or in
Derridean --but decidedly not Heideggerean -- parlance, absent; therefore, the copula in Heidegger functions with
regard to both presence and absence, and by doing so, problematizes the characterization of Heidegger's work as
being purely determined by presence. The difference between Heidegger's undeterminable S and Derrida's
implication that S is not S may appear negligible, but within that difference lies possibility, necessary for
anticipatory resoluteness, care, and authenticity. Although it may seem counterintuitive to the conventional wisdom
surrounding deconstruction's systemic indeterminability, Derrida's insistence on the "différance at bottom" obliviates
possibility, and with it, Heideggerean authenticity.
202
The italics here indicate Heidegger's translation of Hobbes' Latin into German, and Hofstadter's translation of
Heidegger's German into English. William Molesworth's edition of the relevant section from The English Works of
Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury follows:
A proposition is a speech consisting of two names copulated, by which he that speaketh signifies
that he conceives the latter name to be the name of the same thing whereof the former is the name;
or (which is all one) that the former name is comprehended by the latter. For example, this
speech, Man is a living creature, in which two names are copulated by the verb is, is a
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With the earlier examination Derrida's insistence that the lack of the copula indicates
absence-as-copula in mind, immediately following this selection from Hobbes quoted by
Heidegger in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Hobbes continues:
But there are, or certainly may be, some nations which have no word which
answers to our verb is, who nevertheless form propositions by the position only of
one name after another, as if instead of man is a living creature, it should be said,
man a living creature; for the very order of the names may sufficiently show their
connection; and they are as apt and useful in philosophy, as if they were copulated
by the verb is (The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury 31).
We cannot know whether Derrida, in tracking down Heidegger's citations, read this bit of
The English Works before he formulated the copula as absence; we cannot even know whether
Derrida had Heidegger's The Basic Problems of Phenomenology in mind when he wrote "The
Supplement of the Copula" for Derrida does not mention The Basic Problems of Phenomenology
anywhere in that essay, nor anywhere in Margins, for that matter. What we have, though, is a
suspicion arising from a too-precise inversion of Hobbes' position by Derrida, but with the
supplement of absence incorporated into what Heidegger calls Hobbes' "pure verbal sequence."
That is the core here, regarding either Hobbes or Derrida: pure verbal sequence, even though we
can clearly say, with the assistance of an article to indicate a genus/species relationship, An
animal is man, or simply reverse the subject and the predicate, Blue is the sky. Heidegger posits
that the reason that Hobbes "surrenders his own initial approach" of "nominalism" is that

proposition, for this reason, that he that speaks it conceives living creature and man to be names of
the same thing, or that the former name, man, is comprehended by the latter name, living creature
(30).
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"beyond the pure verbal sequence, there emerges a manifold, which belongs to assertion in
general: identifying reference of names to a thing, apprehension of the whatness of the thing in
this identifying reference, the thought of the cause for the identifying referability" (Basic
Problems 192). Importantly here, Derrida's own (anti-) nominalism suffers the same problem as
Hobbes' nominalism; at most, absence merely becomes part of the manifold, and not its central
characteristic, unless one strictly adheres to the rest of Derridean thought. Importantly later, the
concept of the copula as manifold will return herein in a form that differs from Heidegger's
assessment.
Heidegger's explanation of the function of the copula in Hobbes stands as more important
here, however. As Heidegger explains: "'The sky is blue.' Hobbes interprets this proposition in
conformity with his theory by taking the two words 'sky' and 'blue' to be referring to one and the
same res" (Basic Problems 203). While it remains that unless we accept Derridean thought,
absence merely becomes an element of manifold temporality, we cannot ignore that the structure
of both the Hobbesian copula and the Derridean copula are essentially the same. Whereas in
Hobbes, a given situation dictates S and P, the vital difference with regard to the Derridean
copula arrives in the definition of S, which is, in every situation, absence. In that way, every P
copularly predicated from each and every S always refers to the same res that is not a res,
absence. In this way, we can express citationality, and its requisite temporality, in an
extraordinarily simple manner: S is P1 is P2 is P3... Within the khora, arises the originary
absence S and the chain of substitution that is the citational sequence of predication proceeds
indefinitely. As has been noted in the previous chapter, only later in his career will Derrida turn
toward the more complex figure of the knot or the braid, even while simultaneously pursing the
khora.
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Although Heidegger spends a significant portion of Being and Time in establishing
being-in-the-world -- in Chapter 4 of Division I, and, essentially, in Chapter 4 of Division II as
well -- in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Heidegger more narrowly focuses on the
copula than he does in Being and Time. From the Being and Time, however, we find this
statement from Heidegger: "the ontological meaning of the 'is' can be defined, which a
superficial theory of propositions and judgments has disfigured into the 'copula.' The
'origination' of 'significance' can be clarified and the possibility of the formulation of concepts
can be made ontologically intelligible only in terms of the temporality of discourse, that is, of
Dasein in general203" (333). As well we shortly see, the copula plays a different role for
Heidegger, a role, perhaps, that should lead us to read Chapter 4 of The Basic Problems of
Phenomenology as an addendum to both fourth chapters in Being and Time.) and its function in
decentralizing the subject-object relationship in a fashion much after that expounded in relation
to being-in-the-world. With regard to being-in-the-world, the Heideggerean discourse soon
becomes profoundly complicated. In addition to Dasein, we have the matter of regioning, which
itself is a matter of nearness and remoteness with regard to the over-against; we have the
everyday as viewed in a quotidian fashion or with care, which itself determines the over-against
as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. To avoid summarizing the entirety of Being and Time, we
must risk oversimplification to the point of error here. With regard to Dasein's being-in-theworld, Heidegger offers: "Dasein discovers the being-in-itself of the 'true world' of beings 204
with which Dasein as existing is always already together" (104). This "always already together"
is the condition of Dasein's throwness into the world. As Heidegger expands this recasting of
the subject-object relation:
203

This echoes an argument made in Being and Time, here presented in shortened form: "In the vulgar
interpretation of time as a succession of nows, both datability and significance are lacking" (401).
204
To be clear, "beings" in Heidegger indicates both the inanimate and animate, objects and persons.
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The being which is essentially constituted by being-in-the-world is itself always
its "there." According to the familiar meaning of the word, "there" points to
"here" and "over there." The "here" of an "I-here" is always understood in terms
of an "over there" at hand in the sense of being toward it which de-distances, is
directional, and takes care. The existential spatiality of Dasein which determines
its "place" for it in this way is itself based upon being-in-the-world. The over
there is the determinateness of something encountered within the world. "Here"
and "over there" are possible on in a "there," that is, when there is a being which
as the being of the "there" has disclosed spatiality. This being bears in its
ownmost being the character of not being closed off. The expression "there"
means this essential disclosedness. Through disclosedness this being (Dasein) is
"there" for itself together with the here-being of the world (Being and Time 129,
emphasis Heidegger).
Although Heidegger, at this point in Being and Time, has not yet reached the formal
beginning of his discourse on being-in-the-world, we find here a preemptive summary that
implicitly posits the "fundamental ontology" of his ontic/ontological difference with regard to
subject-object relations. The ontic is. Dasein is. But the ontic only becomes the fundamentally
ontological once Dasein, in a moment, realizes those objects in nearness that define Dasein, with
the caveat that "Dasein exists, and it alone" (ibid., footnote). In that way, we could offer that
subject-defines-object-defines-subject and that object-defines-subject-defines-object
simultaneously, if Dasein transcends its own everydayness in its understanding of other beings
(i.e. objects, in non-Heideggerean usage) beyond being merely objectively present-at-hand, but
in terms of handiness, or in other words, in terms of possibility.
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The importance of the phrase "takes care" in the quotation above cannot be
underestimated. In care (Sorgen), we find one of the differences between Heideggerean
ontology and phenomenology. Care, in essence, individuates Dasein and the beings of the world
in way Husserlian intentionality does not; intentionality is the thought about something
(anything, any S about which then to proffer a predicate); care demands concern, and a
particularity more precise than intentionality as can be seen in Heidegger's differentiation
between the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand; care demands the ontic. As Hans Georg
Gadamer reads the difference between Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerean
fundamental ontology, Heidegger argues that, rather than "Husserl's eidetic phenomenology, a
"phenomenology should be ontologically based on the facticity of Dasein, existence, which
cannot be based on or derived from anything else, and not on the pure cogito as the essential
constitution of typical universality -- a bold idea, but difficult to carry through" (Truth and
Method 245).
This, in fact, may be the greatest difficulty in all of Heidegger: this seeming
contradiction of the particularity demonstrated in the difference between the ready-to-hand and
the present-at-hand205 and ecstatic temporality, as demonstrated in this selection from The
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic:
Temporalization is the free oscillation of the whole of primordial temporality;
time reaches and contracts itself...It is therefore essential, in first defining the
unity of temporality to eliminate anything thing-like, present on hand, which is
between, as it were, having-been-ness and the future. Nor should one smuggle in
any sort of person center, an I-nucleus, but the essence of time lies in the ecstatic
205

Or being-toward-death for the individual Dasein contrasted against the impersonality of the fundamental
ontology of the Seinsfrage, for that matter.
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unitary oscillation. The unity of horizon belong to this peculiar unity of time
(208, emphasis mine).
The issue at hand must be read against Heidegger's seeming solution to the subject-object
relation. In this case, in the case of time, we find an a priori condition. The difference,
however, is thinking temporality in terms of the ecstatic unity of past, present, and future, rather
than as the river, the string, the series of moments. Heidegger presents this temporal oscillation
in somewhat simpler terms, elsewhere: "the unity's of time's three dimensions consists in the
interplay of each toward each. This interplay proves to be the true extending, playing in the very
heart of time, the fourth dimension, so to speak -- not only to speak, but in the nature of the
matter. True time is four-dimensional" (On Time and Being 13).
We must, however, turn to another direct statement on the matter of time and Being, and
read it against that which has already been presented:
Summing up, we may say: time is Dasein. Dasein is my specificity, and
this can be specificity in what is futural by running ahead to the certain yet
indeterminate past. Dasein always is in a manner of its possible temporal being.
Dasein is time, time is temporal. Dasein is not time, but temporality. The
fundamental assertion that time is temporal is therefore the most authentic
determination -- and it is not a tautology, because the being of temporality
signifies non-identical actuality206. Dasein is its past, it is its possibility in
running ahead to this past. In this running ahead, I am authentically time, I have
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If Dasein is temporality; and if temporality is ecstatic; but if we view each Derridean moment as metonymy,
which not only levels down time, but also enables a tautological equivalency; then once we establish this
equivalency, and we strip the copula of all other senses beyond equivalency, then we can work our way back to
Dasein as metonymy, the self-qua-khora, the constructed subject as synecdoche for the whole citational process,
with each synecdoche read as allegory for the whole. See footnote 85 in the previous chapter.
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time. In so far as time is in each case mine, there are many times. Time itself is
meaningless; time is temporal.
If time is understood in this way as Dasein, then it indeed becomes clear
what the traditional assertion about time means when it says that time is the
proper principium individuationis. (The Concept of Time 21, emphasis
Heidegger, emphasis mine).
Heidegger's various conceptualizations of temporality collected here should ameliorate
two lingering points. First, one of the primary, if not the core, difference between Destruktion
and deconstruction is the relation to temporality of each method. When viewed from the position
of the end of Western metaphysics that Heidegger openly championed, and Derrida only
considered on his way to building his own metaphysical system, both Destruktion and
deconstruction may be easily conflated; when viewed casually, Derrida's version of Heidegger
overwhelms. And one may justify some indistinction. Earlier, at the beginning of the discussion
of the copula in the second section of this chapter, we were presented a quotation from Margins
concerning the fallenness of the copula. Heidegger, in one respect, makes much the same point
in Introduction to Metaphysics in his "The Examination of the Word 'Being.'" With regard to the
etymology of "to be," Heidegger states that "we derive three initial and vividly definitive
meanings [of "to be"]: living, emerging, abiding. Linguistics establishes them. Linguistics also
establishes that today these initial meanings have died out, that only an 'abstract' meaning, 'to be'
has survived. But here a decisive question announces itself: how are the three stems above
unified?" (76).
Derrida, in Margins, presents the same quotation from Introduction to Metaphysics, but
differently translated into English, and with an essential elision: "we derive the three initial
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concrete meanings : to live, to emerge, to linger or endure. These are established by linguistics
which also establishes that these initial meanings are extinct today, that only an 'abstract'
meaning 'to be' has been preserved..." (202, ellipsis original).
We may quibble over the flavor of the translation, for example, how Gregory Fried and
Richard Polt's translation renders the survival of the "'abstract' meaning" of "to be" with an active
verb, and how Alan Bass chooses the passive voice for the same clause. The omission, in
Derrida, of the question of "how are the three stems above unified," however, offers the most
interesting opportunity. The three stems of "to be," with which Derrida does not disagree,
indicate that which lives, emerges, and lingers. The answer, which Heidegger does not supply,
and which Derrida excludes by deleting the question, presents itself with regard to the
conceptualization of temporality.
With regard to Heidegger's question, here, then, a possible answer, which Heidegger
never precisely formulated as such, even though, as noted above in the quotation from Being and
Time, Heidegger binds is to the temporality of Dasein:
Of the three meanings of is: To live: the present. To emerge: the past. To linger: the
future.
We lose the manifold meaning of "to be" when we lose the manifold of ecstatic
temporality.
Or, we could argue the inverse, we lose manifold temporality when we lose the manifold
meaning of "to be."
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In other words, we lost the manifold of ecstatic Being when we lost the manifold of
ecstatic temporality, or vice versa 207. We cannot say which is the case; although it must be
recalled that in Being and Time, according to Heidegger, the concept of time as the sequence of
moments arose with Aristotle (17), which Heidegger later lengthens in it usage by attributing the
sequence of moments to Plato (402). First, this is the kind of question that Heidegger may assign
to the question of the history of Being, toward which he will seemingly turn. Secondly, the
manifold of ecstatic temporality has been completely forgotten, only if we have come to an
absolutely complete and irreproachable understanding of time. Even so, even if we have come to
consensus concerning the nature of temporality208, we have no way of proving or disproving
temporality without first positing what Heidegger called, alternately an "enframing," "world
view," or the "world picture209."
Heidegger presences here. We have taken an arduous and circuitous route, through
Jameson and through Derrida -- that is through the respective work of the central figures in two
dominant modes of critical theory -- only to return to "The Anaximander Fragment," and only to
recast, slightly, what Heidegger names as the "riddle of Being." In that essay, Heidegger offers
the following:
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This, of course, does a tremendous violence to linguistic specificity, and demands a kind of universality or, at
least, a pan-Europeanism stemming from the Greek. Heidegger's German, for example, yet frequently requires the
present form of "to be" as an auxiliary to form the Perfekt tense, or can indicate the future by using the present tense.
English, as well, retains this feature of expressing the past with the present tense of "to be," but often in an
intentionally archaic form. "He is risen," as written and spoken by Christians at Easter, is one such example, which,
it seems, indicates a past event that continues into the present, which is not entirely dissimilar to interpreting the
logos that opens the Book of John as the Word that continues to sound, which itself is not entirely dissimilar from
the logos as the declaration Christ's redemption throughout all time, according to Augustine in Book 7, Chapter 32
of The City of God (238-39), and both stand as contrary to how we understand the temporal limitations of the aural.
Compare this to Derrida's previously noted insistence from Voice and Phenomena that we cannot talk to ourselves in
full presence. In comparison, the temporality upon which Derrida depends becomes extraordinarily clear, again.
208
We certainly haven't, have we? Is our consensus that which dismissed temporality as a topic for thought in the
movement from High Modernism to postmodernism, or is that movement simply a function of time itself, and so
creates consensus?
209
Specifically, enframing from "The Question Concerning Technology," world view as found throughout
Heidegger's work as Weltanschauung, and world picture as specifically formulated in "The Age of the World
Picture."
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The on210: says "being" in the sense of to be a being; at the same time it names a being
which is. In the duality of the participial significance of the on the distinction between "to be"
and a being lies concealed. What is here set forth, which at first may be taken for grammatical
hair-splitting, is in truth the riddle of Being (Early Greek Thinking 32-33.) Within this
connection, we find Heidegger's linkage between the copula and Being expressed distinctly. The
alteration herein is only an expansion of the riddle of Being as a demonstration of how we have
ceased to ask the question of Being. Without Dasein, we lose ecstatic temporality, and we lose
Being. This connection between the copula and Being becomes utterly irrelevant for Dasein,
ecstatic temporality, and Being are elided. We are left, as we have seen, only with the copula,
either as simple processional equivalency or as the Wittgensteinian duality of equivalency and
copula as read under the strictures of logical positivism, or a Wittgenstein notes, the dual
functions are a meaningless coincidence. Once the copula has been shorn of its ecstatic
temporality, once Dasein has been removed from consideration, time then becomes
conceptualized in a form that matches that of equivalency. This cannot be stressed strongly
enough.
While we have demonstrated that Heidegger discussed each of these factors throughout
his corpus, he did not state them in this combination. He could not. Heidegger foresaw death,
but Heidegger was not Kalchas. It was only after the unfolding (or unconcealment) of the work
of Jameson and Derrida that we could begin to expand the riddle of Being by the careful notation
and comparison of the elisions of concepts in Heidegger's work by Jameson and Derrida in their
respective works. Those elisions most relevant here are, again, Dasein, ecstatic temporality,
210

Heidegger defines on [omicron nu] in the following manner in the essay, "In Plato and Aristotle we encounter the
words on and onta as conceptual terms. The later terms "ontic" and "ontological" are formed from them. However,
on and onta, considered linguistically, are presumably somewhat truncated forms of the original words eon and
eonta...the epsilon in eon and eonta is the epsilon in the root is [iota sigma] of istin, est, esse, and 'is'" Early Greek
Thinking 32).
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Being, and is as a temporal manifold. We must continue with temporality in the next section of
this chapter, but there is one more elision to come in the next chapter, which also stands as one
of the more problematic features in Heidegger's philosophy: metaphor.

D. The Problem of One Temporality for All Time
As noted in the first chapter herein, Jameson, in Valences of the Dialectic, argues that
"human time in late capitalism has undergone a kind of structural mutation" (494). Rather than
rendering the alteration in "human time" as a "structural mutation," we could instead portray the
issue not as a "structural mutation," but as a de-emphasis, a forgetting of time. The issue occurs
not as a "structural mutation," but as a de-emphasis, the forgetting of time consubstantial with
the forgetting of Being. Heidegger, in "The Age of the World Picture," writes:
The fundamental event of modernity is the conquest of the world as picture.
From now on the word "picture" means: the collective image representing
production. Within this, man fights for the position in which he can be that being
who gives to every being the measure and draws up the guidelines. Because this
position secures, organizes, and articulates itself as world view, the decisive
unfolding of the modern relationship to beings becomes a confrontation of world
views; not, indeed, any old set of world views, but only those which have already
taken hold of man's most fundamental stance with the utmost decisiveness. For
the sake of this battle of world views, and according to its meaning, humanity sets
in motion, with respect to everything, the unlimited process of calculation,
planning, and breeding (Off the Beaten Track 71, emphasis mine).
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This process of "calculation, planning, and breeding" extends "to everything" to far
greater an extant than Heidegger imagined. In Being and Time, and elsewhere, Heidegger
expressly states that "Temporality 'is' not a being at all (314, quotation marks and emphasis
Heidegger). Technicization, then, is the extension of this calculation of beings to temporality;
the treatment of temporality as another being to be calculated. In that way, we can draw a map
of time, as described with regard to Jameson in the first chapter herein. Of extraordinary
importance to this calculation is measurement; either the map of time or the Derridean knotted
string, let alone clock time, supplies the means to denote, calculate, order, and measure. In doing
so, human time has not undergone a structural mutation as Jameson insists, but human time, in as
much as human time is similar to the temporality of Dasein, has been forgotten or worse. We
have world time, clock time, public time, and objective (scientific) time, as well as the basic unit
of the day as Heidegger names them throughout Being and Time, within a discourse that also
includes specifications such spannedness and datability. Without summarizing the whole of the
complexity of temporality presented in Being and Time, we will rely on Heidegger's words: "the
throwness of Dasein is the reason 'there is' public time" (392), to which we add the caveat public
time relates to all other those other temporalities named above, while Dasein intends ecstatic
temporality. Or, rather than having been forgotten, ecstatic temporality has been erased,
supplanted by a scientific time, which itself is relative to the earth, and quickly falls into a
confusion approaching sublimity once we consider the effects of gravity on time on earth with
regard to elevation, let alone attempt to think time in the vastness of outer space. Thus the
atomic clock, which measures time vis-a-vis radioactive decay as a means to de-planetize time,
takes temporality toward an extreme of dehumanization; the measurement (and thus
conceptualization) of time that cannot be understood without highly specialized technological
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apparatus 211. In "The Question Concerning Technology," an almost oddly optimistic Heidegger
expounds the possible benefits of technology only if we do not view technology instrumentally,
for that instrumental view carries with it the will to master technology, thus in the pursuit of
mastery, we fail to place technology within the context of the Seinsfrage as a matter of alethia.
Heidegger uses neither Seinsfrage or alethia at this point in "The Question Concerning
Technology." This is an interpretation, within Heideggerean terminology, of his more direct
statement: "When, however, we ask how the instrumental comes to presence as a kind of
causality, then we experience this coming to presence as the destining of a revealing" (The
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays 32). This technicization of everything, as
enframing, "threatens to sweep man away into ordering as the supposed single way of
revealing...it is precisely in this extreme danger that the innermost indestructible belongingness
of man...may come to light, provided that we...pay heed to the coming presence of
technology212" (ibid.)
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Which befits Stiegler's argument in Technics and Time.
Stiegler bases much of his Technics and Time, Vol. 1 on this essay from Heidegger, essentially arguing that
Heidegger underestimates the likelihood of the inescapability of what Heidegger names the "extreme danger," and
this underestimation is why we find ourselves in our current state. A problematic feature of Stiegler's extensive
reading of Heidegger arises in the "General Introduction" of the first volume: "the Heideggerean existential analytic
inscribes temporal advance and delay within the originary horizon of existence" (16). Stiegler presents the manifold
of ecstatic temporality as a form of presentism: the "originary horizon" is neither the "advance" nor the "delay;" that
is, neither the future nor the past, which leaves only the present as the "originary horizon" rather than as the properly
Heideggerean "primordial temporality" of ecstatic temporality. While this could be read as obviously Derridean on
Stiegler's part (See the second chapter herein, and compare Stiegler's reading of Heideggerean temporality to our
reading of Derrida's reading of Husserl's temporality: "The pure, unmoving pole vanishes and in its place, Derrida
substitutes uchrony and panchrony as subservient positions in a hierarchy culminated by the Living Present."), we
could also read Stiegler's temporal structuration as closely aligned to both what we could imagine as Husserl's
Rückfrage if accompanied by what we could call a Vorlauffrage, or Heidegger's depiction of Bergson's structuration
of temporality in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic of time as a scroll (206), but with the scroll furled upon
itself. As stated by the Derridean Stiegler, in his formulation, the present takes precedent; the past and future are
inscribed upon that originary horizon. This certainly and absolutely is not the Heideggerean interplay of the ecstatic
unity of past, present, and future; this is a present which only partially yields to the future and past. It is interplay, in
Stiegler, only so much as an adult playing checkers with a small child: the outcome can never be in doubt; the adult
may only yield. While Technics and Time has much to recommend it, this fundamental error in the configuration of
ecstatic temporality places Stiegler's work under the ambit of technicized temporality, of Heraclitean temporality, of
Derridean temporality. And in doing so, Stiegler drastically problematizes his reading of Heidegger. He realizes
this; his attempt to rationalize the removal of his discussion of Heidegger from the terms of ecstatic temporality -212
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A number of problems arise, not least of which are Heidegger's turn away from Dasein to
the history of Being; the inherent structural and representational problem of is, and Heidegger's
conceptualization of the future as the time when Dasein is past. As to the first two objections,
with the first being based on the Kehre, Heidegger closes Identity and Difference with a
restatement of the role of the copula: "The little word 'is,' which speaks everywhere in our
language, and tells of Being even where It [Being] does not appear expressly, contains the whole
destiny of Being -- from the estin gar einai of Parmenides to the 'is' of Hegel's speculative
sentence, and to the dissolution of the 'is' in the positing of the Will to Power in Nietzsche" (73).
To view this citationally, would be to argue Heidegger's substitution of the history of Being for
the concern of Dasein, which is exactly how Heidegger's later work is often read. To engage in
such a substitution, however, would be to obfuscate Heidegger's insistence, written in 1938, that
"Being needs humans in order to occur essentially, and humans belong to Being so that they
might fulfill their ultimate destiny in Dasein (Contributions to Philosophy [Of the Event] 198).
Heidegger repeats and expands this idea in a later section of the same work ("The Human Being
and Dasein" 251). Heidegger repeats again the inseparability of Being and beings after the turn
in 1943 by posing the formulation as part of a conditional in "Postscript to 'What Is
Metaphysics?'": "the truth of Being entails that Being never prevails in its essence without
beings, that a being never is without Being213" (Pathmarks 233). To forget the relationship
between Dasein-as-a-being and Being, and between Being and Dasein-as-a-being would be to

his own sort of Kristevan transposition in the mixing of semiotic systems -- comes in the section "Real-Time Clocks
of the Blank 'Geschlecht,'" which is less than convincing because of Stiegler's focus on the "reality" of repetition and
the deferred future rather than on ecstatic temporality. Simply, the essence of Stiegler's argument is that Derrida
implied Heidegger was wrong about time (219-225).
213
The sentence that contains this quotation is significantly grammatically convoluted. That which is quoted is done
so directly; one could argue, however, that it has been taken out of the context of a conditional phrase. That
criticism may be mitigated when read against the similar quotation from Contributions. Additionally, this quotation
as presented befits Heidegger's de-emphasis of the subject-object relation with regard to both ontic-ontological
difference and facticity.
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think Heidegger's work outside of ecstatic temporality, which would also be to think is as the
pure present.
To continue with the second objection and incorporate the third, for the sake of the
argument, we will work, much like Heidegger does in explaining the temporal ecstasies in Being
in Time; we begin with the common understanding: "Temporality temporalizes, and it
temporalizes possible ways of itself...we call the phenomena of future, having-been, and present
the ecstasies of temporality" (314). From there, Heidegger turns toward the centrality of the
future within the ecstasies with regard to the "futurally having been," authenticity, being-towarddeath, care, and the historicity of Dasein (314-18). Before he presents the dense summation that
will be expanded in the proceeding chapters, Heidegger begins, as we have seen, with the simple
concepts of past, present, and future. It is this simplicity that enables us to consider,
provisionally, emergence as the past, living as the present, and lingering as indicating the future,
despite Heidegger's emphasis on the future as the end of lingering. In accepting the three
temporal ecstasies as individuated here, we find ourselves between ecstatic temporality, which
temporalizes the future, past, and present, and the vulgar understanding of time, conceptualized
predominantly as a series of now points that proceed from the past toward the future.
Only in this conceptualization of temporality between the ecstatic and vulgar can we
posit a few points on the copula. To move toward the ecstatic would be to overwhelm the copula
with the future and death, as Heidegger clearly does as he reads ecstatic temporality: "the future
has priority in the ecstatic unity of primordial and authentic temporality" (ibid.); to move toward
the vulgar conceputualization of time would overwhelm the copula with the present, taken to one
of its furthest points by Derrida with the infinite deferral of the future and the arbitrary past.
That Heidegger could not make such a claim for the temporality of the copula without
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problematizing much of his work seems obvious; care, authenticity, being-toward-death, beingwith, responsibility and the Augenblick all arise in relation to the invariability of the death of
Dasein in the future, which projects time from the future toward the past.
Derrida, as we have already seen in this chapter, attempts to remove even the present
from the copula in that the copula is only an equivalency that indicates absence in the form S is
not S. And, to extend this problem to demonstrate the elision of the future from the ecstasies of
time, Gadamer writes of the horizon with regard to his hermeneutics, and defines the horizon,
thusly: "the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. There is no more an
isolated horizon of the present in itself that there are historical horizons which have to be
acquired. Rather, understanding is always the fusion of these horizons supposedly existing by
themselves" (Truth and Method 305, emphasis original). Whereas Heidegger cannot synthesize
his emphasis on the future with is as the manifold of ecstatic temporality, and whereas Derrida
cannot admit even the present in the verb, Gadamer removes the future from consideration. The
phrase the "fusion of horizons" cannot furnish a near-synonym for the phrase "manifold of
temporal ecstasies" for, while Gadamer's phrase contains the interplay of ecstasies, it also omits
the ecstasy of the future.
Here, though, with death, absolute indeterminability, and the non-presence of the future
held at bay, we can venture to follow what Heidegger has written: Dasein is time; time is the
interplay of the three temporal ecstasies; is formerly contained all three temporal ecstasies, and
in that, the copula joins and separates in the past, present, and future. To think of this jointure as
a synchronic statement of a diachronic process, as demonstrated in both the work of Jameson and
Derrida, is already, from the initial outset of the question, to have determined the fundamental
structure of time and to have answered, in advance, a number of questions. To fall back to
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synchrony/diachrony or dia-synchrony already elides ecstatic temporality, and creates a
transcendental condition with regard to temporality. While we need not establish the structure of
temporality, we find ourselves at a loss if we attempt to understand literature that predicates itself
on a temporality beyond that which can be described in the terms of synchrony and diachrony,
which, whether in the form promulgated by Jameson or Derrida, relies on the overarching figure
of allegory; specificity yields generality, species relates to genus.
In effect, to approach a text with an underlying conceptualization of temporality is to
approach a text with an unrecognized ideology. And while much useful criticism has sprung
from ideological critique, any criticism that attempts immanent critique begins at least one step
removed when it ignores the underlying conceptualization of temporality of the text in question.
Whether in examples from Jameson or Derrida, we find that we must first come to decisions
about the nature of temporality, which have profound effects on Being, and beings, and the
human, before we can adopt either a Jamesonian or Derridean position. We find ourselves,
almost counterintuitively -- given the last half a century of critical theory -- at the point where we
can argue that too many assumptions were made, too many conditions were assumed as givens,
that even the most seeming radical criticisms -- whether Jameson's former utopian flights or
Derrida's totalization and universalization of the nothingness of absence -- can only occur after
we have made an absolutely quotidian set of assumptions concerning temporality. In other
words, we do not need to prove Heidegger correct, nor do we need to prove Jameson or Derrida
wrong, nor do we need to set forth the absolute, unassailable delineation of time. All we need to
do is to be able to ask the question of time; all we need to ask the question is doubt. If, however,
we take our clues from the relationships between the copula as equivalency and temporality, that
question may well no longer be possible. The full technicization of temporality functions via the
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reduction of the copula to an equivalency. The structural mutation Jameson posits concerning
human time originates in the diachronic mutation of the copula214. We may have forgotten, or
completely lost, the cognitive ability to consider time in any other terms 215.
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Merely as an aside that could be expanded elsewhere, consider only briefly the crusade for the extirpation of the
passive voice in English, a construction ubiquitous in serious scientific writing, philosophy, and a number of
European languages (me gusta or es gefällt mir or mi piace). While we may offer arguments concerning the manner
in which the passive voice hides agency and/or responsibility, or how the Associated Press style -- the quasi-official
language of politics, commerce, and entertainment -- resists the passive construction, we also find that the loss of the
passive further diminishes the temporality of the copula, and with it, the being of beings. Take these two sentences,
which convey the same information: "The book was written by Heidegger in 1927" and "Heidegger wrote the book
in 1927." The former sentence, while possibly causing a stern rebuke from advocates of the extirpation of the
passive construction, also affords a more complex sense of temporality. The latter sentence, even though indicating
a past event, emphasizes the present in that we understand, before all other temporal considerations, that we are
discussing the book at this moment. The former sentence also indicates our present discussion, but emphasizes the
past, via the book, at the time of composition, which is to say, a past that continued to linger into the future that is
now our present. Many have worked on this question, but for us here, we can glimpse the simplification of
temporality into the sequence of moments concurrent with the advocacy for the dominance of the active
construction. To put it provisionally in Heideggerean terms: the active voice is one path for the technicization of
temporality. The active voice brings near that which was far, with the result, to recontextualize a few words from
Heidegger in "The Thing," "everything gets lumped together in uniform distanceless" (Poetry, Language, Thought
(164).
215
Compare this loss of cognitive ability to the distinction between nostalgia and nostalghia briefly posited
above in footnote 175. The Jamesonian nostalgia film, then, could be read in a different context. For Jameson, in
schizophrenic postmodernism, the "signifying chain" has been broken, which results in "pure material signifiers...a
series of pure and unrelated presents in time" (Postmodernism 27). Should we quote and recontextualize Heidegger
again? "Everything gets lumped together in uniform distanceless" (Poetry, Language, Thought (164). While we
could say much in the comparison of this idea of "distanceless" "pure and unrelated presents" to Jameson's more
recent explorations of affect theory, what we have, in Heideggerean terms, is the pure temporality of the they, a pure
and absolute public time. If, according to Jameson, before schizoid postmodernism, there was a "signifying chain" - that is, a vulgar diachronic movement of a vulgar sequence of nows -- then could we begin to argue that the
schizophrenic temporality of postmodernism arises out of time conceived as synchrony and diachrony, the
preconditions for an Exploding Static Inevitable, rather? (In footnote 4 herein, we posited that the temporality of
utopia is the temporality of a Platonic form: unchanging. In the temporality of all being always available for play,
we, from another direction, sense the utopian impulse in postmodernism. The temporality of utopia has been shorn
from utopia. This is the utopian "pleasure" of Derrida's endless play as cited above from The Post Card.) Certainly,
Jameson emphasizes the loss of diachrony here as much as Jean Baudrillard does when he coined "circulation" in
Simulation and Simulacra. What we should note above all else, however, is that Dasein (or the subject, ego, self,
individual, or any other debatable synonym that often carries with it the history of an entire discourse) does not
appear in Jameson's equation, just as it does not appear in Derridean citationality. If we can argue that the
schizophrenic temporality of postmodernism arises out of the structuralist temporality formulated within High
Modernism, cannot we then argue that synchronic/diachronic temporality arises with and from the complete loss of
Dasein, or, rather, the absolute inability or unwillingness to remember or ponder ecstatic temporality? By viewing
Jameson's arguments on the temporality of the nostalgia film within a Heideggerean context, we can see how that
discourse is two steps removed from Dasein, and how Dasein is no longer even a consideration. (See the first
section of the previous chapter herein for a discussion of das Man vis-à-vis Jameson.)
Take, for example, Jameson's reading of Warhol's Diamond Dust Shoes that foregrounds the whole of
Postmodernism: Jameson compares Warhol's painting to Heidegger's reading of Vincent Van Gogh's various
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paintings of peasant shoes in "The Origin of the Work of Art." For Jameson, unsurprisingly, Van Gogh is
undeniably a moment of High Modernist utopianism as an "act of compensation" (7). And, when Heidegger appears
in Jameson's text, Jameson homes in on Heidegger's reading of Van Gogh's painting as the equipment for a world
and "the unconcealment of its being" (qtd. in Postmodernism 8; Poetry, Language, Thought 35). From there,
however, Jameson turns in this direction: "Heidegger's account needs to be completed by insistence on the renewed
materiality of the work, on the transformation of one form of materiality -- on the earth itself and its paths and
physical objects -- into that other materiality of oil paint" (8). Although we will return to Heidegger's "The Origin of
the Work of Art," briefly here we must remark on Jameson's apparent disingenuity. To follow Jameson's commands
would be to completely elide the distinction between earth and world upon which Heidegger bases the essay; as
Heidegger writes much later in the essay, "we must aim at the thing's belonging to the earth. The nature of the earth,
in its free and unhurried bearing and self-closure, reveals itself, however, only in the earth's jutting into a world, in
the opposition of the two" (67, emphasis mine). To follow Jameson, as a Marxian, would be to read Heidegger in
purely ontic form, which, in turn, would completely elide not only world, but also Heidegger's ontic/ontological
difference of fundamental ontology, and, in turn, that would elide any consideration of Dasein, the Being of beings,
and Being. With this, we could continue to argue that cultural criticism such as Jameson's, by eliding any possibility
beyond the ontic, functions in complicity with the very same social phenomena it seeks to critique. As does
deconstruction.
If we follow Jameson's casual suggestions here through to their logical ends, we would find ourselves with
a Heidegger radically altered into the form of a pure materialist. (Again, the ghost of Marcuse.) Alternately, if we
read Warhol's painting under Heidegger's rubric, summarized succinctly in Introduction to Metaphysics as "art is the
opening up of the Being of beings" (146), we then find not the celebration of flatness, surface, and play, but a much
more recognizable High Modernist mourning of the loss of lingering temporality – tradition -- indicated by a lack of
depth: the world that presents itself yields the sorrow of the indifference of pure fungibility, with the relation to
earth intact, but further concealed and forgotten. We could draw a parallel argument Warhol's iconography, itself
stripped of religious context imbued with a kind of transcendental temporality, and then replaced by the diachronic
procession of metonymic and synchronic moments of celebrity. We glimpse again the distinction between nostalgia
and nostalghia, but we can only begin to consider nostalghia if we consider Dasein. We are in the double bind of
the elision of Dasein that exists between Formalism and its unraveling in deconstruction or cultural criticism.
Here, we offer a further suggestion, as well: the more recent Jameson of affect theory has realized that the
"series of pure and unrelated presents" is pure public time, with "public" being a Heideggerean adjective that could
be reconceived as the Marxian "collective," with collectivity understood as the necessary prerequisite for utopia, all
of which indicates a different direction toward the completion of the High Modernist utopian project with the nasty,
troubling, disruptive force of the self removed. In this manner, as well, we can begin to be able to articulate the
ways in which High Modernism and postmodernism, despite Jameson's once strenuous protestations to the contrary,
share a utopian thrust, but simply differently configured.
Again briefly, but from a different direction: what is Pound's vorticism of The Cantos? A series of
synchronic juxtapositions culled from a diachronic process, a series of knots that each tie together in a moment
various diachronic strings? If so, they can cohere exactly as dia-synchrony coheres or does not. We do not have the
time to do so now, but what if we were to read The Cantos as a proto-dia-synchronic text against Charles Olson's
thoughts on The Cantos, Pound, and objectism? In The Cantos, Pound, as Olson concludes in the collection of
"Mayan Letters," creates "a space-field where, by inversion, though the material is all time material, he has driven
through it so sharply with the beak of his ego, that, he has turned time into what we must now have, space & its live
air" (Selected Writings 82). (A utopian space? A new realization of the blank sheet of the khora upon which we
can write whatever desire?) Olson presents his solution for this beak of the ego in his manifesto, "Projective Verse"
as objectism, rather than Poundian objectivism. For Olson, objectism is the "getting rid of the lyrical interference of
the individual as ego, of the 'subject' and his soul, that peculiar presumption by which western man has interposed
himself between what he is as a creature of nature...and those other creations of nature which we may, with no
derogation, call objects" (idem 24). In these short selections from Olson, we find what Heidegger calls Bestand, the
standing reserve of "The Question Concerning Technology," preferred over the Gegenstand of "What Is a Thing?";
we find space clearly dominant over time; and, if we view The Cantos as a series of dia-synchronic knots, we find a
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very different way to contextualize Derrida's thought in a tradition of spatialization, which is diametrically opposed,
by Olson at least, to the concern of temporality. To this particular vortex, we should add Charles Altieri's Enlarging
the Temple, a work, written nearer to the brief period Jameson identifies as Late Modernism, but before the zenith of
deconstruction and Jamesonian cultural criticism. One of the main themes of Altieri's work is the change in the
attitude toward -- more than conceptualization of -- time between High Modernism and postmodernism and, in
some ways, its relation to Augustinian temporality and relation to Altieri's preferred terms for the individual, "ego"
and "self."
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Epilogue: A Simple Extended Metaphor for the Interplay of Synchrony, Diachrony,
and Ecstatic Temporality

Our subject is time. To begin, we require an extended quotation from Heidegger's
Introduction to Metaphysics, with its own analogical metaphor, that will serve as a guide 216:
A painting by Van Gogh: a pair of study peasant shoes, nothing else. The
picture really represents nothing. Yet you are alone at once with what is there, as
if you yourself were heading homeward from the field on a late autumn evening,

216

This text was written in 1935. Heidegger extends this discussion of the vapor of Being, with regard to
Nietzsche, for a number of pages, essentially concluding with "our question, whether Being is to remain a mere
vapor for us or whether it is to become the fate of the West" (53). What follows closely after this introduction of
Being as vapor (40) offers a continuously difficult and controversial assessment by Heidegger of the situation of the
German people with
Russia on one side and America on the other. Russia and America, seen metaphysically, are both
the same: the same hopeless frenzy of unchained technology and of the rootless organization of
the average man...
We lie in the pincers. Our people, as standing in the center, suffers the most intense
pressure -- our people, the people richest in neighbors and hence the most endangered people and
for all that, the metaphysical people. We are sure of this vocation; but this people will gain a fate
from its vocation only when it creates in itself a resonance, a possibility of resonance for this
vocation, and grasps its tradition creatively. All this implies that this people, as a historical
people, must transpose itself -- and with it the history of the West -- from the center of their future
happening into the originary realm of the powers of Being. Precisely if the great decision
regarding Europe is not to go down the path of annihilation -- precisely then can this decision
come about only through the development of new, historically spiritual forces from the center
(Introduction to Metaphysics 40-41, emphasis original).
With regard to Heidegger's "resonance," we repeat, this time not ironically, caveat auditor! This use of
Being as the justification for voluntarism in the formulation of the Great Stupidity does not automatically disqualify
Being from consideration; there is no indication that Heidegger wrote the entirety of his corpus to this point simply
to be able to promote the greatness of the German people and their position at the center at this single moment in
1935, which is not, as well, to forgive or diminish the overwhelming and profound stupidity of the Great Stupidity.
What we will follow here is Being as thought rather than as applied in this one extraordinarily unfortunate and
idiotic case. As for the technicization of Russia and America and "the rootless organization of the average man,"
those assessments are far more difficult to refute, and in many ways, describe the current state of postmodernity as
the virtual. The possibility of the disembodied consciousness -- the uploaded mind existing essentially as software - defines precisely our furthest popular imagining thus far of a technicization, organization, and absolute
rootlessness that surpasses even the body: a perfect atemporal, nondescript, nonspecific spatialization, a second
khora.
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tired, with your hoe, as the last potato fires smolder out. What is in Being here?
The canvas? The brushstrokes? The patches of color217?
In everything we have mentioned, what is the Being of beings? Really,
how is it that we can run around in the world and stand around with our stupid
pretensions and our so-called cleverness?
Everything we have mentioned is, after all, and nevertheless -- if we want
to lay hold of Being it is always as if we were reaching into a void. The Being
that we are asking about is almost like Nothing, and yet we are always trying to
arm and guard ourselves against the presumption of saying that all beings are not.
But Being remains undiscoverable, almost like Nothing, or in the end
entirely so218. The word "Being" is then finally just an empty word. It means
nothing actual, tangible, real. Its meaning is an unreal vapor. So in the end
Nietzsche is entirely right when he calls the "highest concepts" such as Being "the
final wisp of evaporating reality" (Twilight of the Idols VIII, 78). Who would
want to chase after such a vapor, the terms for which is just the name for a huge
error! "In fact, nothing up to now has been more naively persuasive than the error
of Being (VIII, 80) (Introduction to Metaphysics 37-38, emphasis original,
citations for Nietzsche by Heidegger).
217

Compare this to Jameson's insistence in Postmodernism, noted in footnote 214 above, that, concerning
Heidegger's reading of Van Gogh in "The Origin of the Work of Art" that Heidegger should further emphasize the
material aspects of the painting itself.
218
This last clause should be another example to problematize Derrida and de Man's reading of Heidegger as a
thinker of pure parousia. Heidegger's distinction and complication of Nothing appears a few pages later: "Nothing,
which, as something thought and said, 'is' also something," from which Heidegger then draws the unsurpassable
"highest generality" of Being (42-43). This, on the other hand, would seem to vindicate Derrida and de Man;
according to Heidegger, nothing is something, no-thing falls outside of Being. Even with that question left open, we
also must realize that Derrida's absence, "as something thought and said, 'is' also something." In this sense,
Heidegger is no more or less a thinker of pure parousia than Derrida is.
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We must seriously consider that Being is vapor. We accept this metaphor with the
understanding that to say that "Being is vapor" is also to say that "Being is not vapor." We work
here only with juxtaposition, at the point of a synthesis that cannot be completed without
producing metonymy. We work only with an analogy that denies its own completion.
In the earlier chapters, through an examination of the work of Derrida and Jameson,
respectively, we have seen a simplified linear concept of temporality has severe limits. A most
problematic limit appears for such criticism when one simply questions linear temporality.
Citationality insists upon linearity to exist as a concept, even if it occurs as a sequence of diasynchronic knots; the dialectic of historical materialism, despite Jameson's later abeyances,
requires linearity. These are riparian concepts of temporality. In contrast to these critical
approaches under the river of time, Ricoeur offer methodologies that function from a premise of
oceanic time; the course defines direction, and thus, creates linearity; the linear connection
between points within time is only relative, in that any given example of a straight line exists
bounded by the formlessness of eternity, which also presents a number of different challenges
involving the concept of induction, or rather, plotting and emplotment. Ricoeur, in his own
discussion of Kant's Second Analogy from The Critique of Pure Reason, phrases it this way in
Time and Narrative, Vol. 3: "the act of drawing a line certainly does not constitute the intuition
of time but does cooperate in its intuition" (55). The narrative line reinforces distention, the line
that plots the course of the multiple times held together, in an orderly fashion, recognizable to the
human.
Here, a different approach will be presented, drawn from a different conceptualization of
temporality. First, however, the most essential caveat to this undertaking -- a repetition of
Augustine intellectual self-criticism: "I must admit, I do not know what time is." Contrary to
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beginning with a dominant concept of time (like Derrida, or Jameson, or Bloom, or Kristeva, or
Riffaterre, or Ricouer, or Žižek), the approach herein requires the simultaneous overlay of a
number of coextensive, but individual, delineative categorical approaches. Regarding
temporality and events (textual or otherwise), this extended metaphor holds neither to riparian
nor oceanic temporality, but turns toward a third term.
And to define that third term requires an extension of the metaphor of temporality as
water to emphasize its totality, and simultaneously, the inelidable differences. The metaphor,
ironically, intends to attempt to solidify the relations between aqueous concepts, not the concepts
themselves.
Well-known and well-defined by the natural sciences, the hydrologic cycle consists of
numerous phenomena. Here, however, given the established categories of riparian and oceanic
time, only a third term will be proposed: nebulous temporality. In terms oversimplified enough
to anger a precise hydrogeologist, the hydrological cycle grants us an approach to conceiving the
approaches of the conceptualization of temporality outside of the binary of riparian and oceanic
time. Simply, the point at which we begin does not matter, and, in fact, we cannot name a
beginning, except as we choose to name it. Due to the emphasis on riparian temporality in
Derrida and Jameson, however, we begin with the river that flows, the myriad branches moving
with gravity all in the same direction, irreversibly, unceasingly toward the ocean. This is the
time of citationality, of the dialectic (Hegelian or Marxist), of Plato (according to Heidegger),
and of Heraclitus. The metaphor of the hydrologic cycle clarifies a question with regard to
riparian time: it does end, in that it reaches the ocean, a body of water so vast that it defies
conscious totalization; and when confronted with vastness, like Ricoeur, the only method
seemingly available to approach understanding is to plot a course. The water in the ocean does
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not remain there, however; the water evaporates into the atmosphere, condenses into clouds, and
in one moment, a single moment, precipitates back to earth, providing the runoff that creates the
tributaries of rivers that feed the ocean that contains the water to be evaporated, condensed, and
precipitated, and so on, with end, and without beginning.
One danger at this point is to turn toward cyclical time, which, is precisely the
implication of viewing the water cycle as a totality. To draw cyclical time from this metaphor of
the hydrological cycle would be to yield to the linearity of riparian time, but with an added
hierarchy of repeated states comprising a series of now-points. Likewise, to draw cyclical time
from this metaphor of the hydrological cycle also would be to yield to the vast, ultimately
undifferentiatable formlessness in a hierarchy that creates a vastness vaster than the oceanic
vastness. Either and both of which render the question of allusion utterly pointless 219. Another
danger would be to conflate this tripartite metaphor with the temporal conjugates of past, present,
and future. This metaphor, again, concerns the conceptualizations of time, but not time itself.
The central point, though, are the moments of evaporation, condensation, and
precipitation. The first two afford a dramatic change in the state of matter: from liquid to gas (or
sublimaton, from solid to gas, which is possible with ice), and from a gas to a liquid (or
deposition from a gas to a solid in hoarfrost, especially). As dramatic as these changes in the
state of matter are220, on the scale of Dasein, they exist invisibly, imperceptibly (which is not to
deny the existence of these phenomena or any metaphorically corresponding conceptualizations
of temporality.
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Or emplotment for that matter. Time, at this scale, approaches an inhuman sublime, which, in some ways, is
exactly Derrida's point.
220
To return to the earlier discussion in Chapter 4, Section B of Specters of Marx: "all that is solid melts into air" as
Marx wrote in the Communist Manifesto; "O, that this too too solid flesh would melt" repines Hamlet in Act I, scene
ii.
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As a metaphor for conceptualizations of temporality, however, the moment between
condensation and precipitation aligns with the Heideggerean concept of Augenblick, as the
singular moment of realization and the fall within the ground/abyss of Being, from the
ground/abyss of Being, to the ground/abyss of Being. And this singular moment gives the point
at which the individuated raindrop forms. If the focus here lies on the raindrop itself, then the
movement has already fallen back into the three temporal ecstasies that Dasein must consider
simultaneously, here metaphorically represented as evaporation, condensation, and
precipitation221. If the focus here lies on Augenblick, then we ignore the three temporal ecstasies.
We can only consider this as the nebulous conceptualization of time. As in Heidegger, although
he emphasizes ecstatic temporality, he includes synchrony and diachrony as well.
We can only consider these three conceptualizations of temporality metaphors or else risk
falling into the pre-Socratic ontic incongruity. And, within this metaphor, we emphasize the
interplay, since the three aspects of the hydrological cycle do not occur in a specific order; the
vapor is omnipresent. From the critical theorists we have examined, we have the rivers and the
ocean, but we have no rain. And when it does not rain, we have drought, and a prolonged
drought causes desertification.
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It is simple enough to think of the formation of a raindrop within a cloud within Heideggerean terms. Polemos as
the formation against the over-against of the vaporous clod; eris as fall; dike, the oblivion with which a being pays
for its Being as the impact with the ground, which, as well, for the raindrop, is the abyss and death.

226

WORKS CITED

227

Adorno, Theodor W. Negative Dialectics. 1973. Trans. E. B. Ashton. New York: Continuum,
2007. Print.
Altieri, Charles. Enlarging the Temple: New Directions in American Poetry During the 1960s.
Lewisburg: Bucknell UP, 1979. Print.
Aristotle. Metaphysics. Trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred. 1998. New York: Penguin, 2004. Print.
---. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Terrence Irwin. 2 nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999. Print.
Augustine. Confessions. Trans. Henry Chadwick. New York: Oxford UP, 1992. Print.
---. City of God.Trans. Henry Bettenson. 1972. New York: Penguin, 2003. Print.
Badiou, Alain. "The Desire for Philosophy and the Contemporary World." The Symptom.
Lacan.com, 2006. Web. 15 May 2013.
The Barbarian Invasions. Dir. Denys Arcand. 2003. Miramax, 2004. DVD.
Barthes, Roland. S/Z. Trans. Richard Miller. New York: Farrar, 1974. Print.
Baudrillard, Jean. America. Trans. Chris Turner. 1988. New York: Verso, 2010. Print.
---. The Illusion of the End. Trans. Chris Turner. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1994. Print.
---. Simulacra and Simulation. Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994.
Print.
Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations: Essays and Reflections. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry
Zohn. New York: Schocken, 1968. Print.
Bergson, Henri. Matter and Memory. Trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. New
York: Macmillan, 1913. Print.
Blanchot, Maurice. The Instant of My Death. Trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford: Stanford
UP, 2000. Print.
---. Thomas the Obscure. Trans. Robert Lamberton. 1973. Barrytown: Station Hill, 1988.

228

Bloom, Harold. The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford UP,
1997.
Borges, Jorge Luis. A Universal History of Infamy. 1935. Trans. Norman Thomas di Giovanni.
New York: Penguin, 1975. Print.
The Bride of Frankenstein. Dir. James Whale. 1935. Universal, 1999. DVD.
Capps, Robert. "The Good Enough Revolution: When Cheap and Simple Is Just Fine."
Wired.com. Wired, 24 Aug. 2009. Web. 23 Sep. 2014.
Caputo, John D. The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion.
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1997. Print.
Days of Darkness. Dir. Denys Arcand. 2007. Alliance, 2008. DVD.
The Decline of the American Empire. Dir. Denys Arcand. 1986. Koch Lorber, 2004. DVD.
Debord, Guy. The Society of Spectacle. Detroit: Black & Red, 1983. Print.
Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans.
Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987. Print.
Derrida, Jacques. "Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy." Oxford Literary
Review 6.2 (1984): 3-37. Humanities International Complete. Web. 1 June 2012.
---. Aporias. Trans. Thomas Dutoit. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1993. Print.
---. Dissemination. Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1981. Print.
---. "Economimesis." Diacritics 11.2 (1981): 3-25. Trans. R. Klein. Rpt. in The Derrida Reader:
Writing Performances. Ed. Julian Wolfreys. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1998. 263-92.
Print.
---. Edmund Husserl's "Origin of Geometry:" An Introduction. Trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. 1978.
Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1989. Print.

229

---. "The Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority.'" Acts of Religion. Ed. Gil
Anidjar. Trans. Mary Quaintance. New York: Routledge, 2002. Print.
---. The Gift of Death (2 nd ed) and Literature in Secret. Trans. David Wills. Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 2008. Print.
---. Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992.
Print.
---. Of Grammatology. Corrected ed. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. 1976. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins UP, 1998. Print.
---. "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (Geschlect IV)." Reading Heidegger: Commemorations.
Ed. John Sallis. Trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1993. 163-218.
Print.
---. "Hostipitality." Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 5.3 (2000): 3-18. Academic
Search Premier. Web. 10 Nov. 2010.
---. "The Law of Genre." Acts of Literature. Ed. Derek Attridge. New York: Routledge, 1992.
221-52. Print.
---. Limited Inc. Ed. Gerald Graff. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1988. Print.
---. Margins of Philosophy. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982. Print.
---. Memoires for Paul de Man. Trans. Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan Culler, and Eduardo Cadava.
New York: Columbia UP, 1986. Print.
---. On the Name. Ed. Thomas Dutoit. Trans. David Wood, John P. Leavey, Jr., and Ian McLeod.
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995. Print.
---. Positions. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1981. Print.
---. The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of

230

Chicago P, 1987. Print.
---. The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy. Trans. Marian Hobson. Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 2003. Print.
---. Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume I. Eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg.
Stanford: Stanford UP, 2007. Print.
---. Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International.
Trans. Peggy Kamuf. New York: Routledge, 1994. Print.
---. Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby.
Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1989. Print.
---. Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles. Trans. Barbara Harlow. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1979. Print.
---. "At This Very Moment of This Work Here I Am." Re-Reading Levinas. Eds. Robert
Bernasconi and Simon Critchley. Trans. Ruben Berezdivin. Bloomington: Indiana UP,
1991. 11-50. Print.
---. Voice and Phenomenon: Introduction to the Problem of the Sign in Husserl's
Phenomenology. Trans. Leonard Lawlor. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 2011. Print.
---. Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978. Print.
Eliot, T. S. "East Coker." The Complete Poems and Plays: 1909-1950. New York: Harcourt,
1971. 123-29. Print.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. 1977.
New York: Vintage, 1995. Print.
---. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Trans. Anonymous. 1970.
New York: Vintage, 1994. Print.

231

---. "What Is an Author?" Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and
Interviews. Ed. Donald F. Brouchard. Trans. Donald F. Brouchard and Sherry Simon.
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1980. Print.
Fried, Gregory. Heidegger's Polemos: From Being to Politics. New Haven: Yale UP, 2000.
Print.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. 2nd ed. Trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G.
Marshall. New York: Continuum, 2004. Print.

Genette, Gerard. Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree. Trans. Channa Newman and
Claude Doubinsky. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1997.
Harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural
Change. 1980. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990. Print.
Hawking, Stephen, and Leonard Mlodinow. The Grand Design. New York: Random House,
2010. Print.
Hegel, Georg W. F. The Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. V. Miller. New York: Oxford UP,
1976. Print.
Heidegger, Martin. Basic Concepts. Trans. Gary E. Aylesworth. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1998.
Print.
---. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Revised
ed. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1988. Print.
---. Off the Beaten Track. Eds. and trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Hayes. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 2002. Print.
---. Being and Time. Ed. Dennis Schmidt. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State U of New York
P, 2010. Print.

232

---. The Concept of Time. Trans. William McNeill. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992. Print.
---. Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event). Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela VallegaNeu. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2012. Print.
---. Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy. Trans. David Farrell Krell and
Frank A. Capuzzi. 1975. New York: Harper, 1984. Print.
---. Hölderlin's Hymn: "The Ister". Trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis. Bloomington:
Indiana UP, 1996. Print.
---. Holzwege. 1952. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1963. Print.
---. Identity and Difference. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1969. Print.
---. Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale UP,
2000. Print.
---. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. Trans. Michael Hein. Bloomington: Indiana UP,
1984. Print.
---. Nietzsche, Volumes I and II. Trans. David Farrell Krell. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.
Print.
---. "'Only a God Can Save Us.'" Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker. Ed. Thomas Sheehan.
1981. New Brunswick: Transaction, 2010. 45-68. Print.
---. Parmenides. Trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana UP,
1992. Print.
---. Pathmarks. Ed. William MCNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998. Print.
---. Poetry, Language, Thought. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. 1975. New York: HarperCollins,
2001. Print.
---. The Principle of Reason. Trans. Reginald Lilly. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1991. Print.

233

---. "The Question Concerning Technology" and Other Essays. Trans. William Lovitt. New
York: Harper, 1977. Print.
---. On Time and Being. 1972. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2002. Print.
---. On the Way to Language. Trans. Peter D. Hertz. San Francisco: Harper, 1971. Print.
---. What Is Called Thinking?. Trans. J. Glenn Gray. San Francisco: Harper, 1968. Print.
---. What Is Philosophy?. Trans. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback. New Haven: Yale UP,
1958. Print.
Heisenberg, Werner. Nuclear Physics. Trans. Frank Gaynor, Amethe Smeaton, and William
Wilson. 1953. New York: Greenwood, 1969. Print.
Hobbes, Thomas. The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 1. Ed.
William Molesworth. 1839. Aalen: Scientia, 1966. Print.
Husserl, Edmund. "The Origin of Geometry." Appendix. 1939. Trans. Jacques Derrida (French).
Trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. (English). Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1989. 157-80. Print.
---. Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy. Trans. Quentin Lauer. New York: Harper,
1965. Print.
---. The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. Ed. Martin Heidegger. Trans. James S.
Churchill. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1964. Print.
Jameson, Fredric. The Antinomies of Realism. New York: Verso, 2013. Print.
---. Archaeologies of the Future. New York: Verso, 2007. Print.
---. The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998. 1998. New York:
Verso, 2009. Print.
---. "The End of Temporality." Critical Inquiry. 29.4 (2003): 695-718. Web.
---. Fables of Aggression: Wyndham Lewis , the Modernist as Fascist. 1979. New York: Verso,

234

2008. Print.
---. "First Impressions." Rev. of The Parallax View, Slavoj Žižek. London Review of Books
28.17 (2006): 7-8. Web. 19 April 2011.
---. Foreword. Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume One: Theory of Practical Ensembles. By
Jean-Paul Sartre. New York: Verso, 2004. Print.
---. Foreword. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. By Jean-François Lyotard.
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984. Print.
---. The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System. Bloomington: Indiana
UP, 1992. Print.
---. The Ideologies of Theory, Volumes 1 and 2. 1988. New York: Verso, 2009. Print.
---. "Marxism and Dualism in Deleuze.” South Atlantic Quarterly 96.3 (1997): 393-416.
ProQuest. Web. 15 March 2012.
---. Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature. 1971. Princeton:
Princeton UP, 1974. Print.
---. The Modernist Papers. New York: Verso, 2007. Print.
---. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca: Cornell UP,
1981. Print.
---. "The Politics of Utopia." New Left Review 25.1 (2004): 35-54. Web. 16 Aug. 2013.
---. Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke UP, 1991. Print.
---. The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian
Formalism. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972. Print.
---. A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present. 2002. New York: Verso,
2009. Print.

235

---. The Seeds of Time. New York: Columbia UP, 1994.
---. Valences of the Dialectic. New York: Verso, 2009. Print.
Joyce, James. Finnegans Wake. 1939. New York: Viking, 1959. Print.
---. Ulysses. 1922. New York: Random House, 1961. Print.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Marcus Weigelt and Max Müller. New York:
Penguin, 2007. Print.
Kristeva, Julia. The Kristeva Reader. Ed. Toril Moi. New York: Columbia UP, 1986. Print.
Kurzweil, Ray. The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology. New York:
Penguin, 2005. Print.
Lewis, Wyndham, ed. Blast 1. 1914. Berkeley: Gingko, 2009. Print.
Lewis, Wyndham. Tarr. 1918. Ed. Scott W. Klein. New York: Oxford UP, 2010. Print.
---. Time and Western Man. 1927. Ed. Paul Edwards. Santa Rosa: Black Sparrow, 1993. Print.
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. Geoff
Bennington and Brain Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984. Print.
Marcuse, Hebert. Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. Boston: Beacon,
1966. Print.
---. Heideggerian Marxism. Eds. Richard Wolin and John Abromeit. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P,
2005. Print.
Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. The Communist Manifesto. Trans. Samuel Moore. New York:
International Publishers, 1948. Print.
McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Me: Lectures and Interviews. Eds. Stephanie McLuhan and
David Staines. 2003. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2005. Print.
McTaggart, J. M. E. "The Unreality of Time." Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and

236

Philosophy 17.68 (1908): 457-74. JSTOR. Web. 11 February 2010.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Ed. Bernard Williams. Trans. Josefine Nauckhoff.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. Print.
---. Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None. Eds. Adrian Del Caro and Robert. B.
Pippin. Trans. Adrian Del Caro. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. Print.
Nostalghia. Dir. Andrei Tarkovsky. 1983. Fox Lorber, 1998. DVD.
Olson, Charles. Selected Writings. Ed. Robert Creeley. New York: New Directions, 1967. Print.
Plato. Cratylus. Trans. C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998. Print.
---. Parmenides. Trans. Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996. Print.
Pound, Ezra. The Cantos of Ezra Pound. 1970. New York: New Directions, 1996. Print.
Ricoeur, Paul. Oneself as Another. Trans. Kathleen Blamey. 1992. Chicago: U of Chicago P,
1994. Print.
---. Time and Narrative, Volume 1. Trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer.
1984. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990. Print.
---. Time and Narrative, Volume 3. Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. 1988. Chicago:
U of Chicago P, 1990. Print.
Riffaterre, Michael. Fictional Truth. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1990. Print.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Trans.
Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. Print.
---. Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume One: Theory of Practical Ensembles. 1976. Ed.
Jonathan Rée. Trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith. New York: Verso, 2004. Print.
Sokal, Alan, and Jean Bricmont. Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of
Science. New York: Picador, 1998. Print.

237

Vermeulen, Timotheus, and Robin van den Akker. "Notes on Metamodernism." Journal of
Aesthetics and Culture 2 (2010): n. pag. Web. 18 May 2012.
Steigler, Bernard. States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21 st Century. Trans. Daniel
Ross. Malden: Polity, 2015. Print.
---. Time and Technics, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus. Trans. Richard Beardsworth and George
Collins. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998. Print.
Stevens, Wallace. The Collected Poems.1954. New York: Vintage, 1990. Print.
Virilio, Paul. Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology. Trans. Mark Polizzotti. Los Angeles:
Semiotext(e), 2007. Print.
Williams, William Carlos. "Pictures from Brueghel" and Other Poems. New York: New
Directions, 1962. Print.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. 3rd ed. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe.
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1958. Print.
---. Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus. 1922. Trans. C.K. Ogden. Mineola: Dover, 1999. Print.
Woolf, Virginia. To the Lighthouse. 1927. New York: Harcourt, 1981. Print.
Žižek, Slavoj. Event: Philosophy in Transit. New York: Penguin, 2014. Amazon. Web. 12 Feb.
2014.

238

VITA
In 1974, Donald Nicholas Shultz was thrown into a world that no longer exists. He grew
up on a small farm, and attended Northern Cambria High School in Spangler, Pennsylvania. In
1992, he entered Saint Francis University, in Loretto, Pennsylvania, only to leave in 1993 and
then resume his studies in 1995 at Indiana University of Pennsylvania, in Indiana, Pennsylvania,
where he completed a Bachelor of Arts in English in 1997. He earned a Master of Fine Arts in
Creative Writing with an emphasis in Poetry from University of Pittsburgh in 2003, and accepted
a graduate teaching assistantship in the Doctoral program in Literature, Criticism, and Textual
Studies at University of Tennessee, Knoxville, in 2006. He will graduate in 2016.

